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Abstract 
In his book The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature (2006), Pierre Hadot 
details two opposing paradigmatic attitudes to nature that have prevailed over the ages, namely, 
the Promethean and Orphic approaches, which entail, respectively, the violent unmasking of 
nature’s secrets through technology and the gentle approximation of them through aesthetic means. 
However, while this dichotomy does constitute a useful tool for understanding broad attitudes 
toward nature, it does not allow for consideration of the more nuanced, responses to nature across 
the various epochs, including the contemporary context of the looming ecological crisis. For this 
reason in what follows, Hadot’s Promethean-Orphic binary will be extended into a more 
comprehensive framework that allows for the contemplation of three additional approaches to 
nature, namely Socratic withdrawal, Aristotelian-inspired faith in teleology and the Hippocratic 
pursuit of balance with nature – which Hadot sees as either displaced by or incorporated into the 
Promethean attitude.  
 Thereafter, various historical epochs will be explored through the lens of this extended 
Hadotian framework in order to assess the manner in which the abovementioned attitudes and 
approaches to nature have been adopted and progressively rearticulated, from Archaic Greece to 
Deleuze’s control society. And it will be advanced that, while at the outset, these approaches were 
more or less equivalent in terms of their discursive influence, over time Prometheanism, and the 
rearticulated permutations of Socratic withdrawal and Aristotelian-inspired faith in teleology, have 
combined to constitute what is here referred to as the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus; a 
nexus which, as will be discussed, has progressively eclipsed the less invasive approaches of 
Hippocratic balance and Orphism, to the detriment of both nature and human relations to it. 
 The progression of such tendencies will then be examined in relation to the two 
contemporary environmental films associated with Leonardo DiCaprio, namely The 11th Hour 
(2007) and Before the Flood (2016). This will be done in order to draw into conspicuity the 
intensification of discourses surrounding the technological dominance of the environment by 
humans who have withdrawn from nature, inspired by faith in the telos of the free-market 
economy, along with and the attendant marginalization of balance-seeking and aesthetically-
oriented approaches to nature. Furthermore, it will be advanced, in concluding that such discursive 
ii 
 
patterns could account for the widespread apathy and indifference which characterizes 
contemporary responses to the environmental crisis.  
 
 
Key words: Hadot, Prometheanism, Orphism, disciplinary power, societies of control, 
environmental documentary, DiCaprio, binaries, deep ecology    
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Introduction 
The place of humans in the world extends only so far as we have been able to carve out for ourselves 
a niche within which the ravages of nature can be mitigated or propitiated in one way or another. 
Throughout the ages this has entailed a number of attempts to bring the various anomalous 
phenomena of nature within the sphere of human control through a variety of techniques, ranging 
from mythical explanatory models to scientific definition. And the contemporary era is no 
exception, characterized as it is by growing concern over the threat posed to the continuation of 
human life on earth – along with non-human life – by climate change; the contribution of humans 
in precipitating the related global environmental crisis, notwithstanding. Within this context there 
has emerged a seemingly dazzling array of perspectives and discourses on nature, which range 
from those that imbue it with divine status, and see it as possessed of a timeless, spiritual logic – 
for example, the Gaia hypothesis, and its associated popular variants, which extend even to Earth 
worship – to those that see nature as a mere material resource to be dominated and controlled 
through technological means.  
 Moreover, the pervasiveness of such perspectives and discourses is such that, at times, 
instead of remaining mutually exclusive, they can overlap in a single rather schizophrenic position 
from which they are articulated collectively, in a way that ignores the blatant tensions and 
contradictions between them. Arguably, Leonardo DiCaprio’s two environmental films, namely 
The 11th Hour (2007) and Before the Flood (2016) are both cases in point,1 on account of how 
DiCaprio as narrator constantly repositions himself in a protean fashion through his adoption and 
presentation of different stances toward nature at different moments in the films. 
 However, although at first glance this might be construed as a reflection of the post-modern 
context in which the films are situated, where the mixing and matching of different perspectives 
and discourses take precedence over the erstwhile modernist maintenance of fidelity to a single 
metanarrative, such appraisal of the films is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, upon closer 
inspection DiCaprio’s various perspectives emerge as less the product of creative reflection on his 
part, and more the product of ideas concerning nature that have been cycling through human history 
for millennia, and which Pierre Hadot renders partially conspicuous through his The Veil of Isis: 
An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature. Secondly, unless the features and dynamics of all 
five approaches to nature are identified, the progressive preeminence of three of them in DiCaprio’s 
                                                          
1 The 11th Hour (2007) was directed by Nadia Conners and Leila Conners Petersen, and Before the Flood (2016) was 
directed by Fisher Stevens.  
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films remains difficult to detect, despite the importance of doing so because of how their combined 
approach to nature entails its reduction to a mere material resource that is disconnected from 
humans, and subordinate to a telos which humans conceive in different terms at different times. 
Accordingly, Pierre Hadot’s advancement in The Veil of Isis of various distinct approaches to 
unveiling the secrets of nature, comprises a key theoretical point of departure for this dissertation. 
 That is, in The Veil of Isis Hadot, in relation to Heraclitus’ enigmatic aphorism, “phusis 
krupteshai philei” – now broadly understood to mean that “nature loves to hide” (Hadot 2006: 1) 
– explores the changing meanings of the term at different historical junctures, from the Greco-
Roman to the Enlightenment eras.  In this regard, while Heraclitus’ statement was initially 
interpreted as referring to the elusiveness of nature, Hadot explains that “in all likelihood this 
meaning never occurred to Heraclitus” (2006: 1). This ambiguity, though, has preoccupied 
generations of scholars who have sought to unravel the meaning of these words. And accordingly, 
over time, various interpretations of this statement have led to the conceptualization of nature as 
an entity distinct from humans, the dynamics of which nevertheless remain inscrutable to humans. 
In the face of this ostensible impenetrability, Hadot advances three categories of response, largely 
determined by “relations between men and nature” and “oriented by the way the image of the 
‘secrets of nature’ was perceived” (Hadot 2006: 92).  
 The first of these approaches is Socratic withdrawal, which according to Hadot entails an 
overall repudiation of scientific investigation into the natural world. And this Socratic turn away 
from nature as an area of philosophical interest is informed by  
 
a refusal to discuss things that, on the one hand, transcend human beings, because 
they are inaccessible to their investigative powers, and, on the other hand, have no 
importance for them, since the only thing that must interest them is the conduct of 
moral and political life. (Hadot 2006: 91) 
 
For Hadot, this approach also garnered several highly influential adherents through the ages from 
Arcesilas to Seneca, and from Rousseau to Nietzsche (Hadot 2006: 91), to name just a few. But 
despite this, Hadot maintains that such acknowledgment of nature’s transcendence and an attendant 
withdrawal from the contemplation of it, has over time fallen from favor in cultural consciousness 
as an appropriate response to a vast, threatening, and unknowable nature.  
 The second approach, identified by Hadot is that of the Promethean, involving the response 
by which nature is forcibly revealed. Here Hadot relates the violent extrusion of nature’s secrets to 
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the coup of Prometheus, who through trickery wrested the secret of fire from the gods, and 
according to both Aeschylus and Plato, thereby “brought man the benefits of technology and 
civilization” – but also resulted in divinely-gifted, “Promethean man demand[ing] the right of 
domination over nature” in perpetuity (Hadot 2006: 95). To this end, through recourse to various 
“technical procedures” first manifesting in antiquity, humans have forcibly sought to discover the 
secrets of nature, be it through nascent forms of mechanics, magic or experimental method (Hadot 
2006: 101). In particular, Hadot outlines the four fundamental characteristics of the Promethean 
approach as follows: Firstly, it entails an epic “struggle between man and nature,” predicated on 
the development and advancement of technology and the scientific method. Secondly, the objective 
of these advancements is solely the benefit of humans, through the advancement of civilizations, 
the alleviation of suffering, and catering to our “taste for pleasure and luxury.” Thirdly, the 
instruments which enable the abovementioned gains are human-made, and thus reinforce the 
duality of nature and technology. And fourthly, these technologies are supported by mathematics, 
which allows one not only to produce a given result, but also to understand how such an effect 
came about, in order to repeat and improve upon the efficacy of the process (Hadot 2006: 102-
103).  
 Finally, the third approach identified by Hadot is that of the Orphic approach; named after 
Orpheus, the custodian of the theogonic poems, it also seeks to penetrate “the secrets of nature, 
[yet] not through violence but through melody” (Hadot 2006: 96). That is, the Orphic approach is 
anchored in poetic discourse and art through which it seeks to “discover the secrets of nature while 
confining itself to perception without any help of instruments,” which involves recourse to the 
“philosophical and … pictorial arts” in the belief that humans “can understand only what they can 
produce by their own art” (Hadot 2006: 155-156). In other words, the Orphic approach dictates 
that humans should seek to understand the divine secrets of nature, but only by mimicking the 
generative processes of nature through the creation of discourse and art, and that through such 
aesthetic practices we may gain small insights into “the secret of the fashioning of the world” 
(Hadot 2006: 157).  
 For Hadot, though, Socratic withdrawal is outweighed in terms of longevity and cultural 
significance by the Promethean and Orphic approaches to nature. Accordingly, The Veil of Isis is, 
in effect, a discussion of the various manifestations of the latter two, from the Classical Greek era 
to the Enlightenment. In particular, in terms of the Promethean approach, Hadot charts its 
development from Hippocrates and his exploration of nature and the body, through to Francis 
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Bacon and his suggestion that we need to wrest the secrets of nature even if it requires violence – 
something which persists in the contemporary era. In turn, in terms of the Orphic approach, Hadot 
contends that its features may be discerned in Classical Greece, most notably in the sacred religious 
rites of the mysteries of Eleusis (2006: 97), and that certain of these features extend into the art of 
the great naturalist painters and sculptors of the Renaissance, and even into the symbolism of the 
early modern period. For example, images of “Prometheus gnawed by a vulture and Icarus falling 
into the sea attest to the dangers of audacious curiosity” of the Promethean stance (Hadot 2006: 
97). To be sure, Hadot’s The Veil of Isis, on account of his selection of sources that ground the text 
in Western history and mythology, tends to be read as Westernist or Eurocentric, but the critical 
importance of his arguments is not lessened as a consequence of this. This is not least because, 
while undeniably couched within such a discursive context, his arguments serve ultimately to 
problematize Eurocentric binary reductionism through which the opposition of nature and culture 
has been instantiated; an opposition which has arguably precipitated much of the contemporary 
ecological crisis. In this regard, Hadot – drawing as he does from a wide variety of sources – 
endeavors to demonstrate that, while dualistic thinking characterizes much of what has come to be 
understood as European culture, there are also a number of other aspects of European culture 
which, in contrast, have historically sought to draw close to nature, rather than to dominate it. And 
these elements are thematized in his appraisal of the aesthetically-oriented and non-invasive Orphic 
approach, which was subsequently marginalized through the growing influence of the Promethean 
attitude.  
 Accordingly, the value of Hadot’s above three categories – Socratic, Promethean, and 
Orphic – for cultural analysis has been widely recognized, and in many ways they have become all 
the more relevant because of the increasingly urgent need for new, less destructive, approaches to 
nature, in light of the looming ecological crisis. In this regard, Hutter praises Hadot’s “strong 
concern with ecology” as well as his deep cognizance of “the absolute necessity for restraining the 
hubristic aspects of technology” by exchanging them for less aggressive alternatives, which 
encompass “poetic/aesthetic [approaches] to fathoming the mysteries of being” (2008: 3). Having 
said that, though, the range of responses detailed by Hadot, Promethean, Orphic, and to a lesser 
extent, Socratic – are somewhat constraining and run the risk of eclipsing other responses to the 
enigma of nature; responses which they house but do not allow to emerge in their own right. And 
it would be important to allow them to emerge so that we can identify them in the contemporary 
era – in reflections such as those of DiCaprio’s The 11th Hour and Before the Flood. After all, if 
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we are to think differently about nature in the future, we need first to recognize the formulaic ways 
in which we have hitherto responded to nature. 
 In this respect, against the backdrop of Hadot’s The Veil of Isis, in what follows, an 
extended Hadotian framework will be advanced involving three adjustments. To begin with, the 
continuation of Socratic withdrawal, which has by and large been marginalized by the Orphic and 
Promethean approaches in the work of Hadot, will be argued for. Moreover, the historical existence 
of two additional distinct categories, alluded to but not fully articulated in the work of Hadot, will 
be advanced. The first of these is that of Hippocratic medicine, which Hadot sees as a constituent 
of the Promethean approach, but which can also be understood as distinct from it, because while it 
comprises elements of scientific research, the objective of the Hippocratic approach is also to attain 
a state of flourishing through achieving a balance with nature. The second of these, again 
articulated by Hadot as Promethean in orientation, is that of Aristotelian philosophy, but in contrast 
to the Promethean approach of Aristotle’s scientific enquiry, it will be argued that his theory of 
teleology or telos comprises something wholly different from scientific, mathematical, or 
mechanical explorations of nature. This is because it is couched in a conviction that the ends of 
nature are governed by a divine logic that is beyond the ken of humanity, such that it is marked 
less by science and more by faith in something greater than us, which exceeds our understanding 
even as it carries us with it as it unfolds. In addition, though, fear of nature is also considered the 
catalyst for the formulation of the above stances, as it is for the three other stances outlined by 
Hadot; fear which is glossed over in The Veil of Isis partly as a result of Hadot starting his 
considerations from the 6th century BCE with Heraclitus, instead of earlier in relation to the dark 
prehistory reflected subsequently in the poems of Theognis and Homer. 
 In this regard, Chapter One begins with the Archaic Greek attempts to negotiate with an 
implacable nature, reflected through the lens of Hesiod’s Theogony, in which he stages an epic 
battle between the elemental Titans and the comparatively genteel Olympians. And this fictional 
battle will be advanced as symptomatic of a civilizational endeavor to put a human face on nature 
and, wherever possible, to domesticate it incrementally by rendering it open to propitiation. After 
this, with reference to The Odyssey, the continuation of such strivings in Homeric imagery will be 
explored, with particular attention being paid to the residual positioning of dangerous forms of mad 
nature at the margins of society. A trope which, as will be discussed, continued as a feature of later 
Classical Greek literature and indeed philosophy, where it similarly functioned as a tacit 
acknowledgment that the elemental fury of the Titans remained an insurmountable and ever present 
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aspect of nature. Correlatively, as nature in Classical Greece became increasingly understood 
through scientific means, so too did a growing ontological anxiety emerge at the realization that a 
demythologized nature – unlike Olympian deities – could not be propitiated. As will be argued, 
this anxiety led to a divergence of thought that ranged between those perspectives detailed by 
Hadot: the Socratic tendency to withdraw from nature, the Promethean ambition to reveal the 
secrets of nature through force, and the Orphic desire to draw close to such secrets throughout art. 
But in addition, the Hippocratic attempt to strike a balance with nature’s elemental forces, and the 
Aristotelian-inspired faith in its ultimate ends – even though they are construed as beyond human 
comprehension will also be advanced as distinct approaches to nature in their own right. Next, the 
manner in which these five approaches of an extended Hadotian framework continued, in varying 
degrees, in Roman thought surrounding nature, will be explored, along with how later Roman 
thought increasingly gave way to mythico-religious models of understanding both the natural world 
and the physical and mental afflictions of those therein; models which paved the way for a Christian 
appraisal of nature as evil. In this regard, the Socratic legacy evident in the Stoic pursuit of ataraxia, 
and the influence of Aristotelian-inspired faith in telos on the Stoic idea of autarchy, to the point 
where it supplanted science with belief, will be considered. After this, and with a view to exploring 
developments in these conceptions, and attendant shifts in the treatment of nature (and its effects 
on humans) after the fall of the Roman Empire, the related mythico-religious interpretations 
adopted by Medieval thinkers will be examined. In terms of this, emphasis will fall on how these 
both bore the vestiges of Greco-Roman thought, yet also differed from their discursive 
predecessors. And in particular it will be argued that the new images may be seen as the foundations 
upon which the binaries of the natural and human – and correspondingly, the earthly and heavenly 
– were discursively concretized, before being disseminated through the spread of Christianity. 
Finally, it will be argued that in the Renaissance, the advances which brought about the growth of 
cities, entailed the continued valorization of the human, and by extension the rational, against the 
backdrop of a natural world that was increasingly being understood in scientific terms. And it will 
be advanced that within the context, nature came to be progressively regarded as a mere canvas 
upon which man – as the measure of all things – could impose his will. 
 In turn, Chapter Two, using the convergence of various approaches to nature discernible in 
the work of Renaissance artist Leonardo da Vinci as a point of departure, explores the instantiation 
of the disciplinary regime identified by Foucault, in early modernity in relation to the extended 
Hadotian framework elaborated upon in the foregoing chapter. This exercise is important to 
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undertake because Hadot’s analysis in The Veil of Isis only extends so far as the Enlightenment, 
such that it is necessary to close the gap between this period and the contemporary era before the 
extended Hadotian framework can be used as a lens through which to critically view DiCaprio’s 
The 11th Hour and Before the Flood. In this regard, to begin with, a contextual backdrop will be 
established through a discussion of Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power and its key features, 
particularly the retreat of visible forms of power into anonymity, and the correlative emergence of 
pervasive and intrusive technologies, such as the application of panoptical surveillance and the 
increasingly strict regimentation of time and space, and the bodies therein, in the pursuit of ever 
more effective means of social control.  
 Following on from this, the abovementioned technologies of disciplinary society will be 
explored through a consideration of their various resonances and dissonances with the five 
approaches to nature of the extended Hadotian framework, namely Promethean scientific 
rationality, Socratic withdrawal, Aristotelian-inspired faith in teleology, Hippocratic balance and 
Orphic artistry. In this regard, it will be advanced that disciplinary society may be viewed as 
historically distinct from the cultural milieus outlined in the previous chapter in that, for the first 
time, disciplinary society saw the institutionalization of Promethean, Socratic and Aristotelian  
approaches within social organizations. Arguably, these changes facilitated the formation, and 
subsequent preeminence, of the overarching Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, and the 
correlative marginalization of the non-invasive, balance-seeking Hippocratic and Orphic aesthetic 
approaches to the environment.  
 With this in mind, firstly, the Promethean response will be discussed through the lens of 
increasing industrialization, with particular focus on how this engendered a radical expansion in 
humanity’s capacity to harness nature for its own ends. Relatedly, how in this climate of scientific 
exploration, Hippocratic and Orphic approaches to nature became progressively sidelined by the 
rapidly expanding medico-scientific corpus, aided by the invention of new scientific instruments 
and techniques which allowed for the more efficient extraction of nature’s secrets will also be 
discussed. Secondly, Socratic withdrawal will be explored, within the context of disciplinary 
society as an intensification of themes established in the Renaissance – discussed in the previous 
chapter – alongside continued and escalating dynamics of urbanization and the concretization of 
industrialist sentiment, particularly as it regards the doctrine of social efficiency. Thirdly, how 
Aristotelian-inspired faith in teleology in this era of widespread disciplinary secularization became 
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increasingly detached from the faith-based readings of previous centuries and steadily infused with 
the logic of discipline, will be considered.  
 Next, the vestiges of approaches which continued in the disciplinary era to seek to know 
nature through non-intrusive means will be explored. In terms of the Hippocratic approach, this 
will be discussed in relation to social and scientific shifts precipitated by the secularization and 
industrialism of the disciplinary era, which gave rise to several forms of resistance like the 
burgeoning environmental consciousness of scholars such as Robert Smith, as well as a recognition 
of the enduring need to seek balance between the subject’s own nature and their environment, 
reflected in the works of  here interpreted by Freud and his psychoanalytic model. In terms of the 
Orphic approach, this will be discussed in relation to artistic and spiritual movements such as 
Romanticism and theories surrounding the notion of the world soul through an array of artistic, 
literary and philosophical texts from Goethe to Schelling. 
 In turn, Chapter Three outlines the progressive dissolution of Foucault’s disciplinary 
society and the birth of what Gilles Deleuze calls control society from the mid-twentieth century 
onward, in relation to the extended Hadotian framework. Again, this exercises is important to 
undertake because Foucault’s analysis – read through the lens of the extended Hadotian framework 
in the previous chapters – only extends as far as the end of World War Two, such that it is necessary 
to close the gap between this period and the contemporary era before the extended Hadotian 
framework can be used as a lens through which to critically view The 11th Hour and Before the 
Flood. In this regard, it will be advanced that with the onset of globalized capitalism and the 
continuation and escalation of existing dynamics such as industrialism, urbanization and 
consumerism alongside the development of new digital technologies that humanity has become 
increasingly alienated from nature. This arguably, is most visible through the continuing exhaustive 
use of nature, despite, for the first time in history, a widespread understanding of the dire 
environmental consequences of such actions. In the context of neoliberalism, this has entailed not 
the instantiation of urgent remedial measures, but rather increasingly invasive research into natural 
processes in order to derive maximum market value, despite the deleterious cost to ecosystems that 
this entails. Moreover, as will be discussed humanity, too, suffers as a result of such dynamics, 
insofar as we now exist – digitized and dividualized – embedded in the neoliberal knowledge 
economy, further removed from nature now than at any other historical juncture. Accordingly, this 
will be accounted for, in terms of the continued expansion and amplification of the 
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Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, under the auspices of the contemporary societies of 
control. 
 That is, such structural changes will be advanced as both continuations and modifications 
of the Foucauldian technologies of discipline, as well as in relation to the extended Hadotian 
framework, explored in the previous chapter. Firstly, Prometheanism will be explored primarily 
through the lens of the unceasing pursuit of profit, the technological innovation which has 
accompanied it and the instantiation of ever more effective forms of surveillance and social control 
that such developments have engendered. This climate of unrelenting development, it will be 
argued, has progressively elevated economic interests above humanitarian, and particularly 
environmental concerns. Secondly, how Socratic withdrawal has undergone a radical shift will be 
discussed; from the conscious withdrawal from a majestic nature that transcends the limited 
capacity of human understanding – as initially envisioned by Socrates – through progressive 
withdrawals into human pursuits in the Middle Ages, Renaissance and Enlightenment, to the 
contemporary era, in which the dividual now finds themselves perpetually indebted, digitally 
isolated, and alienated from both their erstwhile disciplinary individuality as well as the 
surrounding natural environment. Accordingly, this process of retreat from nature will be 
elaborated on with reference to Deleuze’s ideas concerning the birth of the controlled dividual, as 
well as Washington’s discussion on the widespread phenomenon of denialism in relation to the 
global environmental crisis. In turn, this denial can be accounted for, in large part, by the 
unfaltering faith in the ends of free market economy, so pervasive today as the current 
manifestation of Aristotelian-inspired faith telos. That is, how faith in the divine logic of the ends 
of nature has been supplanted by faith in the invisible hand of the free market economy, which has 
in the contemporary era, been veiled in quasi-religious rhetoric. 
 In turn, contemporary manifestations of balance-seeking Hippocratic approaches to nature 
will be explored, through the lens of growing environmental consciousness from the mid-twentieth 
century. In particular, movements espousing an ‘ecosophy’ of balance, moderation, ecocentrism, 
and human embeddedness in nature will be focalized, namely Arne Naess’ deep ecology, 
ecofeminism as articulated by Ariel Salleh and Murray Bookchin’s social ecology. Finally, in 
relation to Orphism, contemporary echoes of this approach will explored through the work of poets, 
musicians, artists and filmmakers – namely John Elder, A.R Ammons, Olivier Messaien, Ben 
Rivers, Jacques Perrin and Jacques Cluzaud – who seek, through their varied artistic endeavors, to 
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mimic and capture the creative and generative processes of nature, not for the purposes of scientific 
enquiry or surveillance, but rather as a means of drawing close to nature.  
 In Chapter Four Leonardo DiCaprio’s environmental documentary The 11th Hour (2007) 
directed by Nadia Conners and Leila Conners Petersen will be explored as a representation of the 
extent to which the critical potential of the medium of film – as considered in the previous chapter 
in relation to the cinema of Perrin and Cluzaud – has largely been undermined in the contemporary 
era by the structural functionaries of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus. That is, an 
overarching faith in the neoliberal economy and the ability of technological advancements to 
ameliorate and thereby distance us from the effects of the environmental crisis. These factors, it 
will be argued, have contributed to an unbalanced representation of approaches to nature and, 
ultimately, to final cinematic product that does little to challenge the established ideological 
frameworks which have arguably led us to the brink of ecological collapse. In this regard, via an 
analysis of the emergent tropes and discourses surrounding nature, the environmental crisis and 
solutions thereto, it will be demonstrated that over the duration of the film – through mechanisms 
ranging from relative prioritization, timing and framing – messages which echo Hippocratic and 
Orphic sentiments are de-emphasized, while messages oriented toward the scientism,  
anthropocentrism, and capitalism of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, are, by contrast, 
thematized, and at times even allowed to co-opt aspects of alternative Hippocratic and Orphic 
approaches.  
 In terms of this, following a brief synopsis, firstly, representations of the Promethean 
approach are explored through the progressive sidelining of Hippocratic and Orphic messages, the 
representation of nature through scientific terminology and diagrams, the framing of nature as a 
threatening ‘other’ to humanity, and finally through the film’s ultimate recommendation of 
biomimicry as a viable solution to problems of climate change, food and water insecurity and a 
host of other issues. Biomimicry, in particular, will be emphasized for the purposes of this analysis, 
as it may be viewed as representative of the ideological contradictions of the film as a whole. That 
is, it seeks to offer a solution to the environmental crisis which, in a reiteration of Cartesian 
dualisms, further concretizes the dominance and exploitation by humanity and science over nature. 
Secondly, in relation to Socratic withdrawal, the reiteration of dualistic perspectives as well as 
themes of a retreat from nature into economic and digital spheres and DiCaprio’s vision of a 
“civilization of the human mind” (in Conners & Conners Petersen 2007), and the increase in 
digitally-mediated activism will be explored. Thirdly, Aristotelian telos or faith in the free market 
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economy is here explored, in a continuation of ideas outlined in the previous chapter. In terms of 
this, alongside biomimicry, the advancement of economically-driven solutions to environmental 
problems features strongly in the film. It is argued that such an approach, like biomimicry, fails 
largely to engage in any ideological or systemic interrogation and rather seeks to superficially 
ameliorate environmental degradation through programmes of incentives and tax rebates for green 
companies, and the imposition of sanctions and fines for the worst offenders.  
 Next, although largely marginalized and undercut in the film, the vestiges of Hippocratic 
approaches, emphasizing moderation and oneness with nature, will be explored, notably through 
the contributions of environmentalist David Suzuki, of faithkeeper Oren Lyons, of author Andy 
Revkin, and indeed, of Leonardo DiCaprio himself, among others. However, what will also be 
considered is the manner in which the discourse of balance is, at times, co-opted in the film by 
theorists less critical of the effects of dynamics such as hyper-consumption, as well as via the 
various representational techniques employed. As will be discussed, in the film this often entails 
what may be referred to as a ‘bait-and-switch’ strategy that adopts the rhetoric of environmentalism 
to advance ideas which are Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian in orientation, eclipsing critical 
elements of these alternative approaches to essentially provide superficial solutions with a veneer 
of ecological credibility. Finally, the admittedly very limited representations of the Orphic 
approach will be explored, in relation to both Gardels’ invocation of theogonic myth, as well as the 
use of representational techniques similar to those outlined above.  
 Finally, in Chapter Five, Leonardo DiCaprio’s second environmental film, Before the Flood 
(2016), directed by Fisher Stevens, will be explored through the lens of the extended Hadotian 
framework in order to identify possible resonances, dissonances, modifications and escalations of 
tendencies and tropes between the two films, relating to the framing of nature and the 
environmental crisis. It will be advanced that Before the Flood evinces the degree to which the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus has, since the release of The 11th Hour in 2007, continued 
to extend its considerable dominance in the sphere of human perceptions of nature, through its 
prioritization of anthropocentric solutions – namely those which entail a focus on science, politics, 
digital technologies and economic elements – and which accordingly marginalize alternative 
voices.  
 After a brief synopsis of the film, firstly, the film’s representation of the Promethean 
sensibility will be explored through its sourcing of information, particularly in regards to its 
comparative marginalization of critical, ecocentric voices and the resultant framing of nature in 
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ways which resonate with reductive rational and scientific discourses, and which fail to challenge 
the prevailing ontological dualisms surrounding the culture/nature binary. After this, DiCaprio’s 
emphasis on technology-based solutions to the environmental crisis will be examined, with 
particular emphasis on the manner in which solutions such as the development of green 
technologies fails to facilitate critical dialog with the problematic ideological assumptions upon 
which contemporary society is founded.  
 Secondly, with regard to representation of Socratic withdrawal in the film, its themes of 
retreat from nature into the humanist pursuits of politics and digitality will be considered, with 
particular emphasis on the manner in which solutions to the environmental crisis are increasingly 
couched, not in terms of meaningful engagement with the natural world, but rather in terms of 
superficial, mediated interactions with nature through online political action, apps, and cyber 
activism, along with small individual purchasing decisions which do not pose a threat to 
contemporary consumer society and associated ways of life. Beyond this tendency in the film to 
engage with the environmental crisis solely through its propensity to threaten human wellbeing and 
lifestyles will be engaged with, as well as the intensification of these tendencies from The 11th Hour 
to Before the Flood, in the sense that the latter has largely dispensed with even the most superficial 
calls for a recognition of connectedness between humans and nature, that were partially showcased 
in the former film – will be commented upon.  
 Thirdly, representations of Aristotelian-inspired faith, as it manifests as an overarching faith 
in the neoliberal economy will be explored through the range of economic solutions, such as tax 
breaks and incentives for companies actively involved in green initiatives, advanced as a means of 
addressing the environmental crisis. The failure of such solutions to interrogate the problematic 
discourses of development and consumerism associated with neoliberalism will also be 
problematized at this point. 
 Fourthly, the continued marginalization and reinterpretation in Before the Flood of 
representations of the Hippocratic approach, will be considered. In particular, the exclusion of 
related approaches which seek balance with nature, and for that matter, the marginalization of the 
voices of those who espouse such recommendations, will be explored, as well as the associated 
rearticulation of the Hippocratic approach, not as seeking a balance with nature, but rather as 
seeking balanced forms of consumption will be considered. Such tendencies will be examined in 
relation to the statements of Sunita Narain of the Centre for Science and Environment in Delhi, 
who presents the only argument in the film which genuinely attempts to address the imbalances 
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brought about by excessive consumption in contemporary society, as well as the manner in which 
her statements are summarily undercut by DiCaprio.  
 Finally, with regard to representation of the Orphic approach in Before the Flood, its 
relative marginalization will be explored, as well as the manner in which it has also been 
rearticulated in a manner that comports with the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus. In this 
regard, particular focus will fall the manner in which on insights derived by aesthetic pursuits are 
deemed appropriate only insofar as they can be validated by scientific findings, as well as how the 
identification of scientific products – such as Sellers’ map of earth – as an artistic work severely 
undercuts the critical potential of the Orphic approach within the film. Accordingly, the degree to 
which the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus has undergone an intensification within the film, 
to the extent that it now encroaches upon the traditionally critical Orphic approach will be 
discussed. 
 In closing it is concluded that the films have both reflected and advanced a generalized 
tendency toward the approaches associated with the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus. 
Beyond the mere marginalization of alternative approaches, the films have, through visuals and 
discourse constituted a furtherance of the gradual cultural shifts – that have been identified over 
time, and elaborated upon in the preceding chapters – which have seen the steady co-optation of 
the Socratic and Aristotelian approaches to nature, enfolding them under the broad banner of 
Promethean pursuit. The manner in which the co-optation of the Hippocratic and Orphic 
approaches is evinced by the films will be discussed, positioning them on the spectrum of 
discursive shifts which have been outlined over the course of this dissertation. After this, 
recommendations relating to the necessity for a restoration of independence of the Hippocratic and 
Orphic approaches, an untethering from inflections by the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus 
will be made, asserting that through the revival and reintegration of such critical approaches, 
humankind may be able to, once again, conceive of their embeddedness in nature and act in a 
manner which reflects such cognizance. Beyond this, it will be advanced that, with a renewed focus 
on the aesthetic endeavors of Orphism, humankind may reshape its relations with nature, thinking 
critically and creatively about the natural world, and subverting patterns of human domination of 
nature through practices which seek to draw close to it. Accordingly, this master’s dissertation in 
Media Studies is couched in cultural studies, media aesthetics, interpretation and criticism, and 
consideration of the social and cultural effects of mass media.  
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Chapter One: Extending the Framework of Hadot’s The Veil of Isis   
 
Introduction 
With a view to exploring Greek perceptions of nature and the changes they underwent over time, 
this chapter examines cultural, literary, philosophical, religious and artistic tropes and motifs in 
which such perceptions are reflected, and how these form part of a discursive trajectory that 
commences with intimations of nature as mad in Archaic Greece through the works of Hesiod and 
Homer. Thereafter, and with reference to Hadot’s The Veil of Isis, Classical Greek perceptions of 
nature will be considered – from Socratic withdrawal to both Promethean and Orphic approaches 
– but contra Hadot it will also be argued that two additional approaches can be discerned alongside 
the three he outlines. As will be discussed, on the one hand, these consist of attempts to attain a 
balance with nature, as initially evinced by Hippocrates and later Galen, and on the other hand, 
these entail faith in the overarching logic of nature, particularly as articulated in Aristotelian 
notions of telos. Understandably, this schematization stands in marked contrast to that of Hadot’s, 
for whom Hippocrates and Aristotle both comprised Promethean figures, as it were but justification 
for the reconfiguration of his schema will be advanced as the chapter proceeds. In this regard, the 
varied reflections of these five approaches will be examined at various intervals in history, from 
Classical Greece through to the Renaissance, against the backdrop discussion of the fear which 
nature inspired among humans in the Archaic period. 
  
Perceptions of Nature in Archaic Greece 
One problem with Hadot beginning his discussion of human relationships with nature as he does – 
with the figure of Heraclitus – is that large aspects of such relationships are eclipsed; aspects 
informed less by a sense of wonder over the enigma of nature, and more by an enduring dread over 
the threatening unpredictability of nature. But if one considers earlier texts, such as those of Hesiod 
and Homer, both such fear and the various discursive mechanisms resorted to diminish its intensity, 
become patently clear. And it is important to recall such fear because, as will be discussed, it has 
only ever been ameliorated over the centuries, rather than eradicated altogether.  
 That is, in his poem Theogony, Hesiod outlines the overthrow of the primordial gods,2 
namely the Titans, by the Olympians led by Zeus. The Titans, who preceded the Olympians, were 
                                                          
2 Hesiod (or Hesiodos) has been hailed “the father of Greek didactic poetry” and is responsible for at least two key 
works, namely Theogony, a compendium of myths of the gods, and Works and Days, which outlines the day to day 
life of peasants in Greek antiquity (Merriam-Webster 1995: 544).  
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the second generation of gods to emerge from chaos, born of the union of Ouranos (sky) and Gaia 
(earth), and they were Kronos (time), Okeanos (ocean), Hyperion (heavenly light), Rhea (female 
fertility), and Thethys (fresh water), to name but a few (Colum 2012: 51). Accordingly, this tale 
reflects a deep cultural fear of the elemental Titans, whose natural yet bestial acts of incest, 
cannibalism, and infanticide stand in marked contrast to the more civilized and human aspects of 
the Olympians. Indeed, Zeus’ ultimate defeat of Kronos may be read as an act of bargaining on the 
part of the Ancient Greeks, as though by bestowing upon nature a more human visage they might 
be spared its unbridled ferocity, and such bargaining, thus comprised the first discursive 
mechanism employed to diminish the fear of nature. That is, where once the gods had been 
fearsome and unpredictable natural elements, under the influence of Hesiod (and the discursive 
dynamics reflected in his work) they took on a more domesticated form, and subsequently the 
Olympians emerged as “the principal deities of Greek mythology” (Hansen 2005: 250). In effect, 
this divine dynasty was believed to oversee all natural realms, with each god or goddess wielding 
authority over a particular sphere – for instance, Zeus as god of the skies and his brother Poseidon 
as god of the seas. Herodotus attributes the initial conceptualization of this “cosmic bureaucracy” 
to Hesiod and Homer (Hansen 2005: 31),3 whom he contends bestowed upon the gods “their 
epithets,” “distributed them their ‘offices’ and their ‘skills,’ and marked out their ‘outward 
appearances’” (Mikalson 2010: 34). But what is interesting is that, although many of the gods still 
represented elements of nature, with these developments the gods also became more familiar, 
taking on increasingly human appearances and even acting “essentially alike, displaying the same 
sorts of feelings and holding essentially the same values” as humans (Hansen 2005: 32). Burkert 
contends that this type of anthropomorphism, or transposal of human attributes upon that which is 
nonhuman, was widespread in Homeric Greece, but not an idiosyncratic feature of the culture. 
Rather, as he explains, in “the high cultures of the ancient world,” the threatening other – the 
unpredictable phenomena of nature – were from a certain point onward progressively interpreted 
as “a plurality of personal beings … understood by analogy with man and imagined in human 
form” (Burkert 2013: n.p). In this way, the rumbling danger of an active volcano, for instance, was 
rendered somewhat less threatening insofar as it became, in the Greek cultural imagination, 
Hephaestus hammering away at his subterranean forge. In short, by attributing human 
                                                          
3 A peripatetic fifth-century Greek historian, Herodotus’ primary preoccupation was with the history of the Archaic 
period and the “meeting of the Greek world with the cultures of Asia Minor, the Near East and Egypt” (Macdonald 
2009: n.p). Many Classical philosophers relied heavily on the works of Herodotus, and his work remains “the most 
reliable extant source” when attempting to trace non-Greek influences on early Greek philosophy (Preus 2015: 191), 
earning him the moniker “the father of history” (Macdonald 2009: n.p).  
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characteristics to these natural phenomena, Homeric Greeks generated an illusory sense of partial 
control over nature through the possibility of propitiating the gods. However, importantly, as Foltz 
points out, implicit in this is a tacit acknowledgement, visible in the relative “ubiquity of conflict 
between the gods in Greek mythology,” that nature was still an arena of incoherence, and ultimately 
of menace, from which protection is required in the form of rituals, sacrifices, and prayers (2014: 
6). Such offerings and placatory gestures would, in contrast, be futile in the case of the earlier 
context of the Titans where, for example Nyx, the primordial, menacing and shadowy elemental 
figure of night or darkness, defied all personification. Kohanski moreover maintains that, for the 
Ancient Greeks, such narratives were more than mere fictions for the amelioration of fear, because 
they “played a determining role in human civilization,” insofar as they constituted a crucial moment 
in “man’s efforts to build for himself a ‘home’ in the realm of being” (Kohanski 1984: 18).  
 The fragility of this home, though, is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in Homer’s The 
Odyssey.4 Traditionally, the ship has manifested in folklore, art, and literature as an “emblematic” 
and “enduring cultural symbol, or root metaphor” of voyage from the known world into the 
unknown depths of nature, becoming over time “deeply embedded in human consciousness” 
(McCaughan 2001: 54) as representative of the dangers that a wild and unpredictable nature 
presents to human existence. And McCaughan adds that such tales of small vessels setting out over 
vast and unfathomable waters, accordingly tap into audiences’ “conflicting emotions of awe and 
fear” which are experienced vicariously in the face of the ocean’s natural “beauty and destructive 
power” (2001: 54). Indeed these images neatly sum up the reality faced by frail humanity, at least 
for those brave enough to acknowledge how beholden they are to the whims of nature. In The 
Odyssey as well as other sagas, such as The Iliad and The Argonautica, ships constitute an integral 
component of the quests, and Sowa attributes this popularity, at least in part, to the ancient Greek’s 
predominantly “seafaring economy” (2005: 9), while Zilcosky situates such travel tales as central 
to the development of narrative in general, arguing that storytelling “began with travel” (2008: n.p). 
However, the depiction of these external spaces that are travelled into – the strange islands 
inhabited by monsters, and the capricious ocean itself – not only contrast markedly with the 
comforts of hearth and home, and the regimented social order of ancient Greek civilizations. In 
                                                          
4 Worrall points out that while The Odyssey and The Iliad are considered seminal texts in the Western canon, “little is 
known about their author [or] the date and manner of their creation.” One commonly held belief is that Homer should 
not be thought of as an individual, but rather “a tradition” or the personification of “an entire culture coming up with 
ever more refined … ways of telling stories that are important to it” (Worrall 2015: n.p). 
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addition, they also in many ways place the frightening unpredictability of nature on the periphery 
of such domesticated spaces.  
 In this regard, The Odyssey is admittedly just one example of the myriad of travel tales 
which abounded “in Greek literature from the archaic period to late antiquity” (Bispham et al 2006: 
277), but its content is nevertheless thematically quite archetypal. To elaborate, the Homeric epics 
are generally regarded as “a genre which conveys to its audience already existing traditions without 
much intervention by the poet,” and because of this, they “reflect the societies of the periods in 
which the traditions brought together in the epics originated” (Ulf 2009: 81). Thus, throughout the 
epic, as Odysseus’ meets with different deities and various challenges, his encounters reflect the 
tensions and fears within the early Greek cultural imagination.  
 In short, the tale recalls the fraught journey of Odysseus, a hero of the Trojan War, back to 
his home in Ithaca after escaping from the island of the insatiable nymph Calypso, where he and 
his crew were shipwrecked. Over the course of his journey, he encounters many dangerous marvels 
and nightmarish phenomena, all of which he in turn recounts to those he meets along the way, 
thereby underscoring the “ancient connections between journeys and narration” (Zilcosky 2008: 
3), mentioned above. However, much of Odysseus’ trauma in this regard is the result of Poseidon, 
who is bent on revenge for the harm Odysseus inflicted on his son, Polyphemus the Cyclops. 
Consequently, it is Poseidon – framed as an antagonist in the epic – who delays Odysseus’ return 
home to Ithaca by raising fierce storms in the hero’s path. Accordingly, Poseidon stands in sharp 
contrast to Athena, “the patron of wisdom” (Sacks & Murray 1995: 40), who throughout the epic 
acts as a force of good – often in opposition to Poseidon – in order to smooth and speed Odysseus’ 
voyage home,5 even assisting his son Telemachus in banishing the usurping suitors from Ithaca.6 
In this regard, it must be remembered that, although collectively presided over by Zeus as king of 
the gods, the Olympians also comprised of “an older generation and a younger generation. While 
the elder Olympians are the siblings of Zeus, Poseidon, Hera, Demeter” and “Hestia, the younger 
Olympians are Zeus’ sons, Hermes, Hephaistos, Ares, Apollon and Dionysus, and Zeus’ daughters, 
Athena, Aphrodite, and Artemis” (Hansen 2005: 250). Thus, the different portrayals of the two 
generations of Olympians in The Odyssey is telling: while the older Poseidon, as god of the sea, is 
easily angered, unforgiving and irascible, in contrast, the younger Athena, as goddess of (human) 
                                                          
5 For example, Athena intervenes in Book 5 to placate the storm raised by Poseidon to blow Odysseus off course as he 
departed the island of Ogygia.  That is, in order to save Odysseus “from the jaws of death,” Athena “checked all other 
winds in their courses, bidding them to calm down and go to sleep” (Homer 1991:72).  
6 In Odysseus’ absence, an array of suitors had taken up residence at Ithaca, hoping to persuade his wife Penelope into 
a second marriage as she would bring with her Odysseus’ substantial estate (Homer 1991).  
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wisdom, is gracious, wise and a cunning strategist. Thus both deities, shaped in the popular 
imagination during this period, can be read as representative of the cultural beliefs and anxieties of 
the time. That is, the seafaring Greeks, familiar with the cruel and destructive natural power of the 
ocean, which was capable of washing entire fleets away and dashing small boats upon the rocks, 
view Poseidon through a lens of fear, and characterize him accordingly. But with the defeat of 
Poseidon by Athena – signified by Odysseus’ safe return to Ithaca – Greek audiences “would not 
have failed to notice that ‘intelligence’ defeats [the] ‘brute power’” of nature (Bremmer 1999: 23). 
This triumph is significant in that it is not merely a victory of Odysseus over various obstacles, or 
of Athena over Poseidon, but also an imagined victory of human reason over the forces of nature. 
In short, mirroring the earlier triumph of the Olympians over the fearsome Titans, Athena’s epic 
victory over Poseidon also points to a second discursive mechanism resorted to by the Archaic 
Greeks to subdue the fear of nature. A mechanism that involved an implicit re-organization of the 
hierarchy of the Greek divinities, with those younger deities who more closely resembled humans 
prevailing over those older deities who represented aspects of the natural world.  
 However, it should also be noted that, beyond the (re-)ordering of such divine 
bureaucracies, there nevertheless remained various menacing forces that defied such ameliorative 
impositions, and which accordingly occupied a third domain – one beyond the scope of the 
Olympian deities – that bears testimony to a residual fear of nature. This was a domain of natural 
danger: innate, unpredictable, and independent of the will of the gods, both those still linked to 
natural elements and those more human. Indeed, these threatening aspects may be seen not only in 
the Titanic era’s primeval forces of Nyx and Chaos,7 but also in other mythical monsters, such as 
the Hydra and Chimera.8 Some of Odysseus’ first encounters after leaving Troy are also highly 
significant in this regard, because they are not obstacles laid in Odysseus’ path by Poseidon or any 
other malevolent divinity, but instead naturally occurring, pre-existing elements in a frighteningly 
unfathomable natural land and seascape.  
 In short, after being blown off course beyond the bounds of “definite geography,” 
Odysseus’ flotilla flounders off the coast of Cape Melea into the land of the Lotus-eaters (Ahl & 
                                                          
7 Outlined in both the Orphic cosmogony and Hesiod’s Theogony, such figures are representative of “the undefined 
that existed before any mythic storytelling,” and which as a consequence remain somewhat “inaccessible” (Bronfen 
2013: 2)  
8 These creatures exist alongside the Olympian gods in the ancient Greek cultural imagination. The offspring of 
Typhoeus and Echidna, the Hydra is a fearsome many-headed serpentine monster, while a sibling to the Hydra, the 
Chimera, is a fire-breathing hybrid of lion, snake and goat. Both the Hydra and Chimera find their origins in Hesiodic 
myth, though they also appear frequently in later folklore (Daly & Rengel 2004: 44).  
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Roisman 1996: 90). Distinct from the benevolent Athena, and even the vengeful Poseidon, the 
Lotus-eaters – along with several of the entities encountered later – signify something natural but 
also perilous. The Lotus-eaters are, as Odysseus explains to Alcinous, King of the Phaecians, “a 
race that eat the flowery lotus fruit” (Homer1991: 112). And while these mysterious beings show 
no tendency toward violence, they do ply Odysseus’ men with an intoxicating fruit that grows wild 
rather than through cultivation, and that renders them listless and “forgetful of their homes and 
homeward journey” (Ahl & Roisman 1996: 90).9 Stripped of their good sense after ingesting the 
fruit, the apathy of Odysseus’ men thus alludes to an awareness of naturally-occurring madness, 
and is thus partly indicative of a cultural suspicion of natural spaces beyond the margins of society, 
for fear of a dehumanizing potential that stalks the periphery of the civilized centers. Similarly, this 
cautionary trope is repeated in Odysseus’ encounter with the Sirens, who also exist in a 
geographical space beyond that of the familiar. Bloom describes the putrid home of the Sirens as 
an “inversion of the […] common topos” (Bloom 2007: 60), and maintains that, like the fruit of the 
Lotus-eaters, their voices lure the men to certain death. Odysseus accordingly orders his men to 
plug their ears with wax, and has himself bound to the mast in order to resist the powers of the 
“honey-sweet” song (Homer 1991: 161), which would otherwise drive him to madness and death. 
The threat of such a fate is also emphasized by the imagery of the death and decay of less fortunate 
“men [,] whose withered skin still hangs upon their bones,” and by the piles of “mouldering 
skeletons” that have collected around the Siren’s abode (Homer 1991: 158). Such images thereby 
render conspicuous the Homeric Greeks’ awareness of the perils of engaging too directly with 
certain elemental forces of nature, the power of which could rob one of one’s wits and lead to one’s 
demise.  
 To this set of images must, of course, be added that of the Scylla and Charybdis, two 
mythical beings who were thought to inhabit the Straits of Messina. Daly and Rengel describe these 
fearsome creatures as follows:  
 
On the Italian side [of the Straits] lived the monster Scylla. She had the body of a 
woman, but around her waist grew six long necks with the heads of dogs armed with 
three rows of teeth, who emitted ferocious and terrifying barks. On the Sicilian side 
lived Charybdis, who dwelled under a great fig tree. Three times a day, Charybdis 
swallowed up the sea and then spat it out again in a boiling whirlpool. (Day & Rengel 
2004: 116) 
  
                                                          
9 The fact that the fruit grows wild underscores the perceived link between the loss of human memory and the influence 
of undomesticated nature.  
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And as Dougherty recalls, even though he is warned of these dangers beforehand by the witch 
Circe, such is their natural power that Odysseus still falls afoul of the Scylla and loses several 
crewmen in his attempt to navigate the perilous straits. These monsters – representative of a 
geographically extant passage, beset by dangerous currents and jagged rock formations – 
accordingly signify “the risks of overseas travel” and the many dangers which a wild, implacable, 
and mad nature posed to mariners (2001: 98).   
 From the popularity and longevity of these tropes it emerges that, in Archaic Greece, the 
appraisal of nature or the natural elements occurred in relation to a broad spectrum of social 
formations and orientations, which largely shaped it into myth and established such narratives as 
those elaborated upon above. Correlatively, at this time, attempts to comprehend and thereby 
mediate the fear of the potentially devastating effects of an unpredictable nature took place through 
discourse – in particular, epic poetry – rather than through recourse to manmade instruments. But 
such Archaic Greek responses to nature do not amount to proto-versions of what Hadot identifies 
as the Orphic approach to nature. That is, although they were not predicated on any scientific 
model, but rather on those theogonic myths which accounted for creation and natural phenomena, 
such discourses did not entail “an experimental practice” (Hadot 2006: 159) aimed at opening up 
nature and its secrets to humans. Instead, such epic poetry, mapped the world of natural phenomena 
in mythic terms, rather than offering a pathway to deeper and broader understanding of nature in a 
manner akin to, for example, the later Eleusian mysteries, which could be progressively pursued 
by a faithful devotee. Accordingly, in such epic poetry what we see is not only a pervasive and 
enduring fear of nature, the roots of which lie way back in the terrifying vicissitudes of the Titanic 
era – which are only just barely covered over by the veneer of humanity granted to the subsequent 
Olympian deities. In addition, we also encounter in both Hesiod’s and Homer’s works, poignant 
intimations of human powerlessness before such overarching natural power, the intolerability of 
which can be understood as helping to precipitate the changing perceptions of nature in Classical 
Greece.  
 
Perceptions of Nature in Classical Greece 
To be sure, the shift from the Archaic to the Classical era did not entail a dramatic rupture between 
their perspectives on nature; rather, a degree of overlap existed, which was reflected most notably 
in literature. However, at the same time the Classical era entailed a burgeoning critical disposition 
which also distanced itself from the erstwhile passivity in the face of myth, in favour of pursuing 
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greater agency in relation to nature, and it is here that Hadot identifies the key elements of the 
framework. Yet as will be discussed, while certain aspects of this framework remain thoroughly 
cogent, and have accordingly not been disputed, other aspects can profitably be contested in the 
interest of extending the Hadotian framework, with the view to creating a critical lens which can 
help render conspicuous, and lend clarity to, certain discursive dynamics that characterize the 
contemporary era’s approach to nature and the associated environmental crisis.  
 That is, although the above Archaic views of nature as beset by the pitfalls of danger, and 
indeed madness, became refined in later periods in Greek history, as Padel advances, early literary 
texts – like The Odyssey – nevertheless in many ways constituted “the foundation for the grammar 
of the western language of madness” that subsequently emerged and came to be associated with 
nature (in Pietikäinen 2015: 18). That is, as Pietikäinen explains, by the Classical era (480-323 
BCE), literature reflects a development not only in the perception of the subject, but also in the 
understanding of madness which was indissociable from changing perceptions of nature. This 
primarily entailed a burgeoning understanding of people as “individuals who monitor themselves 
and reflect on their own states of mind” as a consequence of the civilizing effect of societies. A 
view distinct from the understandings of the Archaic era where, as reflected in Homeric epic, 
individuals were regarded as subject “to divine forces,” and thus often mere “marionettes whose 
motives for action are external to themselves” – primarily through the machinations of the gods 
who were linked to nature (2015: 18).10 But despite such developments, elements of nature – and 
the dehumanizing effects they entailed – continued to exist as potential threats to the physical and 
mental health and wellbeing of the individuals of the polis. 
 That is, by the Classical era, the Greeks had adopted a more subtle view of madness, the 
understanding of which was shaped by three key phenomena, namely darkness, damage and 
wandering (Padel in Pietikäinen 2015: 18). The first two were loosely related to physiological 
causes: in the case of darkness, it was believed that an excess of black bile resulted in rage – which 
adumbrated the burgeoning humoral approach to understanding the body – and in the case of 
                                                          
10 It must be remembered, though, that these interventions were not exclusively good or bad, insofar as they were as 
likely to manifest in moments of heroic greatness in battle – as in the case of Idomeneus’ Poseidon-inspired heroism, 
in Book 13 of The Iliad – as they were in bouts of chaotic rage or senselessness. This latter debilitating madness is 
alluded to, for example, in an exchange between Agamemnon and Achilles in Book 19 of The Iliad, where Agamemnon 
apologizes to Achilles for his earlier theft of Achilles prize, Briseis, saying to Achilles: “I am not to blame! Zeus and 
Fate and Fury stalking through the night … drove that savage madness in my heart” (Homer 1990: 491). Within this 
era, though, Achilles readily accepts the apology because of the perceived validity of Agamemnon’s explanation within 
the context of the shame culture they both inhabited, in which such co-option of humans by the gods was a disturbing 
part of reality; a reality in which the boundary between humans and the gods who mediated nature was interminably 
porous.  
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damage, the inner damage of madness was thought to manifest in “damaging outward acts” 
(Pietikäinen 2015: 18). In turn, the idea of wandering in nature relied strongly upon the notion that 
madness drives people to “wander aimlessly from place to place,” such that they drift into ever 
increasing estrangement from society and into ever further alliance with nature. Here “the external 
wandering of the madmen” in nature was seen to correspond “with the interior wandering of their 
minds” (Padel in Pietikäinen 2015: 19).  
 Such ideas were readily reflected in literature; for example, they underpin aspects of the 
plot of Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex. As the story goes, at the time of his birth, a prophecy was made 
regarding the son of Laius and Jocasta, king and queen of Thebes, and it was foretold that the boy 
would grow up to murder his father and marry his mother. Fearing this dire augury, Laius and 
Jocasta send the baby away with a herdsman to be abandoned and die from exposure; however, 
taking pity on the infant the herdsman instead leaves him in a place where he would easily be found 
by a passerby. And accordingly, a peasant comes across the baby and delivers him to the king and 
queen of Corinth, who adopt him and name him Oedipus.11 When he comes of age, Oedipus 
consults the oracle at Delphi who warns him not to return home as he is fated to murder his father 
and commit incest with his mother.  But, unaware of his true parentage, Oedipus flees to Thebes, 
on the road unwittingly fulfilling the first part of the prophecy by killing his true father, King Laius. 
Shortly thereafter, on the outskirts of Thebes, Oedipus encounters a Sphinx that has been plaguing 
the city, and through his wit and cunning defeats the creature by correctly answering its riddle.12 
Consequently, he is hailed a hero in Thebes and is soon after made king when he marries the 
widowed queen Jocasta, bringing the prophecy to fulfilment. But when Thebes is later beset by 
famine and plague – both of which similarly point to the threats posed by a powerful and cruel 
nature, which holds the city in its palm – Oedipus, seeking respite for his people, consults the 
oracle, at which time the whole sordid affair of murder and incest is revealed to him. Upon hearing 
this Jocasta kills herself and, finding her body, Oedipus blinds himself and flees Thebes, to wander 
in the wilderness for the rest of his days.  
 To be sure, as Ashliman reminds us, such tales can be understood as serving as “an outlet 
for our frustrations and fears” (Ashliman 2004: 1), insofar as the taboos against murder and incest 
are momentarily overcome before being reinstated. But in other respects Oedipus Rex can also be 
                                                          
11 Oedipus means “swollen foot,” and the king and queen of Corinth named him thus due to the injuries he sustained 
to his feet and ankles during his abandonment and subsequent exposure (Hasan-Rokem & Shulman 1996: 263).  
12 The Sphinx asked “what walks on four legs in the morning, then two legs at noon, and three legs in the evening?” 
(Sophocles 2007: 8). This complex riddle had perplexed many travelers before Oedipus, but in deducing the correct 
answer – namely a human being – Oedipus manages to defeat the Sphinx and thus saves Thebes.  
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seen to reflect a cultural anxiety over the existence of the madness of nature beyond the margins 
of society. After all, the previously encountered tropes of a lurking madness in nature, and of 
wandering in such nature as an image of madness, come to the fore within the narrative. This can 
initially be seen in the abandonment in nature of the baby, perceived to be dangerous and depraved, 
which correlatively renders Oedipus a threat from without; a murderous force at the margins of 
society that subsequently infiltrates and debases the very center of civility – the Theban royal 
family. This is again emphasized in the situation of the Sphinx and the murder of King Laius – 
both beyond the city walls – in an overt nod to the dichotomy of safety within, and danger outside 
of, society. Furthermore, Oedipus, in his blindness and exile in nature, also provides a vivid 
representation of the wandering madman who is aligned with nature. In this regard, through 
profound guilt at the discovery of his transgressions, Oedipus is plunged into madness, signaled by 
“the onset of an animal persona revealed in [his] aimlessness, wandering,” and in some cases 
“causeless violence” (Miller 2000: n.p). Additionally, Miller contends that, as a tragic hero, 
Oedipus’ fruitless and guilt-driven wandering in nature may be viewed as “an intensification or 
hypertrophy of the hero’s normal bent toward movement from place to place and adventure to 
adventure,” because, stripped of its reason, his quest becomes an ever more futile and senseless 
wandering in nature (2000: n.p).  
 Yet in tandem with such discursive echoes of the Archaic past that remained at least 
partially consistent with certain Homeric ideas – particularly those of The Odyssey discussed earlier 
– distinctly new, scientific understandings of the nature and madness also began to emerge. Jouana 
explains this divergence of worldviews in the early Classical period as follows:  
 
Tragic poetry and the work of Hippocratic doctors are not at the same stage of 
development. The works of doctors are totally free from mythical thought, … whilst 
the works of tragedians, since they take their material from myth, still remain 
indebted to archaic thought. (2012: 79)  
 
Accordingly, where before nature had been interpreted through the lens of superstition and 
mythology – in an effort to render nature less terrifying through providing its aspects with 
Olympian masks – now nature became increasingly intelligible through the burgeoning fields of 
mathematics, astronomy and science. As such, Bryant believes that the Classical Greeks “were the 
first to truly ‘discover nature,’” in the sense that they recognized that “physical phenomena are not 
the products of random, arbitrary forces or supernatural powers, but [rather] regular events 
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governed or patterned by determinable sequences of cause and effect” (1996: 120).13 However, 
despite the significant discoveries such as Pythagorean Theorem and Ionian physics made during 
this period, what must also be appreciated is the prevalence of initial ambivalence toward the 
naturalism they entailed.  As Tarnas argues,  
 
none of these philosophers commanded universal cultural influence… [because] for 
most Greeks the Olympian gods were never seriously in doubt. … [Thus] the gradual 
rise of these different strands of early philosophy … represented the seminal 
vanguard of Greek thought in its development out of the era of traditional belief into 
the era of reason. (2010: 23-24) 
 
It is important to underscore such prevalent ambivalence toward naturalism, though, because it can 
be accounted for in relation to the loss of ontological security which such scientific discovery 
threatened. That is, the rise of scientific discourses and the corresponding waning of the belief in 
the supernatural, would have been indissociable from the proportional realization that the gods 
could no longer be propitiated for protection against the ferocity of nature. Consequently, the 
gradual exchange of the anthropomorphic Olympian deities for natural phenomena would also have 
resulted in a decrease in the tentative sense of ontological security which the Olympians had 
previously provided (Bundy 2008: 197). This was particularly so as the Greeks of the Classical era 
became ever more cognizant of their defenselessness in the face of the unrelenting onslaught of 
nature, unmediated by myth.   
 It is in relation to this context that Hadot advances his Promethean-Orphic framework, in 
association with what he calls Socratic withdrawal. To begin with, as Hadot points out, Socrates 
exemplifies the position that nature is unknowable, and maintains that to attempt to know it is folly. 
His response accordingly consisted of a turning away “from the things that have been hidden and 
wrapped up by nature itself,” and an essential refusal “to discuss things that … transcend human 
beings because they are inaccessible to their investigative powers” (Hadot 2006: 91). That is, 
denouncing the vain curiosity in nature’s secrets that drove physikoi such as Thales and 
                                                          
13 In this regard, the pre-Socratic philosophers – specifically Thales – may be seen as trailblazers in the emergent field 
of science. Thales, one of the first physikoi, speculated on the natural (as opposed to supernatural) origins of 
earthquakes, and theorized that the earth floated on water and that earthquakes could thus be attributed to subterranean 
waves, rather than the displeasure of the gods (Harris 2005: 32). This thought signified a break from previous 
explanatory models, insofar as the ensuing precedence of similar naturalistic models for understanding the physical 
world and its phenomena increasingly contrasted with the mythical understandings of the Homeric era and their echoes 
in Classical literature.  
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Anaximander,14 Socrates viewed these pursuits as a distraction from ethical contemplation, and 
instead advocated a “complete rejection of research on nature” (Hadot 2006: 138). In this regard, 
in Plato’s works, one largely encounters a marginalization of the pursuit of scientific knowledge in 
favour of an emphasis on achieving self-knowledge, which is advanced as key to the effective 
functioning, not only of the subject,15 but also by association of society at large.16 In Alcibiades 
and Laches, for example, Plato outlines the core ideas of his care of the self, which Foucault neatly 
encapsulates in “Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth” in terms of the “fundamental theme”  of self-
knowledge, alongside freedom derived from mastery over one’s own passions (Foucault 1997: 
285). Such practices, which emphasized personal insight and restraint, were accordingly deemed 
necessary for the attainment not only of social order, but also prior to that, of physical and mental 
wellbeing. In short, Plato (or Socrates) advanced the above as a necessary prerequisite to the art of 
good governance in the context of the polis, stating that before assuming a position of leadership, 
one should first attain a degree of self-knowledge and self-mastery through the practices of the care 
of the self.  
 Correlatively, in Plato one also finds warnings of the disastrous consequences of weak 
leadership that might allow the common man to wrest power, and interestingly these ideas are 
presented in the form of “an allegory first mentioned … in The Republic” (Rodriquez & Szurmk 
2016: n.p) which harks back to the Archaic themes, discussed earlier. Here, Plato sketches the 
scenario of a ship, captained by “a steersman distinguished for force of body as well as for skill in 
his craft, but not clever in dealing with, or acting upon other men” (Seymour 1902: 385), who is 
subsequently overcome by his inept and mutinous crew. This occurs when the latter, each believing 
they have the right to steer, “throng about the captain, begging and praying him to commit the helm 
to them,” until they eventually “mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the 
stores; thus, eating and drinking, they proceed on their voyage in such a manner as might be 
expected of them” (Plato 1989: 179). And the result of this ill-fated voyage is accordingly a 
meandering “drunken pleasure cruise rather than a rational, well-organized journey from A to B” 
(Steinbauer 2016: n.p). Of course, in this parable, the ship of fools represents the extension of 
                                                          
14 In addition to Thales, Anaximander (610-546 BCE) is widely credited for penning “the first surviving lines of 
Western philosophy,” in which he speculated upon “the origin of all that is.” His works have also been influential in a 
vast array of fields including geography, biology and astrology (Couprie n.d: n.p).  
15 As Foucault points out, “the expression hippo khrēsthai (using a horse) does not mean doing what one likes with a 
horse [but] … handling it properly[,] … so … when Plato (or Socrates) employs this notion [it is] in order to seek the 
self one must take care of” namely “the soul as subject … of instrumental action, of relationships with other people, 
of behavior and attitudes in general and … of relationships to oneself” (2005: 56-57). 
16 The end goal of such education was the production of a good leader for the sake of the polis (Foucault 2005: 82).  
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democracy that Plato criticized,17 since he held that philosophers were best equipped to govern 
society, primarily “because reason is dominant in their soul” (Jha 2010: 40). In keeping with this, 
here the philosopher is portrayed as the knowledgeable captain, who is unable to lead effectively 
under the constant bombardment of his hapless crew. And through this, Plato attempts to 
demonstrate the inevitability of disorder and injustice as a result of democratic systems, as 
reasonable leaders are sidelined by the “uneducated masses” who are not cognizant of the 
intricacies of “running a community,”  and who eventually allow “the least-qualified individuals 
to become […] guardians” (Lubling 2005: 190). But with the trope of the ship already popular, and 
the link between wandering in nature and growing madness so strongly entwined in the Greek 
literary imagination, it is hardly surprising that out of this era there emerged the imagery of the 
ship of fools. Moreover, of additional interest is that, even in these metaphors of Plato, we 
encounter the tropes of tragedy borrowed from the Archaic past, as madness emerges alongside 
reason on board the ship as it sails from the city into the natural depths of the ocean, because the 
further it sails into nature, the more madness overtakes reason.  
 In contrast to such Socratic withdrawal from a nature deemed incomprehensible, in another 
of Plato’s works, Timeaus, Hadot finds archetypal themes which for him neatly encapsulate the 
characteristics of the Orphic response to nature. The work is presented in the form of a speculative 
monologue by the titular character, Timeaus of Locri, who discourses on “the nature of the physical 
world and human beings” (Melchert 2013: n.p), and Hadot advances this format as a nod to Plato’s 
belief that the only means of discovering the generative mysteries of phusis – natural life or the 
birth of things – is to engage in an artistic game. That is, an “artistic game that imitates the artistic 
game of that poet of the universe, the divinity” in the act of creation, through which we may 
“rediscover the genetic movement of things in the motion of discourse” (2006: 156). In this way, 
through human art, thinkers muse upon nature, in the interest of intuiting its hidden aspects. 
Accordingly, Hadot argues that the Timeaus is highly significant to our understanding of the 
relations between humans and nature, as through this text we experience “for the first time a theme 
that will play a vital role in our story: that of the work of art, the discourse or poem, as a means of 
knowing Nature” (Hadot 2006: 156). Such beliefs were, of course, not unique to Plato, but rather 
constituted part of a larger (if somewhat obscure) tradition called Orphism, which can be traced 
                                                          
17 Plato sketched this scenario as a critique of the growing emphasis on Athenian naval power, which he saw as 
precipitating such democracy, because instead of remaining the preserve of upper class warriors, victory could now be 
decided by anyone who could row, which emboldened those of the lower social classes to demand political rights (Hale 
2009: 269-272).  
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back to the time of Hesiod. Admittedly, Gargarin concedes that knowledge of Orphic texts from 
the “Archaic and Classical periods is meagre,” but, evidence from this period nevertheless suggests 
the existence of “religious phenomena involving initiation rites, eschatological concerns, ascetic 
practices, and the use in rituals of poems ascribed to Orpheus”18 (Gargarin 2010: 121).  These 
practices, broadly referred to as the practices of mystery cults or schools, are commonly understood 
to have involved elements emphasizing the worship of the goddess Isis, and as dating back to 
“pagan antiquity” (Burkert 1987: 1), with a consistent emphasis falling on secretive initiation 
rituals for members. Burkert identifies several key manifestations of such cults, including the cult 
of Eleusis, those of Dionysus-Bacchus – the founding of which is widely attributed to Orpheus 
(Casadio & Johnson 2009: n.p) – as well as Pythagoreanism and Neo-Pythagoreanism (1987: 2). 
That is, the cult of Eleusis was dedicated to the worship of Demeter and Persephone, who were 
associated in Greek lore with agriculture and grain. In this regard, as Burkert explains, key among 
the rituals of members of the cult was the re-enactment of “mourning” in response to tragic events 
from folklore, such as the “abduction of Persephone, [and] the death of Dionysus,” so that there 
was “a sequence of mourning followed by a joy in the mysteries” (1987: 75).  Such reenactments 
would also generally take place at agricultural festivals – called the Greater Eleusinian Mysteries 
– while smaller festivals celebrated “the sowing, sprouting and reaping of the grain,” in rituals 
referred to as the Lesser Eleusinian Mysteries (Spencer 1995: 48). In turn, the cult of Dionysus-
Bacchus “had for its focus the divine forces hidden in nature and human beings,” and Casadio and 
Johnson argue that these preoccupations generally manifested in the enactment of “ecstatic 
nocturnal celebrations that showed traits of promiscuity” (Casadio & Johnson 2009: n.p). Finally, 
the Pythagoreans invested spiritual meaning in what they deemed to be divine numbers and 
proportions, particularly in their potential to create beauty if applied to the arts, and they did so 
through rituals which were “aimed at bridging the gap between the mundane and the divine” (Netz 
2005: 93), with the latter understood as imbricated with nature and the sources of its mystery, which 
art could at least partially unlock.  
 Yet, in contrast to both the Socratic withdrawal discussed earlier and such Orphism, other 
figures of the era – such as Hippocrates – were at the same time developing influential scientific 
models for understanding the natural world and the human body. But when one considers the 
                                                          
18  Orpheus, “a pre-Homeric Greek poet” and musician (Adkins & Adkins 2004: 323), was “the son of a Muse and a 
Thracian king” (or Apollo in some accounts), and was celebrated in Ancient Greece for his extraordinary talents in 
music and verse. While he is credited by sources such as Aristophanes as being the “inventor of initiation rituals,” such 
as those of the Bacchic mysteries, he is perhaps best known in Greek myth for his fateful journey to the underworld to 
rescue his wife Eurydice (Gargarin 2010: 120).  
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degree to which he emphasized the importance of balance with nature, the appropriateness of 
Hadot’s characterization of him as Promethean becomes very questionable. That is, best known for 
developing the humoral understanding of the human body, Hippocrates is widely “credited for 
turning away from divine notions of medicine and using observation of the body as a basis for 
medical knowledge.”19 At its simplest, this entailed a dismissal of supernatural explanatory models 
based on ideas of possession, or divine retribution, as the primary causes of illness. This was 
because Hippocratic diagnostic practices “largely disregarded the gods, at least the punitive or 
malicious role of gods, in disease” (Robson & Baek 2009: 58), in favour of a focus on natural 
causes, namely the four humors identified in the treatise On Diseases – phlegm, blood, bile and 
water (later, black bile). In this text, Hippocrates identifies three key origins of diseases: the first 
is an “excess or deficiency of any one of the four humors;” the second are “violent causes, such as 
wounds [or] falls” from which disease springs; and the third cause of illness are extremes in 
“atmospheric conditions … which can dispose people toward disease” (Carrick 2001: 29). In short, 
when in a state of disequilibrium, the humors were thought to undergo fluctuations in volume, 
temperature, or texture, to which all manner of physical and mental ailments could be attributed, 
but which could be addressed through a restoration of equilibrium.   
 Revolutionary in its field, on account of its break with the mythico-religious framework of 
the past, Hippocratic principles also both influenced and resonated with certain other philosophical 
movements of their time. This can most clearly be seen in Hippocrates’ view of man in relation to 
nature. Wallace and Gagh explain that “Hippocrates’ concept of health and disease was based on 
his belief that Man was intimately related to Nature; [that] they were interdependent,” with the 
consequence that, for him, “health consisted of a balance of forces, and disease resulted from an 
imbalance in the interaction of Man and Nature” (Wallace & Gagh 2010: 787). Thus, for 
Hippocrates, in order to live healthily, one must achieve both internal balance by avoiding excesses 
of all kinds, and external harmony with nature; something which required “treatment [to be] 
directed at the restoration of balance, with vomits [,] purges and bleedings designed to reduce the 
humors which were in excess and [thereby] restore the body to the optimum condition” (Hodgkin 
2010: 56).  Moreover, these prescriptions applied equally to the workings of the mind and the body, 
as Hippocrates viewed the two as functioning together as a single system.  Thus, for him, 
“corrupted humors could disrupt the workings of the mind, just as readily as those of the body, and 
                                                          
19 There is some debate as to whether Hippocrates was indeed the sole author of the works attributed to him, or whether 
a group of scholars contributed to the vast array of stylistically diverse and sometimes contradictory medical treatises 
referred to as the Hippocratic Corpus (Nuland 1995: 11).  
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humors in their turn could be corrupted by unwholesome patterns of thought and behaviour” 
(Hodgkin 2010: 56). But precisely because the restoration of equilibrium was construed as so key 
to the achievement of healing, and indeed the maintenance of health in perpetuity, the degree to 
which one can categorize the Hippocratic approach as Promethean – as Hadot does – is very much 
debatable. And this becomes even more apparent when one considers it in relation to the avowedly 
Promethean approach of Aristotle. 
 As Hadot explains, Aristotle’s approach entails an enduring attempt to master nature 
through developing knowledge of it via zoological observation and categorization (Newmeyer 
2014: 517). Accordingly, nature, particularly as it is encountered through the senses, received 
immense emphasis in the work of Aristotle, which distinguished his writings from those of Plato. 
Indeed, it is for this reason that “Plato and Aristotle have traditionally been considered divergent 
in their philosophical approaches,” because while “Plato looked upward to the heavens as a source 
of truth … Aristotle emphasized empirical research in the world we know” (Balot 2006: 227).  
Analogously, in contrast to Plato (and Socrates), who sought self-understanding through reflection, 
Aristotle’s approach entailed an outward focus; an exhaustive “investigating and explaining [of] 
natural phenomena” (Leunissen 2010: 1). This was not least because, for him, only through “the 
serious study of nature for its own sake … [can] man ultimately achieve self-understanding” (Lear 
1999: 10). In this regard, Aristotle is perhaps best known for his identification of the four causes, 
namely, the “formal, material, efficient, and final” causes (Veatch 1974:66), or the identification 
of basic factors by which objects can be understood or known.  
 However, the most contentious of the four is, of course, the final cause, “or the regular and 
characteristic consequences or results” of an object (Johnson 1990: 24). While this is relatively 
unproblematic in the case of objects such as tools that are designed with a purpose in mind, many 
feel that it becomes problematic as a means of appraisal of nature or “human affairs” (Johnson 
1990: 24). This is particularly as Aristotle’s theory of telos posited the existence of final purposes, 
which are not predicated on the existence of a divine creator, but which nevertheless require an 
analogous degree of faith.20 Yet in a world increasingly bereft of possible propitiation of the gods, 
and correlatively increasingly faced with the harsh reality of an implacable and unsympathetic 
array of natural forces and elements, Aristotelian teleology may well have served a crucial purpose, 
insofar as it rendered even unpalatable experiences at least acceptable in terms of the ‘greater 
                                                          
20 As Winter neatly explains, “Aristotelian ethics is consistent with the existence of the teleology of a divine creator, 
but it does not require one” (2012:38).  
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scheme of things’ as it were – the ends of which justified the means, even if the latter were 
unpleasant for those along the way. Moreover, it is also important to challenge Hadot’s schema in 
this way by differentiating between the Promethean and the faith-based aspects of Aristotle – in 
addition to challenging Hadot’s designation of Hippocrates as Promethean (because of 
Hippocrates’ focus on achieving a balance with nature rather than on any violent wresting of 
nature’s secrets). This is because, although Hadot admits such complexity in Plato’s ranging 
between Socratic withdrawal and Orphic pursuit, for some inexplicable reason he seems reluctant 
to extend such complexity to Aristotle, despite how both the Promethean and faith-based aspects 
of Aristotle evidently exerted great influence in the emerging Roman world, and indeed beyond.  
 
Perceptions of Nature in Ancient Rome 
During the Roman republic, as well as the early years of the Roman Empire, Roman culture 
“adopted many elements from Greek civilization” (Slomp 2011: 50). Indeed, in many respects, the 
period of the Roman Empire – spanning from roughly 30 BCE to its fall in 476 CE – constituted 
something of a melting pot of the preceding five perspectives on nature of the extended Hadotian 
framework. Firstly, with regard to Socratic withdrawal from nature, the Stoics modified the 
practices associated with Plato’s “anthropological orientation” (Horujy & Jakim 2015: 39); as 
Elden points out, the key variation was that spiritual exercises were now carried out, not toward 
the end of effective leadership, or as “preparatory [work] for the care of others, but as an end in 
itself” (2016: n.p).  Relatedly, in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault reiterates the 
importance of self-knowledge within this context, but also emphasizes the growing importance of 
the practice of care of the self, and he proposes that at this point an individual needed first to “take 
care of the self for itself, the relationship to others being deduced from and entailed by the 
relationship one establishes of self to self” (2005: 206). Such a relationship, Foucault maintains, 
was achieved by an intensive regime of turning inwards, toward the self, and he suggests that the 
subject pursued this through a concentrated application of  
 
ourselves to ourselves, that is to say we must turn away from everything around us. 
We must turn away from everything that is not part of ourselves but which might 
grab our attention, our diligence, and arouse our zeal. We must turn away from this 
in order to turn around to the self. Our attention, eyes, mind, and finally our whole 
being must be turned towards the self throughout our life. We must turn away from 
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everything that turns us away from our self, so as to return to ourselves. (Foucault 
2005: 206 207)  
 
While such exclusive focus on the self would later under Christianity come to be regarded with 
some degree of suspicion, during the Roman empire this knowledge and care of the self was 
regarded as an essential component of self-determination, or the means of freedom for any 
individual.  Accordingly, Foucault stresses that this concern for the self did not merely improve 
self-knowledge, but that it also entailed exercises, as well as certain “way[s] of being” or behaviors 
– such as “clothing, gait, appearance,” an air of calm and one’s relation to others – through which 
one’s freedom was demonstrated (2000: 286). This tendency toward inward turning, a shift in focus 
away from the unpredictable and indomitable outside world – both natural and political – and the 
dangers and distractions it presents, and toward the control afforded by such self-mastery, resonates 
strongly with Socratic ideas of withdrawal from nature. 
 Secondly, in terms of the Orphic approach to nature, certainly in Rome “we do not find … 
the patronage of Orpheus or other Orphic elements,” and even where vestiges remained, inherited 
from Hellenistic tradition, “they [were] perceived … as something specifically Greek,” and thus 
“alien to Romanness” (de Jáuregui 2010: 68). However, it is important to recall that the 
marginalization of the cultic following of Orphism as a branch of religious practice in Roman 
culture, did not entail the eradication of Hadot’s Orphic perspective in relation to nature. This is 
not only because of the Romans’ adoption of theogonic myth, to account for the “creation of the 
universe and everything in it from chaos,” that is, as a framework to understand the origins and 
workings of the natural world around them (Krebs 1999: 73). In addition, apart from the significant 
growth of Bacchus worship – at least until the highly “repressive … Bacchic affair of 186,” which 
saw thousands killed and imprisoned and Bacchic temples destroyed (Orlin 2010: 165) – there was 
also a form of “neo-Pythagorean[ism],” which remained “the patrimony of a select minority” (de 
Jáuregui 2010: 69). Moreover, it cannot be forgotten that Roman emperors, such as “Augustus, 
Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius, Commodus, and Gallienus [all] chose to be initiated into the Eleusian 
mysteries” (Casadio & Johnston 2009: 6). 
 Thirdly, in terms of the Hippocratic pursuit of balance with nature, involving Greek 
naturalistic and biomedical understandings, madness, for example, continued to be “defined in pre-
psychiatric times by two characteristics: aimless wandering and violence” (Rogers & Pilgrim 2014: 
181). But, although these features resonate strongly with Padel’s model of the Classical Greek 
understandings of madness (Pietikäinen 2015: 18) discussed earlier, namely wandering in nature 
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and violence or rage, they were increasingly determined along Hippocratic lines, in terms of 
physiological causes. That is, damage, involving “an imbalance in the humors,” was understood to 
manifest in certain abnormal “psychiatric behaviours” (Corrigan et al 2011: n.p). In this regard, 
during the Roman era, scientific study in the area of medicine was advanced particularly by the 
Roman physician Galen, who continued upon the trajectory established by Hippocrates. Indeed, 
building upon Hippocrates’ theory of the humors, as well as developing his own theories of disease 
and their correct treatment, Galen’s work remained “a dominant influence on European medicine 
from the Roman Empire until the Renaissance” (Wilson 2006: 307). In particular, in keeping with 
the focus of his predecessor, Galen’s work on the four humors encompassed an approach which 
sought to restore or maintain favorable “proportions” between yellow bile, black bile, phlegm, and 
blood, in conjunction with a suitable “blending of the four primary qualities (hot, cold, wet, dry)” 
(Wilson 2006: 337).  And in order to do so, Galen – in true Hippocratic fashion – closely observed 
the symptoms of a patient and, applying his theory of opposites, would prescribe a treatment which 
qualitatively opposed the patient’s symptoms. For instance, if a woman had a cold, he would 
prescribe pepper for its warming effect, and if a man was suffering from weakness, he would 
prescribe vigorous exercise (Kelly et al 2002: 37). To be sure, while Galen’s method for treatment 
remained anchored in the Hippocratic method, he did demonstrate a more nuanced understanding 
of health and the humors than his precursor. This was especially insofar as he theorized that since 
“not every deviation from the normal humoral proportions resulted in disease,” there must exist a 
gradient or range, where one could be healthy, either in a state of ideal harmony of humors, or a 
state “just short of disease” (Wilson 2006: 337). Additionally, he also theorized “how the balance 
of these elements is not only related to physical disease but also affects how one sees and responds 
to particular situations, whether one is easily angered or calm” (Hammer 2014: 236), with excessive 
disquiet accordingly precipitating disequilibrium and illness. But despite these advancements, the 
Hippocratic emphasis on the gentle approximation of balance with nature, remained a guiding 
thread of Galen’s work. 
 Fourthly, though, at this time a schism in medicine also becomes visible, which is 
illustrative of a shift away from the pursuit of unity, balance and coherence with nature, and toward 
a more violent, Promethean-inspired domination of nature. This tendency may be discerned in 
Posidonius’ invocation of the Platonically divided soul, 21  when he maintains that:  
                                                          
21 In The Republic, Plato uses the analogy of a charioteer driving two horses to illustrate his concept of a tripartite soul, 
which he divides into “a rational mind and the two irrational faculties of ambition and appetite” (Long 2006: 425), 
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the cause of the passions, that is, of discord and of an unhappy life, is failing to follow 
in everything the spirit (daimôn) within oneself, which is akin to and has the same 
nature of the spirit that manages the whole world, but [rather] falling away and being 
carried along with the inferior animal-like spirit. (Posidonius in Sharples 2014: 128)  
 
This excerpt is revelatory of the instantiation of a discursive rift between a higher and lower nature: 
the spiritual self, that which is representative of restraint and order, and which should be aspired 
to, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the animal self, that which is chaotic and subject to base 
passions, and which should be subordinated. Admittedly, this tendency toward bifurcation was 
already reflected in the new moralizing inflections that arose in scientific fields, including 
medicine, in the years “following the death of Hippocrates.” But as “the Roman Empire 
dominated,” these fields became marked by a general slowing in the areas surrounding “the science 
of psychology and mental disturbance” (Hinshaw 2007: 58). And this stagnation in the sciences, 
aided by increasing distrust in Greek ideals and the correlative rise of Christianity, signaled the 
gradual reinstantiation of mythico-religious thought, as well as the resurgence of supernatural 
explanatory models for both bodily and mental afflictions. Accordingly, the new models, contrary 
to their naturalistic or biomedical predecessors, often leaned heavily on ideas of demonic 
possession or divine vengeance, and this radical divergence in thought is neatly reflected in the 
birth of two rival schools, headed by Asclepiades and Celsus, respectively. On the one hand, 
Aesculapian thought followed the traditions established by Hippocrates, and espoused humane 
treatment for those afflicted with mental disturbances, which generally entailed a period of rest and 
nurturance in an Aesculapian temple or sanctuary. However, on the other hand, with the 
abovementioned recession of naturalistic thought, interpretations of madness also turned once 
again to more Promethean-inspired treatment of the mad, involving increasing brutality in an effort 
to control their animal aspects and to force them back into health. This movement was led by 
Celsus, who “contended, quite strongly, that the optimal treatments for those with mental afflictions 
were those that emphasized restraints,” along with “states of deprivation and hunger, placement in 
total darkness, and intentional use of fright in order to distract the individual from disturbed modes 
of thinking” (Hinshaw 2007: 58-59). Hinshaw also makes note of a cycle of advancement and 
retreat – “of compassion versus cruelty” (Hinshaw 2007: 59) – in the perception and treatment of 
madness seen as the effect of aberrant nature, or as the result of the vicissitude of nature, which 
                                                          
represented by the charioteer and the two steeds, respectively. In this he suggests that reason must govern our wilder 
instincts, in the same manner as the charioteer yokes and directs the horses.  
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had succeeded in seeping into and disturbing otherwise social human beings. But ultimately, it was 
the Promethean approach of cruelty which won out, and which, as will be discussed, went on to 
inform much of human attitudes to nature. 
 Fifthly, with regard Aristotelian-inspired faith in the telos of nature, the theme of human 
beings as beholden to a natural order which they could not fully intuit, but from which they 
nevertheless could derive solace if they could summon up sufficient faith in its divine rationality, 
remained central. This was particularly true insofar as the spheres of philosophy in the Roman 
Empire drew heavily on the ideas of Aristotle, whose work “filtered into wider culture” (Hammer 
2014: 236), most notably through Stoicism which exerted “a great influence on the Romans” 
(Richard 2003: 108). Yet while the Stoics shared a common teleological outlook with Aristotle, 
believing that “the universe was an endless chain of causation, like a river destined to flow in a 
certain direction” (Richard 2003: 107), they also “conceived of natural philosophy more broadly” 
than did Aristotle (White 2003:125).  That is, for Aristotle, natural philosophy comprised mainly 
“a conceptual investigation of kinesis (motion or change) and of whatever is implied by change 
(e.g. magnitude, place and time)” (White 2003: 125).  In contrast, for the Stoics, such physics were 
only one component of a complex set of beliefs and practices that shaped the way they viewed and 
related to their world. And unlike the Aristotelian approach, which relied primarily on scientific 
observation, the Stoics’ relation to the natural world was more multifaceted, encompassing 
“physics, ethics, and logic” (Hadot 1995: 266). To elaborate, the Stoic topos of physics or 
cosmology, Pigliucci explains, deals with “what we today would classify as natural science [and] 
metaphysics,” and like Aristotle, Stoic physics was in part a quest to understand nature, “not [as] 
an end in itself, but rather [as] subordinate” to the greater end of living a “eudaimonic life” 
(Pigliucci 1995: n.p). Similarly, for the Stoics, such a life could not be divorced from nature, as 
they believed that “the greatest good (summum bonum) consists in applying knowledge of the 
working natural causes to the conduct of life, in choosing what is in accordance with nature, and 
in rejecting what is contrary to it.” In short, “for them, the greatest good is to live in agreement […] 
with nature” (Holowchak 2008: n.p). However, while Stoic philosophy and practice, due in large 
part to its essentially egalitarian outlook, “appealed to all classes … [of] Roman society” (Scofield 
2004: 153), such enthusiastic adoption of Stoicism by the Romans was not unproblematic. As 
Arnold explains, often when a new philosophy gains more general acceptance, “it begins to assume 
all the features of a religion” (2015: 3). And such transformation is marked not only by an increased 
precedence of literary allusions to Stoic doctrine (Arnold 2015: 3), but also by a general waning of 
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interest in physics, and an increasing theological aspect. Accordingly, late Stoicism, particularly 
during the Roman Empire, is typified by “an emphasis not on the physical structure of the cosmos 
but on the divine spirit in each individual,” and its correlative faithful subordination to the workings 
of divine reason – workings which exceed the capacity of human comprehension, but in which 
belief is nevertheless recommended (Sharples 2014: 128). Indeed, Hadot himself emphasizes such 
“effort to become aware of our situation as part of the universe” as an “exercise of wisdom;” which 
not only formed a crucial part of late Stoic practice, but which also remains a valuable initiative 
for “modern man” (Hadot 1995: 212).  
 
Perceptions of Nature in the Middle Ages 
The closing decades of the ancient world ultimately saw increasing recourse to the preternatural as 
an explanation for madness usurp the naturalistic bio-medical models which previously rivaled 
them, and the above five approaches to nature of the extended Hadotian framework – Socratic, 
Orphic, Hippocratic, Promethean and Aristotelian – all underwent degrees of corresponding 
transformation. But in all this, one dynamic which dominated was a diminishment of endeavors to 
meet and harmonize with nature in the interest of pursuing the good life, and an increased disregard 
for nature as the realm of evil. Indeed, the domain of nature itself bore testimony to the greatest act 
of madness ever, namely the rejection of God’s grace which had condemned humankind to an 
earthly existence – at least according to the Christian meta-narrative.  
 That is, after the fall of the Roman Empire in 476 CE, Europe entered a new period of vast 
social changes that were accompanied by an attendant shift in the perceptions and representations 
of nature and, for that matter, madness. And where Greco-Roman traditions faltered, Christianity 
surged forth; this, Pietikäinen maintains, comprised the primary driver of the widespread 
“regression to a mythical-religious thinking” which had once “been successfully challenged by 
Greek rationalism and naturalism” (2015: 25). In particular, the above bifurcation of humans and 
nature became increasingly articulated in religious terms, as a binary of spiritual/divine versus 
bodily/earthly were pitted against each other. This is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in early 
Christian texts, such as Augustine’s City of God,22 which describes the existence of two cities – 
one “earthly and [one] heavenly” (O’Daly 1999: 98). This allegory constitutes a foundational 
component of Augustine’s social philosophy, in terms of which he advances the existence of “two 
                                                          
22 Referred to as “the first magnum opus of Christian philosophy,” the text – completed in 426 CE – covers a wide 
array of topics surrounding the burgeoning Christian faith, such as “civil and natural theology, the history of creation, 
philosophy of history, eschatology, and martyrdom” (Comstock 2013: n.p).  
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classes of persons, to whom [he] refers collectively and allegorically as cities — the City of God 
and the earthly city” (Mattox n.d: n.p) – which are mutually exclusive cities, destined for salvation 
and damnation, respectively. To elaborate, those who preoccupy themselves with earthly pursuits 
such as greed, lust and aggression, Augustine considered justifiably damned, as the “unregenerate 
progeny of Adam and Eve” who had fallen irretrievably from grace. Conversely, for Augustine, 
citizens of the city of God, or heavenly city, are “out of place in the world [and] without earthly 
intuition,” or desire for earthly or material goods (Mattox n.d: n.p), and are thus destined for 
salvation. In short, during this period, humanity, nature, civilization, and the divine, were all 
articulated in relation to binaries of good and evil, which were at once new and familiar, insofar as 
biblical parables – such as that of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden – revived pejorative tropes 
of nature found in earlier epics and tragedies, such as The Odyssey and Oedipus Rex. In terms of 
this, Adam and Eve, on account of their hubristic disobedience, were banished from the Garden of 
Eden – comprising a safe and domesticated natural environment – into a wild and unpredictable 
natural environment (Smithard 2012: n.p). Correlatively, this tale also cautioned readers of the dire 
fate that awaited those who engaged too closely with, or who immersed themselves too deeply 
within, nature, which by definition now constituted both the domain of the fallen and something to 
be superseded by the heaven accessed in the next life, by those fortunate enough to obtain salvation. 
The most salient implication of such representations is, of course, the separation of humanity from 
nature, and consequently, the inference of an innate danger in the diversity of nature, as a domain 
that evinced the most primordial act of madness, namely Adam and Eve’s (and by implication, 
Satan’s) rejection of God’s grace, which had condemned humankind to an earthly existence.  
 Against this backdrop, the five approaches to nature of the extended Hadotian framework 
– Aristotelian-inspired faith in teleology, Socratic withdrawal, Orphism, Prometheanism, and the 
Hippocratic pursuit of balance – were all subject to inflection, with some rising to dominance and 
others being impugned. Firstly, Stoic teleology was reinscribed in Christianity through the 
paradigm of divine causation,23 such that, in accordance with an Aristotelian-inspired faith in the 
telos of an overarching divine rationality, “the laws of nature” were understood simply as “what 
god intends for all and each of us” (Clark 2013: 17). And this philosophical influence only grew in 
strength over the ensuing millennium until it emerged as the cornerstone of Thomas Aquinas’ 
                                                          
23 That is, while Plato’s understanding of the body-soul divide and his theory of forms was integral to the formation of 
Augustine’s Christian belief systems (Davidson 2013: n.p), the traditional pillars of Stoicism – Logic, Physics and 
Ethics – assumed new personified forms under Christianity, as the Father, Son and Holy Spirit respectively (Visher 
1997: 38). 
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Christianity, which borrowed more heavily from Aristotle than from Plato (Spurgin & Swindal 
2010: 30). Through this, what emerged was “theology which, precisely with Aquinas … was … 
founded on Aristotle” as a “rational reflection founding a faith with a universal vocation, founded 
at the same time [as] the principle of a knowing subject” (Foucault 2005: 26). In terms of this, 
Aquinas concurred with Aristotle, insofar as he advanced that “the final cause is not only the cause 
of causality of the efficient cause but … also the causality of all the causes” (Peterson 2008: 21); 
and, moreover, it was argued that even if the final cause in itself was unknowable, its mere 
existence was sufficient to provide the “basis for an argument for God’s existence” (Fesser 2009: 
n.p).  
 Secondly, while a Christian variant of Socratic withdrawal prevailed during the Middle 
Ages, which borrowed from the preceding Hellenistic-Roman practices of the self, it also differed 
from them in key ways. That is, the Hellenistic-Roman schools had previously sought an adequate 
relationship of self to self (Foucault 2005: 223) via integrated practices. Referred to by Foucault as 
epimeleia heautou (Ng 2016: 143), these practices of the care of the self “were performed on the 
self, by the self,” and involved a host of exercises ranging from “memorization, meditation [and] 
abstinence, … [to] examination of conscience,” which constituted the cornerstones of Stoic, Cynic 
and Epicurean philosophy (Menihan 2012: 2-3). In contrast, early Christians, in a somewhat stark 
departure from Hellenistic-Roman tradition, adopted approaches calling for a withdrawal even 
from the self-knowledge of their predecessors, to concern themselves instead with “the conduct of 
moral … life” (Hadot 2006: 91).  Consequently, along with the appropriation of the above ancient 
mechanisms, early Christians also “introduced several key modifications” to these exercises of 
“ancient asceticism” (Horujy 2015: 50), with the most important of these being “self-renunciation.” 
That is, where previously the Hellenistic-Roman practices – such as examination of the conscience 
– were oriented toward improved self-knowledge in order to better care for oneself and those 
around one, in Christian ascesis, self-knowledge was rendered suspect and the objective became 
instead “the total renunciation of oneself;” indeed, the renunciation “of one’s individuality, self 
[and] identity” (Horujy 2015: 50) for the sake of the salvation of one’s soul.  Emerging in tandem 
with the new suspicion of such self-knowledge, was also an elevation of the divine soul – or the 
soul as substance rather than the soul as subject (Foucault 2005: 22-222) – and a correlative 
growing revulsion for the natural body. As already mentioned, at this time, the body was viewed 
as the negative binary opposite of the pure, eternal soul, namely it’s earthly and sinful counterpart; 
a view formalized by Augustine. For him, while “Adam and Eve, prior to their sin, had in a pre-
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existent state engaged in an uninterrupted, ‘angelic’ contemplation of God,” it was “their fall from 
grace [that] took the form of their fall into the body, into flesh” (Gelpi 2008: 57). Thus, their total 
immersion in nature, precipitated by their sampling of the fruit of the forbidden tree, signified a 
break from godliness and a descent into the immorality and physical suffering of nature. The 
inflection of the Platonic/Socratic notion of the separation of flesh and spirit through the moralizing 
rhetoric of Christianity, which demanded interminable self-renunciation, can scarcely be missed.  
 Thirdly, the Orphic approach to nature was – according to Hadot himself – largely 
suppressed by Christianity. In particular Christian repression of agrarian cults in various forms was 
often extremely violent, and within this context Hadot underscores that the Orphic approach to 
unveiling the secrets of nature through aesthetic endeavor experienced a significant decline, largely 
disappearing “at the end of antiquity and in the Middle Ages” in light of the ascendency of Christian 
explanatory models (Hadot 2006: 282).  
 Fourthly, the Promethean stance fared equally badly, as scientific attempts to uncover the 
secrets of nature were at times condemned as heresy. Albl explains that “the Judeo-Christian 
tradition insisted that the universe was created through God’s logos – the power to infuse the 
universe with natural order” – and therefore “the task of the scientist was only to discover the laws 
through which the divine logos operates in the world” [emphasis added] (2009: 77). Thus, in the 
Middle Ages, scientific Promethean pursuits were largely curtailed by the burgeoning religiosity 
of the era, which rendered them not only idle speculations, but also underpinned by a dubious 
morality that saw in nature less the wonder of God and more a source of abiding natural wonder. 
This is perhaps best represented by the aggression toward heresy of the Spanish Inquisition, which 
extended into the late fifteenth century, and which had among its many effects, a deleterious 
“impact on the accessibility of scientific works,” particularly in fields such as “astrology and 
alchemy [and those] sciences that were deemed to carry overtones of superstition” (Kamen in Albl 
2009: 78).  
 Fifthly, the pursuit of balance with nature previously undertaken by Greek and Roman 
physicians Hippocrates and Galen, fared slightly better in the Middle Ages. On the one hand, as 
Thiher explains, while much of the discourse surrounding nature and madness in the early Middle 
Ages in Europe had been influenced by “Greek thought” and its humoral approach, which 
constituted the “basis for the naturalistic interpretation of madness,” as the Middle Ages proceeded, 
these “medical views were [progressively] subordinated to the final arbiter for all medieval 
interpretations of reality: the Bible” (1999: 46). Accordingly, in medieval Europe, the perception 
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of various events – from natural disasters to illness – became increasingly shaped around Christian 
religious beliefs. The result was that a theological approach to madness came to supersede the 
Hellenistic “humoral determination of madness [and] the Stoic determination of passion as 
madness.” This was because  
 
Christianity constantly added a superior level of interpretation to [the] classical 
determinations of madness. [For example,] the naturalism of the humors theories was 
subordinated to a theological interpretation that constructed humoral imbalance at 
times as directly caused by God, especially with a view to punishing the proud, 
damning the wicked, or testing and improving the just. (Thiher 1999: 46) 
 
In this way, Augustine’s model for the categorization of illness was increasingly taken up, until it 
largely eclipsed the naturalistic Greek and to a lesser extent, Roman determinations, which had 
existed before. In short, Augustine classified illnesses into two groups, namely those that have 
natural and those that have supernatural causes, and madness generally fell into the latter category 
(Pietikäinen 2015: 25). In effect, it was viewed either as a diabolical machination of Satan, or a 
vengeful strike by God against the sinful, or as stemming from man’s “ontological instability” as 
a result of “humanity’s fall from grace” (Thiher 1999: 47).  
 However, on the other hand, Foucault stresses that despite such definition, madness in the 
Middle Ages was not yet subject to the rigid binaries which would later come to characterize 
perceptions of it, such that there still existed a “conversation between reason and unreason” (2006: 
xv). This is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the medieval conception of the “holy fool,” 
and the belief that, in some cases, madness itself could be a manifestation of divinity (Pietikäinen 
2015: 29). These holy fools, who enjoyed the patronage of nobility and the church, were believed 
to be bestowed with the gift of direct communication with God, and were thus “capable of 
expressing essential truths about the world” (Leslie 2000: 67). As a consequence, the mad were not 
shunned or “socially feared” (Merquior 1987: 21), but were instead at times even revered, with 
“falling in ecstasy, speaking in tongues and seeing visions” being perceived as “blessed 
foolishness” (Pietikäinen 2005: 30). Due to these attitudes, the mad were seldom confined, and 
instead either inhabited the margins of society in sedentary fashion, or led a nomadic existence, 
through interminable pilgrimages to holy sites and relics. And it is in this situation of the mad – in 
a persistently liminal space between society and nature – that we see a reflection of Hippocratic 
balance, with the mad themselves the point of balance between society and nature.  
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 Here it should be noted that the idea of the pilgrimage, both as a symptom of and cure for 
madness, draws strongly on the notions of madness and wandering in nature conceived in Archaic 
and Classical Greece, even as it inflected it in terms of a new religious idiom. In the literature and 
art of the time, such conceptions of madness are well attested to, along with the lineage of imagery 
of madness from which they were constructed. Parr accordingly advances that, in this regard, 
“Europe inherited some potent examples from the Classical world” (2015: 18), leaning heavily on 
associated themes of departure from society into nature as related to madness. Indeed, the 
symptoms of madness in the medieval literary imagination bear a striking resemblance to those 
“ancient prototypes” that found articulation in the literature of Classical Greece; this is evinced in 
Polonius’ identification of madness as a deep “alienation, sometimes to the extent of a retreat into 
the wilderness, violence, identification with animals, suicide and other forms of self-
destructiveness” (Feder 1980: 101). As a result, the quest for reason came to be depicted not only 
as a physical journey from one place to another, but also as a spiritual quest, determined by the 
subject’s “compulsion to define the self in relation to God” and the teachings of the church (Feder 
1980: 101). In this regard, Thiher points to Thomas Hoccleve (1370-1450), a mentally-ill poet, in 
whose work the era’s explanatory model for madness is clearly demonstrated:  
 
Right so, though that my witte were a pilgrim 
And went fer from hom, he cam again.  
God me devoided of the grevous venim 
That had enfectid my brain. (Hoccleve in Thiher 1999: 47-48)  
  
The above is significant not only because it is one of the earliest autobiographical accounts of 
madness (Thiher 1999: 47), but also because this extract is indicative of several key views of 
madness at the time, which indicate the survival of aspects of Hippocrates and Galen’s humoral 
model. That is, Hoccleve reflects vestiges of the humoral approach of the Greek/Roman model, 
referring to a “grevous venim” which bears a resonance with the foul black bile, responsible for 
rages and passions according to the Greek and Roman naturalist model. However, this affliction – 
in accordance with the religiosity of the time – is unquestioningly understood as stemming from 
the divine. Furthermore, great importance is bestowed upon the idea of pilgrimage, with the writer 
likening his reason to a pilgrim, departing and returning, as it were. This resonates not only with 
the religious sentiment of the time, which led to pilgrimages to holy sites, shrines and relics being 
recognized as therapeutic activities; in addition, it also alludes to a degree of divine incitement as 
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inseparable from the understanding of the condition. And this clearly reflects the third element of 
Padel’s Classical Greek images of madness, namely wandering in nature. Such images also set the 
tone for future incarnations of the pilgrimage for reason, while at the same time reflecting their 
literary precursors, which emphasized the return journey, and similarly suggested madness to be a 
severe, but ultimately, ephemeral state (Pietikäinen 2015: 18). The possibility of such return, in 
conjunction with the manner in which the quasi-scientific understandings of madness by Greek and 
Roman naturalists mingle with the supernatural determinations of medieval Europe, all indicate the 
discursive flux in relation to nature during this time.  
 However, while madness was seldom viewed as inherently bad, dangerous or permanent, 
and while the institutionalized oppression and confinement of the mad was still for the most part 
unheard of, emerging across Europe were also other structures, both physical and discursive, which 
would come to inform the perception and treatment of the mad along with the conception of nature 
in years to come. These were the leprosaria and lazar houses, designed for the care and quarantining 
of lepers. As Foucault explains, from “the High Middle Ages to the end of the Crusades,” – roughly 
between 1000 and 1300 CE – leprosariums emerged across “the entire face of Europe,” and at their 
apex, it is estimated that “there were as many as 19 000 of them throughout Christendom” (Foucault 
2005: 3). Due to the scale and reach of these operations, they may be seen as the site of the 
development of discourses of exclusion, marginalization and confinement across the Western 
world, but only when catalyzed by the loss of faith in divine teleology that otherwise characterized 
the Middle Ages. 
 
Perceptions of Nature in the Renaissance  
Firstly, with regard to Aristotelian-inspired faith in teleology, as seen before in Classical Greece, 
the failure of faith through the rise of reason brings with it its own set of anxieties and sources of 
ontological insecurity, because in the absence of a deity or deities whom one can ask to hold back 
the forces of nature, one is faced with natural elements that cannot be propitiated. And in this 
context, all five approaches to nature of the extended Hadotian framework underwent 
transformation. York maintains, while cases of leprosy in Western Europe had been recorded since 
the fourth century CE, spreading gradually “along expanding mercantile routes” and in new “urban 
centers” (York 2012: 118), generally the disease received little attention, particularly in comparison 
to the hysteria which would come to surround it in the late Middle Ages. And he attributes such 
subsequent mania not to “a real rise in the disease’s prevalence” but rather to “increased social fear 
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of the disease” (York 2012: 118); an increase in fear that, at least to a certain extent, may be 
understood as proportional to a decrease in religious faith, as a consequence of a growing emphasis 
on reason instead of religious belief. In short, previously, through mechanisms of “social 
construction” (Shoham-Steiner 2014: 22), both the disease and its sufferers came to be held as 
“objects of […] repulsion” (Gutting 1994: 52), because of the widely held view that “leprosy was 
a punishment for … a variety of sins” (Grigsby 2004: 40) – an appraisal which mystified the disease 
and served to bolster the prevailing attitudes of disgust which surrounded it. But the later growing 
fear of contamination and lack of sound scientific knowledge of the causes, spread and cure of the 
disease, also pointed to a growing critical reason that was separating from the comforting 
Aristotelian-inspired faith in teleology writ large in the Christian faith and expressed through the 
ideas of the over-arching will and design of God. Turi provides helpful elaboration on the ensuing 
contradictory position that lepers – and later the mad – occupied amidst the unchecked religiosity 
of medieval Europe. Lepers, in the early Middle Ages, she states, “were considered to be constant 
manifestations of God, since they were the signs both of His anger and His grace; they were 
excluded and by their exclusion did they gain salvation” (Turi 2010: 3). And the rise of leprosaria 
may largely be attributed to such discursive practices, which enabled and justified the isolation and 
imprisonment of the inflicted in “houses designed more for separation from society than for cures” 
(Gutting 1994: 52). Accordingly, through such separation, a manifestation of a perverse aspect of 
the natural world – namely leprosy – created and utilized by God as a means of punishing those 
who, in their madness, had turned away from his grace, was confined. Ironically though, in the late 
Middle Ages, as the disease dwindled, fear of it increased over the prospect of accidental infection, 
the corollary of which was necessarily doubt concerning God’s omniscience, which might 
otherwise have prevented such unfortunate oversights. Correlatively nature emerged once more as 
violent, unpredictable, and indeed mad, on account of anomalies such as leprosy which could 
devastate the lives of the afflicted for no reason whatsoever.  
 The significance of the leprosaria cannot thus be overstated, because they also established 
a template for dealing with any such natural anomalies that stood to threaten the growing city 
centers in future. Consequently, by the end of the Middle Ages, when rates of infection had waned 
significantly, and the vast institutions once brimming with the afflicted were left largely 
uninhabited, this template precipitated their repurposing. That is, they remained empty only until 
“a new incarnation of disease … renewed the [need for] rites of purification and exclusion” 
(Foucault 2005: 3), which could take place within their stifling confines, in the interest of 
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safeguarding the civilization of city centers. City centers in which – in the Renaissance – man 
would become the measure of all things (Huntsman 2016: 120), and his reason, a prized commodity 
in an ever more competitive social environment.   
 Secondly, just as the scientific discovery of nature in Classical Greece was responded to by 
Socratic withdrawal from nature, so too, in the Renaissance the above progressive erosion of 
Aristotelian-inspired faith in divine Christian teleology underpinned an increasing tendency to 
withdraw into the city, and around the idea of “man as the measure of all things” (Copson 2015: 
6). The resultant humanism of the era, of course, had its roots in the Socratic withdrawal of 
Classical Greek philosophy, concerned as it was with the human condition, human flourishing, and 
the privileging of reason, which rendered it secular and anthropocentric (Vernon 2010: n.p).24 
Accordingly, man comprised ‘the measure of all things’ because in the context of intensifying 
secularism and the new potentialities offered by science, he became “both the expression and 
master of creation” (Copson 2015: 6). In keeping with adherence to such principles, the period thus 
saw a progressive favoring of empiricism and scientific inquiry over the erstwhile supernatural 
explanatory models and dogmatism of the Middle Ages, and these new understandings centered 
for the most part, on humanity rather than the divine. Such humanism also affirmed the idea “that 
human beings have the right and responsibility to give meaning and shape to their own lives,” and 
to play an active role in “the building of a more humane society through an ethic based on human 
and other natural values [,] in the spirit of reason and free inquiry through human capabilities” 
(Copson 2015: 6).  
 The corollary of such Socratic-inspired pursuit of self-knowledge was, however, an equally 
Socratically-inspired withdrawal from nature into politics, and this was powerfully evinced in the 
new ideas of social interiority and exteriority that emerged during the Renaissance and which were 
succinctly articulated toward its end in Thomas Hobbes’ concepts of the state of nature, the city, 
and the social contract. Hobbes, a British philosopher and political theorist, was born into a time 
of “great political strife in England,” and he witnessed massive social changes as “cities were joined 
to form nation-states and feudal traditions were overthrown” (Meagher 2008: 65). Hobbes is, of 
course, best known for his seminal text Leviathan, originally published in the mid-seventeenth 
                                                          
24 In particular, Law also cites Plato as pivotal to the development of such humanist thought, on account of his 
preoccupation with the “flowering of human culture, and the systematic application of reason to various fundamental 
social, moral and political questions” (2011: n.p).  
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century, at the end of a turbulent time in European history referred to as The General Crisis.25 
Against this backdrop, Hobbes advanced his theory of the state of nature, or the state of society in 
the absence of government, a judicial system, or any binding form of authority or social control. 
For Hobbes, this state of nature was an environment of rampant violence and unchecked 
competition, largely “incompatible with [humanity’s] ultimate aim to avoid death” (Thornton 
2005: 1). In short, Hobbes explains that, in such an environment, the sum total of human effort 
would be utilized in a bid to survive, and as a result, human culture could not develop. This is 
because,  
 
[i]n such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is 
uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of 
commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments 
of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the 
face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters, no Society; and which is 
worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, 
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. (2015: n.p) 
 
To remedy such a miserable existence, Hobbes suggests the application of reason – or right reason 
– which he contends exists as part of human nature. Bobbio clarifies that what “he means to say is 
that humans have not only the capacity to know per causas [through causes], but to act per fines” 
or in view of an end, because “they can follow rules which tell them the best means for reaching 
the desired end” of a fairly equitable society; one in which the threat of danger is limited through 
the application of the abovementioned rules, or “hypothetical norms” (Bobbio 1993: 44). However, 
such a situation is contingent upon several factors, namely a shared desire for peace, a willingness 
on the part of individuals to relinquish absolute liberty and to submit to some prudential rules, and 
finally a sovereign leader (or leviathan) to whom individuals submit, and who enforces these rules, 
either through violence or the threat thereof (Bobbio 1993: 44-45). But where these conditions 
exist, they constitute the basic social contract advanced by Hobbes as a means of transcending a 
punishing existence in the chaotic madness of the state of nature.  
                                                          
25 The century spanning 1550-1650 was marked by sweeping conflict across Europe, both civil and religious in 
orientation, resulting in “widespread political instability” (Parker & Smith 1997: 2). This period gave rise to the British 
Civil War, The Thirty Years War, the dissolution of feudal regimes, and increasing economic pressures brought about 
by a scarcity of labor and increasing taxes (Asbach & Schroder 2016: 49).  
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 Indeed, in De Cive (1642), Hobbes posits that with the acceptance of the social contract, 
we carve out of the cruel state of nature “a city, or civil society,” comprising of a pocket of rational 
civility free from the animalistic struggle for subsistence (Meagher 2008: 66). As Hutter points out, 
the city is thus not only an urban hub of production, but also highly symbolic, often being 
“associated with the idea of human progress and an underlying belief that equates cities with 
civilization.” And he underlines this coalescence of themes by explaining the etymological roots 
of the word civilization as deriving from the Latin civitas, or city (Hutter 2016: 13), which denoted 
hotbeds of ideas and ingenuity that have played a “historical role in the transformation of culture,” 
as well as providing “the setting in which new states of mind come into being” (Hutter 2016: 13). 
Accordingly, it was out of a discursive milieu of frightening upheaval and pervasive uncertainty 
that Hobbes’ notions of civilization emerged and became tethered to a culture/nature binary, in 
terms of which the idea of danger at the natural margins of the city was established in earnest, in a 
way that echoed in a concentrated manner the Socratic withdrawal into humanism on the part of 
many people during the Renaissance.  
 Thirdly, around the same time, one also encounters a resurgence of something akin to the 
Hippocratic pursuit of balance with nature for the sake of health, particularly in relation to the 
natural anomaly of madness, on the part of those whose reason remained intact. To be sure, on the 
one hand, the breakdown of Aristotelian-inspired faith in divine telos toward the end of the Middle 
Ages was by no means complete, and in this regard Smart highlights a persisting interpretation of 
madness tethered to religiosity, which characterized “folly as moral critique” (Smart 2002: 123). 
In other words, this interpretation seized upon madness as “the punishment for useless, unregulated 
knowledge,” unfettered imagination or ambition, and “an excess of false science” (Foucault 2006: 
22). In relation to it, Foucault also makes reference to the mirror as the new symbol of madness 
because of how it reveals to the deluded “nothing real, but secretly [shows] the presumptuous 
dreams of all who gazed into it to contemplate themselves” (Foucault 2006: 23). In this way, a late 
Middle Age’s view of madness continued to hover over the early Renaissance individual as a 
constant threat; a “punishment and condition of excess” (Boyne 1990: 22) that stood to befall those 
hubristic enough to work contrary to vestigial beliefs in divine telos. But on the other hand, 
alongside such perspectives, madness also “made an appearance in the academic arena, becoming 
a self-reflexive object of discourse” (Foucault 2006: 13). As Foucault observes, at this time and in 
contrast to discourses on madness that remained crudely moralizing and inextricably bound up with 
the Christian metanarrative, a more sophisticated turn occurred. That is, in the vacuum left by the 
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“disintegration of the medieval perspective,” madness adopted new forms and began to appear as 
something multidimensional and “indecipherable” (May 2014: 27). Accordingly, freed from the 
confines of its earlier religious implications, meanings of madness during the Renaissance 
proliferated, spinning a complex “web of connections” (Foucault 2006: 17) that encompassed 
madness and reason, knowledge and ignorance, and a plethora of objects, subjects, attributes, and 
symbols. Consequently, madness stepped forth from its once-modest position in the medieval 
“hierarchy of vices” to take “center stage” and reign over “all the negative aspects of the human 
character” (Foucault 2006: 21-22). In addition, far from being perceived as solely dispatches from 
the divine or the result of diabolical possession, madness also now began to resemble a diverse 
mélange, encompassing inspiration, creativity, wisdom, “the merveilleux, illness, intoxication, 
death, criminality, dream, vision, [and] sanctity” (Huot 2003: 4). In this sense, “the new symbol of 
madness was [also] a mirror” (Foucault 2006: 23), but one that provided a critical reflection on 
what was irrational in a world ostensibly dominated by reason. As Noble explains:  
 
the fool … embodies the constitutional foolishness of all humanity. … The text is a 
mirror that will allow readers to see the fool in themselves and everyone else. The 
fool no longer necessarily dresses as such, with his fool’s cap and scepter. Instead, 
he looks and acts just like the reader, who regards himself in [Renaissance art and 
literature] and sees his own folly. (2010: 264) 
 
Through such means, madness thus began to play a crucial role in the process of self-knowledge 
or self-understanding, around which Renaissance culture had Socratically withdrawn, and with 
which it became increasingly fascinated – after a millennium of Christian denigration of self-
knowledge as a sin and a consequence of vanity. And as a result of this perception, madness not 
only enjoyed a fairly comfortable and constant Hippocratic “dialogue with rationality” (During 
1992: 32), as it were. In addition, within this context, the enigma of madness also became an 
overriding preoccupation for the artists, poets, playwrights, and philosophers of the Renaissance, 
who both marveled at this point through which nature reaches into us – despite out taking refuge 
in the city – and regarded it as an important natural release which dissipated at key intervals the 
intensity of city life and customs, before they could congeal too much and thereby lose their 
dynamism.  
 In particular, in the late 15th century, madness came to be viewed in terms of a 
contemplation of wisdom and reason, and in this regard Foucault cites a number of influential 
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works, such as Brant’s Narrenschiff (1494), Bosch’s Ship of Fools (late 1490s), and Erasmus’ The 
Praise of Folly (1509), as revelatory of the multidisciplinary fascination with madness at the time 
(Foucault 2005: 11).  In fact, while Merquior points out that during the Renaissance, madness was 
at times even framed as “a special form of high reason” (1987: 21), Foucault explains the 
reciprocity of this fluid relationship between madness and reason in the Renaissance as follows:  
 
Madness becomes a form related to reason, or more precisely madness and reason 
enter into a perpetually reversible relationship which implies that all madness has its 
own reason by which it is judged and mastered, and all reason has its madness in 
which it finds its own derisory truth. Each is a measure of the other, and in this 
movement of reciprocal reference, each rejects the other but is logically dependent 
upon it. (Foucault 2006: 28-29)  
 
This relationship between reason and madness thus relied on the reflexive and mutually dependent 
relations of several binary pairs: darkness and light, knowledge and ignorance, and of particular 
importance, critique and tragique, or the “conflict between critical consciousness and tragic 
experience which underpinned all that was felt and formulated on the theme of madness at the 
beginning of the Renaissance” (Foucault 2006: 28). While at first glance seemingly contradictory 
or oppositional, Merquior stresses that each element should be viewed as constituting a complex 
“fusion of reason and unreason,” in which reason enjoys no “objective privilege over unreason” 
(Merquior 1987: 77). Rather, at this time, madness was understood as something of a Hippocratic 
health-giving “ironic jousting-partner for reason” (Palmer 2004: 74), on account of the balance it 
provides, a balance that was construed as indispensable to any endeavor both to know oneself, and 
to learn the nature of existence.  
 Fourthly, there also occurred a variant of the Orphic approach to nature in the Renaissance, 
after it had for so long been silenced by the Christian dogma of the Middle Ages, because at this 
time it was not only madness but also nature that underwent a rigorous reappraisal through 
discourse and art. In this regard, Hadot points to the continuation of the tradition of “the Universe 
as Poem,” which was rooted in Pythagoreanism and Neoplatonism, and which sought to, through 
poetry to “reproduce the numbers and measures of the universe” via establishing numerical 
relations between the numbers of lines, songs or stanzas with values found in nature (Hadot 2006: 
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209).26 Another notable Renaissance figure who attempted to discern through art the secret 
workings of nature was Leonardo da Vinci, who believed that “through the process of creativity, 
artists … investigate nature” (De Girolami Cheney 2010: 106). Indeed, Hadot himself remarks that:  
 
It is extremely interesting to encounter in Leonardo da Vinci" a mind that united 
within itself the Promethean aspiration to use nature in the service of mankind and 
the attitude, which I've called “Orphic,” of respectful and admiring observation of 
nature. If he thinks of building a flying machine, he begins by attentively observing 
and drawing the flight of birds in order to understand its mechanical workings. (2006: 
117) 
 
Beyond the interesting coalescence of engineering and art found in the work of da Vinci, the 
Renaissance also saw the emergence of thought-provoking new art forms. That, shifting from the 
investigative aesthetic mode of da Vinci, often sought to capture and emphasize the “dark, 
dreamlike, tragic threat” of nature (Palmer 2004: 74), laying bare the eschatological anxiety of the 
age and its macabre fascination with death and the bestial.  
 Indeed, such images “haunted the imagination” of certain artists (Merquior 1987: 21), and 
stalked across their canvases in the guise of otherworldly beasts, gargoyles, demons and “dreamlike 
… creatures that are part-animal part-human” – at once terrifying and yet “offering a tempting kind 
of wild freedom” (Palmer 2004: 76), unattainable within the constraints of everyday city life. In 
this regard, Boyne cites Breughel’s work of the mid-1500s, particularly The Triumph of Death 
(1562) as archetypal, insofar as the image depicts the chaotic and scattered remnants of a battlefield 
being ravaged by “the skeletal soldiers of Thanatos,” while a closer examination of the work’s 
details reveals it as comprised of several vignettes in the foreground of this “grim harvest.” Notable 
among them is a pilgrim who lies feebly, allowing his throat to be slashed by one of the skeletal 
horde, a man in fool’s attire attempting to hide from this grisly spectacle, and a nobleman who 
looks on from the bottommost corner as a battle-clad skeleton loots the coffers – while in the wings, 
masses of these bloodthirsty specters stand in formation, awaiting their turn to enter the fray. Here, 
“images of death, panic and catastrophe abound,” and the hollow-socketed skulls and fleshless 
bodies of these fiends bring to the fore terrifying images of death, while their indiscriminate culling 
                                                          
26 In particular, Hadot (2006: 209) points to the writings of Edmund Spenser, the English poet most famous for his 
work entitled The Faerie Queen. Burlinson, similarly, points to Spenser’s description of Alma Castle, which can at 
once be read as “an architectural description of [the] castle or as a geometrical description of the human body” (2006: 
103).  
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constitutes a nod to its inevitability, which stands as a testament to “the zero-point of existence” – 
because of the fundamental madness of nature and existence (1990: 20). In many respects, this 
image presents a concentration of the morbid, existential musings and the eschatological anxiety 
which existed as a central preoccupation of artists during the Renaissance. And these renderings of 
dark and nightmarish imagery of destruction, chaos, nothingness, and the inescapable end of all 
things, speak directly to notions of the cosmic or tragic madness of nature. Accordingly, the 
importance of this work, and others of its kind, bear testimony to the enduring horror-bound 
enthrallment with which we look upon death, and the chaotic void of nature and existence that now, 
as then, remain “the object[s] of a curious sort of cultural hesitation” (Huot 2003: 16).  
 Fifthly, in terms of the Promethean approach to nature, there emerged in the Renaissance a 
newfound preoccupation with natural marginality. As Porter points out, the sciences underwent 
significant advances during this period of resurgence in “humanism and scientific rationalism” 
(Porter 2002: 123), which progressively displaced the supernatural theories of the Middle Ages. In 
this regard, a key figure who emerged toward the end of the Renaissance was Francis Bacon (1561-
1626). An English “philosopher, essayist and statesman,” Bacon is widely regarded as “one of the 
founders of the Scientific Revolution” (Burt 2001: 21), and is recognized as the father of the 
scientific method. Yet, interestingly, Bacon offered scholars and naturalists little by way of “actual 
discoveries in natural philosophy,” focusing instead as he did on the provision of “a manual of 
scientific procedure,” and a framework for the discovery of nature that aimed “to teach how to 
dissect nature and discover the virtues and actions of bodies and their laws grounded in matter” 
(Zagorin 1999: 89). In terms of this, his most significant contribution was the definition of the 
induction method, outlined in his Novum Organum (1620), which stood in sharp contrast to the 
types of deductive reasoning that had characterized the scientific method since the time of Aristotle 
(Ashmore 1961: 751).27  That is, rather than proceeding from a hypothesis in the manner of 
deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning seeks to observe empirical phenomena in order to observe 
patterns, and to arrive at probable conclusions based upon the assumption “that the pattern will 
never end” (Leff 2009: 9). Relatedly, Bacon suggests that the only way to arrive at the truth is 
through a process of exhaustive scrutiny of empirical phenomena or data, derived from observation 
and experimentation. As discussed, Hadot describes the Baconian approach as quintessentially 
                                                          
27 Deductive reasoning is a process initially conceived by Aristotle and later adopted and accepted for some two 
millennia by various scientists and philosophers. This form of reasoning works from the basis of “accepted facts […] 
to reason in a step-by-step fashion until a desired conclusion is reached” (Leff 2009: 9). In short, this mode of reasoning 
employs a top-down logic. 
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Promethean in orientation, equating the relentless brutality of his approach to unveiling the secrets 
of nature, as akin to forcing “Nature to talk under the torture of experimentation” (Hadot 2006: 
149). 
 To elaborate, in this climate of scientific fervor, medical knowledge, unsurprisingly  
bounded forward, advancing from the erstwhile humoral view of the body, “to one which refigured 
the body in mechanical terms [and] … highlighted the solids (organs, nerves, and fibers),” in a way 
that facilitated new, if still tentative, understandings of the brain and its functions (Porter 2002: 
123). As always, such new understandings and advances were the subject of ambivalence within 
medicine at the time, which Mclean describes as a sense of “growing disease with, but [also a] 
continuing adherence to, the inherited Galenic and Aristotelian doctrines” (2002: 14).That is, on 
the one hand,, in keeping with the interest in the recently-recovered texts of antiquity that prevailed 
during the Renaissance, much of the medical teaching at Renaissance universities remained based 
on the theories passed down from Greek and Roman physicians, such as Hippocrates, Galen and 
Dioscorides.28 However, on the other hand, these conventions were also often challenged by 
Renaissance scientists, such as Flemish physician, Vesalius, whose Di Humani Corporis Fabrica 
contradicted Galen’s findings on anatomy. Moreover, advances were not limited to the field of 
anatomy, but occurred on a broad spectrum across many areas of the scientific arena (Barber 2013: 
4-8). Not least of these was a radical new approach to the human body, with scientists and 
physicians now coming to view the body no longer “as a temple of the Holy Ghost, but as an 
integral part of the system of nature, subject to its laws,” and as an object which necessitated 
investigation and discovery (Noreña 1975: 211).  Additionally, Barber contends that the 
Renaissance gave rise to revolutionary technologies, such as the precursors to modern microscopes 
and telescopes, and the development of the scientific method, as well as new treatments and 
advances in surgical techniques (2013: 4-8). And this rapid advancement, Barber maintains, gained 
even further momentum in the wake of the invention of the printing press, which allowed for the 
comparatively cheap and easy dissemination of a range of new ideas (Barber 2013: 6).  
 Yet this explosion of scientific knowledge also precipitated a progressive tension between 
traditional Hippocratic and Galenic attempts to balance with nature, and the Renaissance 
humanist’s overriding “vision and faith in the perfectibility of man” and society through scientific 
advancement (Grose 2016: 529), with the latter evincing a distinctly Promethean attempt, to render 
                                                          
28  Dioscorides was a Greek physician and pharmacist, best known as the author of the comprehensive tome Materia 
Medica, which detailed a variety of medicinal herbs and substances prevalently used in treatments at the time (Kalin 
2014: 333).  
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nature knowable through science, and thus not only less threatening to, but also a resource for, 
humans. Accordingly, such developments, in conjunction with other popular ideas of the time, that 
elevated man to a position of primacy by framing him as the “measure of all things” (Copson 2015: 
6), and alongside Hobbesian notions of the ‘city/state of nature’ dichotomy, all contributed to a 
turn toward security. This entailed a Promethean approach that, in the following centuries, would 
come to shape the cultural understandings of man and nature, and for that matter madness in ways 
that would be increasingly characterized by confinement, constraint, and violence – an approach 
that was irreconcilable with Medieval and Renaissance dreamscapes in which holy fools, pained 
poets, and wild terrors had previously mingled with reason. 
 
Conclusion 
While the importance of Hadot’s Promethean-Orphic schema as a catalyst of thought must be 
acknowledged, the rearticulation of this schema into five distinct approaches – namely, 
Promethean, Socratic, Aristotelian, Hippocratic and Orphic – arguably allows for a more 
comprehensive examination of the variety of perspectives contained within Hadot’s framework, 
particularly by addressing some of the problems which derive from the broadness of his 
Promethean and Orphic binary. As demonstrated, such a binary resulted in the eclipsing of different 
responses, including his downplaying of Socratic withdrawal that is inconsistent with its continued 
manifestation in response to an experience of nature as overwhelming. And it remains important 
to make such nuanced distinctions, as will be discussed, because these five approaches continue to 
comprise categorical responses to the environmental crisis facing us today, which we need to 
recognize as such in order to think beyond their parameters.  
 Accordingly, what will be argued in what follows is that, apart from the two ways in which 
Hadot maintains nature has been responded to – namely, the Promethean category of forcing from 
nature its secrets, and the Orphic category involving fathoming nature’s secrets through discourse 
and art – three other responses stand out: Firstly, Socratic withdrawal from the unknowability of 
nature into that which we can know, namely ourselves, as an enduring response that remains with 
us even today. Secondly, the Hippocratic attempt to find a balance with nature, in the interest of 
achieving harmonious life. And thirdly, Aristotelian-inspired faith in teleology which, although 
beyond the capacity of humans to understand, is nevertheless believed to make sense in the greater 
scheme of things. The formulation of this extended Hadotian framework will thus constitute a 
theoretical lens through which the dynamics occurring across various historical epochs – beyond 
52 
 
those analyzed by Hadot in The Veil of Isis – and their respective environmental implications will 
be discussed. 
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Chapter 2: The Extended Hadotian Framework in the Age of Discipline 
 
Introduction 
In 1504 Leonardo da Vinci – renowned artist, scientist, military tactician and archetypal 
Renaissance Man – penned the blueprint for his eponymous castle. Anthony Easthope speculates 
that this impenetrable bastion was designed for Jacopo IV Appiani, the erstwhile lord of Piombino, 
to provide fortification for the town in the turbulence of the perpetual warring between the city-
states of the region, which characterized early 16th century Italy (1992 37-38). But although never 
materializing in brick and mortar, da Vinci’s castle nevertheless proved archetypal through the 
manner in which its mechanisms of excluding nature, representative of Socratic withdrawal from 
nature, as well as its evident Promethean impulses to exert mastery over nature, guided future 
developments. In short, this castle comprises of a series of concentric rings, accessible by wooden 
bridges above ground and tunnels below. And while moats surrounding the towering contoured 
walls of stone make the castle impervious to invasion or attack from without, the fortified structure 
is also designed to be invulnerable to breach from within. This is particularly because, if threatened 
from within, besieged troops can retreat to the safety of the inner rings, burning bridges and 
flooding subterranean tunnels behind them. Easthope explains that another key component in the 
construction of this theoretically infallible edifice, the way it facilitates of “vision, sight and 
surveillance” (Easthope 1992: 39). Large windows on the inner side of each ring provide optimum 
conditions for continual observation not only of enemies outside, but also of potential threats of 
treason or mutiny within. And although never utilized in combat, da Vinci’s castle design closely 
resembles the complex matrix of exclusion, confinement, and observation mechanisms that 
unfolded in disciplinary societies the world over in the subsequent centuries.   
 In this regard, da Vinci emerges as an interface between the various modes of ‘knowing’ 
nature, outlined by Pierre Hadot in The Veil of Isis, and elaborated upon in the previous chapter. 
As discussed, for Hadot, this ranged between the Promethean impulse to forcibly “wrest from 
nature her secrets” (Bondarev 2014: 56), and the Orphic impulse which seeks to draw close to 
nature through the use of “philosophical and … pictorial arts” to invoke the generative processes 
of nature (Hadot 2006: 155-156). Interestingly, Hadot makes note of the interstices of these 
different approaches in the work of da Vinci, when he remarks that we “encounter in Leonardo da 
Vinci a mind that united within itself the Promethean aspiration to use nature in the service of 
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mankind and the attitude, which I've called ‘Orphic’ of respectful and admiring observation of 
nature” (2006: 117). 
 Yet at the same time, one can scarcely miss how da Vinci’s castle also foreshadows many 
of the mechanisms of panopticism that would become established in the disciplinary era, as 
outlined by Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1991). Accordingly, 
this chapter, after exploring the socio-economic factors and attendant philosophical shifts which 
precipitated the flourishing of disciplinary regimes – as sovereign power faltered across continental 
Europe in the mid-eighteenth century – reads the work of Foucault on the birth of disciplinary 
society in relation to the extended Hadotian framework outlined in the foregoing chapter. As 
mentioned earlier, this exercise is important to undertake because Hadot’s analysis in The Veil of 
Isis only extends as far as the Enlightenment, such that it is necessary to close the gap between this 
period and the contemporary era before the extended Hadotian framework can be used as a lens 
through which to critically view DiCaprio’s The 11th Hour and Before the Flood. 
 To begin with, disciplinary power will be examined through a discussion of its key features, 
and the context in which they emerged, along with their primary orientation around the pursuit of 
ever more effective means of social control and productivity. Thereafter, these technologies will 
be explored through in relation to the extended Hadotian framework, and it will be argued, that the 
disciplinary era may be seen as distinct from other historical epochs for the manner in which the 
nexus of Promethean, Socratic and Aristotelian approaches were institutionalized in society, where 
they achieved a totalizing dominance over the other approaches – namely the Hippocratic attempts 
to balance with nature and the artistic Orphic approach to the mysteries of nature. Moreover, it will 
be advanced that this is important to understand, because the ascendancy of this 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus during the disciplinary era contributed toward the state of 
alienation from, and the tendency to wantonly exploit nature, which have helped precipitate the 
contemporary ecological crisis 
 In this regard, firstly, the radical expansion of the Promethean approach will be examined, 
with particular emphasis on the increasing efficacy of human’s ability to harness nature for his own 
ends, through violently laying bare its secrets in the development not only of steam- and electrically 
powered machines, but also of the “golden age of anatomy” and medical discovery through 
dissection (Simon 2016: n.p).  
 Secondly, in relation to Socratic withdrawal, the continuation of Renaissance tropes that 
focalize ideas of the perfectibility of society through humanist and scientific endeavor, will be 
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thematized, alongside the sustained withdrawal into the city which was bolstered at this time by 
the imposition of Enclosures Acts, as well as the increasing commodification of nature as a side-
effect of capitalist and industrialist sentiment. Here, the ways in which the Socratic ideal of an 
ethical society became re-articulated as the aspiration to achieve the most efficient society, will be 
discussed.  
 Thirdly, Aristotelian-inspired faith in teleology and the manner in which it similarly became 
imbued with discourses of scientific and humanist pursuits in the disciplinary era, will be explored. 
That is, how at this historical juncture, such faith became articulated in a radically different manner 
in a climate of widespread secularization, particularly in terms of the “two great ‘discoveries’ of 
the eighteenth century – the progress of societies and the genesis of individuals” (Foucault 1991: 
160), will be considered. 
 Fourthly, and in contrast to the above, attempts to balance with nature articulated along 
Hippocratic lines, will be explained in relation to the social and scientific shifts precipitated by the 
secularization and industrialism of the disciplinary era. That is, while the abovementioned medical 
discoveries rendered the erstwhile Hippocratic and Galenic humoral understandings of human 
health largely redundant, the effects of the rampant industrialization and urbanization also gave 
rise to a new cognizance – albeit marginal – of the need for humans to endeavor to achieve balance 
with both their own nature and that of their surroundings. And this burgeoning awareness 
manifested in such things as Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, and Robert Smith’s cognizance of 
environmental degradation as a result of both the exhaustive use of natural resources and the 
thoughtless disposal of the harmful by-products of industrial endeavor. In short, as will be advanced 
Freud  can be read – contra Foucault – not as epitomizing disciplinary control measures but rather 
as seeking through gentle reflection and speech, psychological balance that would render urban life 
more tolerable. And Smith, in turn, who in 1872 recognized the link between acid rain and 
industrial pollution, can be understood as signaling the tentative beginnings of today’s 
environmental movements, on account of his emphasis of the need for humans to live in accordance 
with nature, in order to safeguard both their environment and their own existence.  
 Finally, although marginalized by the prevailing Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus 
of the time, the Orphic approach to knowing nature through aesthetic endeavor will be examined 
through attempts on the part of artists, novelists and poets to understand the workings of nature by 
partaking in its generative processes. This will be explored, in particular, in relation to the literary 
and scientific works of Romantics such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Friedrich Wilhelm 
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Joseph Schelling, both of whom problematized the invasive nature of the modern scientific method, 
and who through their respective works conjectured a more immersive, generative means of 
fathoming nature; a means beyond Cartesian dualisms informed by notions of a unified world soul.  
  
Disciplinary Society through the Lens of the Extended Hadotian Framework 
Scholars have defined the Age of Enlightenment, also referred to as the Age of Reason or the 
Classical Age, as dating roughly from the end of the seventeenth century, around the time of the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England, to the early nineteenth century, after the upheavals of the 
French Revolution and the ensuing Revolutionary War. This period of massive social and political 
change was characterized by “dramatic shifts in values and social policy,” as well as by the 
widespread “faith in the progress and perfectibility of society with the help of science and 
technology” (Risse 1992: 149). This complex nexus of economic, social and religious shifts, 
included “changed attitudes to poverty, the de facto withdrawal of the Church” – through the 
separation of Church and State – “the emergence of a new work ethic, [and] the administrative 
expansion of the state,” which all worked in concert to “usher in what Foucault calls ‘the age of 
confinement’” (Boyne 1990:8). Accordingly, these developments would forever change the face 
of European society and in many ways also gave birth to the modern perception of the environment. 
On the one hand, the period is generally associated with the largescale mechanization and 
secularization of society, as well as the attendant development and proliferation of scientific 
discourses. But on the other hand, the appearance of capitalism on the Enlightenment horizon also 
heralded massive changes in the way that nature was viewed. 
 That is, on the one hand, one of the most significant developments in the Age of 
Enlightenment was the advent of industrialization and the birth of modern capitalism. 
Industrialization, or “the process by which societies are transformed from dependence on 
agriculture and handmade products to an emphasis on manufacturing and related industries” 
(Kendall 2013: 10), occurred first in Britain from the mid-1700s. But soon the widespread adoption 
of mechanized mass production, the introduction of factory systems, and the resultant urbanization 
referred to generally as the industrial revolution, occurred throughout Western Europe, roughly 
between 1760 and 1850 (Kendall 2013:10). Though these economic advances – much like their 
scientific counterparts – were largely received with great enthusiasm and optimism for their 
potential to elevate humanity, both politically and socially, Moore argues that these developments 
could not unfold without a certain degree of “violence and repression … from above” (Tellegen & 
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Wolsink 1998: 64). This occurred at both physical and discursive levels through the formation of 
an associated social order that favored rationality, utility, and productivity within the normative 
parameters of capitalism, and which assumed the “ethical power to exclude […] all forms of social 
uselessness” (Foucault 2006: 72). Thus, during the Age of Enlightenment, there occurred in 
conjunction with capitalist advances, the construction of an array of new identities, social roles, 
and sensibilities, which served to shape notions of civic duty and acceptable forms of citizenship, 
and against which those who refused to, or could not, comply, were judged. However some 
historians generally acknowledge that the Age of Enlightenment came to an end at around the time 
of the French Revolution in 1789 (Risse 1992: 149), which coincided with a general tendency 
toward democratization, or at least a widespread scrutiny of absolute monarchy across Europe. And 
this timing is significant as it is demonstrative of the new distributions and functions of power that 
would emerge in tandem with disciplinary regimes. In particular, Smart describes the emergence 
of a new machinery of power, which may be seen as “a fundamental instrument in the constitution 
of industrial capitalism and the new type of society that is its accompaniment” (Smart 2002: 74), 
which Foucault refers to specifically as the “technology of power … [called] discipline” (Foucault 
1991: 194). Accordingly, the economic, political and philosophical features of Enlightenment 
society, alongside the manifold scientific and technological advances heralded by the subsequent 
disciplinary age, signified sweeping changes in the manner in which humans understood their 
environment, something which emerges with clarity when one considers the disciplinary era 
through the lens of the extended Hadotian framework.  
 In this regard, although Prometheanism and its attendant dynamics characterized much of 
disciplinary society’s features, both Socratic withdrawal and Aristotelian-inspired faith in teleology 
were also co-opted by, and re-articulated in accordance with the objectives of, the disciplinary 
project. Indeed, Promethean, Socratic and Aristotelian approaches can be seen as working in 
concert, each supporting and reinforcing each other to effect a particular understanding of nature 
that was compatible with the requirements of the disciplinary organization of society. 
Correlatively, where the nexus of Promethean, Socratic and Aristotelian approaches resonated, 
respectively, with scientific fervor, the focus on individuality, and an overarching faith in the 
constant development of human society – which came to characterize the disciplinary age, less 
intrusive approaches like that of Hippocratic balance and Orphism largely fell by the wayside, 
where they remained present but marginalized; all but eclipsed by their more forceful and 
exclusionary counterparts.  
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 To be sure, while Mokyr points out that it is too simplistic to claim that one particular 
scientific discovery or causal event initiated the Industrial Revolution – or vice versa (1989:11), 
Musson and Robinson similarly argue that it is more accurate to view both the Scientific and 
Industrial Revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as stemming from the 
confluence of a multiplicity of both philosophical and scientific events and practices. That is,  
 
The chief characteristics of the Scientific Revolution were an increasing 
concentration on ‘physical rather than metaphysical problems [involving] … 
accurate observation of the kind of things that were in the natural world,’ and 
‘systematic use of the experimental method.’ These were associated [also] with 
greater interest in the utilitarian possibilities of applied science. (Musson & Robinson 
1969: 12)  
 
In this regard, and as already alluded to, the thoughts which would later come to define disciplinary 
Promethean logic and discourses, and which ultimately lay the foundations for the scientific and 
technological advances that followed, can largely be attributed to Rene Descartes, Francis Bacon, 
and Isaac Newton, who were key proponents of the view that “reason can overcome human 
fallibility and that humanity can progress … and be perfected through rational enquiry and rational 
activity” (Thackeray & Findling 2012: 111). Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapter, Hadot 
himself maintained that the “dominating attitude of modern science is nothing new,” and that it 
merely reflects the Promethean endeavor of the Classical Greek era (2006:123). Yet, for Hadot, the 
thought of Descartes, Bacon and Newton nevertheless constitutes a “definitive break, not with the 
aspirations of magic but with its methods” in the ongoing quest to discover and harness the secrets 
of nature; and in the process, “these scholars discovered the means of progressing in a decisive and 
definitive way” toward the “project of dominating nature, [by] limiting themselves to the rigorous 
analysis of what is measurable and quantifiable in sensible phenomena” (2006: 123). 
 To elaborate, in the disciplinary era, understandings of man’s relative position in the world, 
as well as assumptions of humanity’s entitlement to exploit the natural resources which fueled 
industrial growth, were underpinned by several key philosophical points advanced by Descartes. 
These points were governed primarily by “a radically dualist” perspective, which divides the 
“physical and non-physical, lower and higher, [and] earthly and divine” (Francks 2008: 74). In his 
overview of Cartesian theory, Brenner focalizes the import which Descartes bestows upon 
consciousness (or sentience), and the decipherment of what may be classified as a conscious being. 
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Man, he concludes, is a being that “doubts, understands, asserts, denies … [and] that has sense and 
imagination” (Brenner 1989: 12), and only one capable of all this may be viewed as a conscious 
being. However, this definition of consciousness thus precludes all else, and is viewed by many as 
problematic insofar as it enforces a divide between that which is possessed of a consciousness and 
that which appears to lack consciousness (Brenner 1989: 12). A divide which effectively renders 
humans primary, and all else secondary to human concerns and endeavors. Furthermore, this 
schismatic tendency is also applied to the human being, as Descartes proposes a “disparity between 
body and mind” (Brenner 1989: 16), with the mind seen as “pure substance” and distinct from the 
“divisible human body” (Nelson 2014: 291), which is subject to the “mechanical laws” (Brenner 
1989: 16) of nature. Accordingly, the mind and body are separated in a similar fashion to the 
abovementioned division of humans from all else, while the mind – as the ostensible the site of 
“pure reason” (Brenner 1989: 16) – is granted precedence over the body, which is deemed 
corruptible and subordinate due to its subjection to the laws of nature, which in themselves are 
viewed as secondary. The cumulative effect of such perspectives, Belshaw asserts, is the 
entrenchment of a rationality which “insists both on the hierarchy of God, man, animals and 
plants,” and correlatively that, as humans, “we, ensouled and rational, are distinct from the rest of 
nature” (2014: n.p). Accordingly, the widespread adoption of such thought has had grave 
implications for the “society-nature relationship” (Smith 1999: 31), as it has long “provided 
justification for human abuses” of animals and the environment (Leib 2011: 17) for the sake of 
development, profit and/or scientific progress.  
 However, while the thought of Descartes underpinned the disciplinary understanding of 
human, and more particularly, rational, supremacy over a wild and irrational natural world, it was 
the respective works of Bacon and Newton which elaborated upon the processes for knowing and 
harnessing such a natural world to the end of human benefit. That is, while Bacon’s limited 
contribution to the realm of actual natural knowledge production is generally accepted, his 
contribution through his contestation of the contradiction of “established patterns of faith in 
religious authority and revelation,” is widely viewed as having laid the “groundwork for Newton” 
and subsequent thinkers (Walsh et al 2014: 104). Isaac Newton (1624 -1727), was a British 
physicist and mathematician, is generally acknowledged as “the most influential scientist who ever 
lived,” and is credited with a plethora of discoveries, such as the theory of universal gravitation, 
mathematical advances such as the development of calculus, as well as theories on planetary, lunar 
and tidal motion (Burt 2001: 315). Accurately calculating through mathematical principles the 
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motion of these latter bodies, and integrating their movement with mathematical theorem, Newton 
was able to demonstrate the existence of “a universal law, [that] could explain all earthly or 
heavenly motion” (Walsh et al 2014: 105). In this way, through rigorous application of the 
scientific method, Newton for the first time rendered the workings of the natural world open to 
human understanding, and knowable in terms of empirical data – laying bare, as it were, “in 
completely objective fashion, the ‘secrets’ of the universe” (Thackeray & Findling 2012: 111).  
Newton, along with Bacon, are thus largely associated with the Scientific Method and the scientific 
discovery of nature, but their work also resonated with other Enlightenment thinkers who sought 
to apply these methods – which had proven so effective in uncovering the secrets of the natural 
world – to the study of humanity, in the hope of uncovering the secrets of the nature of man 
(Mergenthaler 2005: 506). These investigations into the nature of man were oriented along two 
lines: firstly, those motivated by the desire to know the constituents and workings of the human 
body; and secondly, those motivated by the desire to understand the constituents and workings of 
the human psyche in relation to the organ of the brain. 
 Previously, at the universities of medieval Europe, and right up until the late Renaissance, 
“the practice of medicine [was] … based on the teachings of Galen, with little or no emphasis on 
the study of anatomical structures within the human body by direct observation” (Boston & Webb 
2016: 44). But the insatiable need for new knowledge, rooted in the science and empiricism of the 
disciplinary era, subsequently necessitated new approaches to the acquisition of such knowledge. 
In accordance with this, the disciplinary period “witnessed a rapidly expanding scientific interest 
in human anatomy and physiology,” and consequently gave rise to practices of dissection 
(Chamberlain 2016: 11), and at times – though admittedly much less frequently – “the vivisection 
of those condemned to death” (Delon 2001: 63). These “increasingly invasive” investigations, once 
unthinkable, became increasingly accepted as a legitimate means of acquiring knowledge, not least 
because of those discursive shifts arising as a result of the progressively secular context of the time. 
LaFleur explains that such a context opened a gap in which the once sacrosanct human body could 
be defined “as a ‘cadaver’ and [treated] routinely as a ‘thing’ that might be dismembered, 
anatomically explored, and then disposed of” (1998: 41). This, along with its “recognized 
usefulness” (2001: 63), Delon attributes both to the increased skepticism with which Enlightenment 
society regarded religious taboo, and to the legacy of Cartesian dualist discourses which elevated 
the soul and mind over the body. Chief among the proponents of this new method for the study of 
the human subject was the acclaimed French anatomist and surgeon, Jean-Joseph Süe, according 
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to whom dissection was “the ultimate means for an inquisitive man of letters to gain a profound 
understanding of nature” (Simon 2016: n.p). Consequently, dissection as a method for the 
extraction of knowledge regarding the workings of the human body gained a growing acceptance, 
both socially and legally at the time.29 However, Sawday remarks upon the violence of such an 
approach, stating that such dissection denotes “not the delicate separation of constituent structures, 
but a more violent ‘reduction’ into parts, a brutal dismemberment of people, things or ideas” (2013: 
1). And this issue resonates strongly with the brutality and irreverence which for Hadot 
characterized the Promethean approach. Here, the words of Süe, regarding the process, are 
particularly evocative of the violence meted out in pursuit of such secrets:  
 
In the process of dissecting, one searches through the entrails of Nature herself, who 
becomes a book for us, and the impressions which stay with us are infinitely more 
sensible than those acquired by other studies. (Simon 2016: n.p)  
 
Yet the apparent violence of the approach did not deter scientists; on the contrary, it was largely 
responsible for the abandonment and displacement of less invasive modes of understanding and 
approaching health, the body, and the natural world. In other words, what was thereby disregarded 
were the Hippocratic and Galenic humoral models, which had for some 2000 years constituted the 
backbone of understandings of sickness, health, and treatment, as these were progressively 
dismantled in the Enlightenment period against the backdrop of the earlier anatomical innovations 
of scholars such as Andreas Vesalius and William Harvey.30 Indeed, the associated tendency to 
reject antiquated theories handed down by Classical and medieval thinkers, only intensified in the 
disciplinary age, with increasing calls for “tangible evidence” to substantiate the “theory and 
philosophical argument” of old (Mitchell 2016: 9). In keeping with the empiricist leanings which 
shaped practices of knowledge acquisition at this time, Simon describes a process by which “first-
hand experience came to triumph over the authority of the ancients,” allowing anatomists to step 
out of the long shadows of Hippocrates and Galen, and through dissection, to proceed to “map the 
interior of the human body free from the misconceptions” of the past (2016: n.p). Yet these changes 
                                                          
29 In keeping with the spirit of the time, legislation which once prohibited the defilement or desecration of the bodies 
of the deceased was amended several times to allow physicians, anatomists, and students easier access to cadavers for 
dissection (Anderson 1997: 106).  
30 Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564) and William Harvey (1578-1657) were considered to be the forerunners in the field 
of anatomy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and are best known for their respective works On the Fabric of 
the Human Body (1543) and On the Motion of the Heart and Blood (1602) (Spielvogel 2015: 485).  
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were not limited to the field of medicine, which constituted only a small part of the sweeping social 
and political changes taking place across society at the time. In the regard, Spary notes that it was 
at roughly this time that 
 
bodies became the subject of large-scale political intervention, from centralized 
responses to plague epidemics or mass inoculation programmes early in the century 
to the growing use of mortality tables at its end. […] [As a result,] medicine became 
implicated in the exercise of government towards the end of the eighteenth century, 
extending disciplinary control and surveillance into the fabric of the body itself. 
(2011: 82-83) 
 
That is, the disciplinary epoch saw the widespread mobilization of enclosure as a tool for social 
control, and Foucault describes it as a requirement of the disciplinary machinery. He explains that 
at the heart of disciplinary enclosure lies the desire to “derive the maximum advantages and to 
neutralize … inconveniences … as the forces of production become more concentrated” (1991: 
142). But Foucault also explains that, by itself, enclosure is insufficient for the creation of a 
disciplinary space, and that further divisions of space are needed if an effective matrix of 
compliance is to be ensured. In this regard, he maintains that discipline mobilizes two additional 
technologies to effect social control, namely partitioning and the definition of functional sites 
within a given enclosure (Hooper & Macintosh 1998: 129; Foucault 1991: 142-143). These 
mechanisms were applied in concert across a variety of contiguous disciplinary spaces through 
which the disciplinary subject would inevitably pass. Examples of such spaces include – but are 
not limited to – schools, hospitals, prisons, factories, military barracks, and even the nuclear family. 
Foucault explains the objective of these organizations as an attempt to  
 
eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of 
individuals, their diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation; it 
was a tactic of anti-desertion, anti-vagabondage, anti-concentration. Its aim was to 
establish presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to 
set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to 
supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its 
qualities or merits. It was a procedure, therefore, aimed at knowing, mastering and 
using. … [for the purposes of which it] … organizes an analytical space. (1991: 143) 
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And within this analytical space, time was viewed through the principle of “exhaustive use” insofar 
as discipline sought to “extract … from time, ever more available moments and, from each moment 
ever more useful forces” (Foucault 1991: 154).  
 
Reflections of Prometheanism in the Disciplinary Era  
To begin with, the Promethean approach identified by Hadot is reflected most saliently in the 
feverish climate of scientific experimentation and discovery that emerged under disciplinary 
power. In terms of this approach, the secrets of nature were forcibly wrested from it by means of 
violence, generally typified by methods of scientific investigation aimed at harnessing the forces 
of nature for human benefit. Moser explains that this was achieved through the deployment of 
“violent science and technology aimed at mastering and controlling an unpredictable … nature” 
(Moser 1995: 7). In this regard, industrial development informed much of the discursive dynamics 
of the time, with nature during the early modern era being described in a hitherto unknown 
“production-oriented tone;” a tone in alignment with the “economic logic” that was increasingly 
informing understandings of “humanity and its relationship to the natural world” (Steinberg 2003: 
71). Now articulated in terms of its capacity to serve human benefit or result in profit, nature largely 
ceased to be viewed as an entity in its own right, worthy of respect, not least because its secrets 
were forcibly being revealed for human ends. As Stearn explains, around this time there was a 
marked increase in the “commitment to science,” which was then “seen as capable not only of 
unlocking nature’s secrets, but also of contributing actively to technical advances and also to 
achievements in medicine and public health” (2003: 105). For Foucault, this was effected through 
the “temporal elaboration of the act” which entailed “the breakdown of gestures and movements” 
as “another way of adjusting the body to temporal imperatives” for highly efficient repetition, 
which functioned in concert with “the correlation of the body and gesture[s]” it was required to 
repeat, and the endeavors to render ever more precise “body-object articulation[s]” (Foucault 1991: 
151-152). All of this also played out against a timeframe now “count[ed] in quarter hours, in 
minutes, in seconds” and informed by “a theoretically ever-growing use of time” (Foucault 1991: 
150-154). 
 Developments in this regard were also not confined to the investigation of the human body; 
rather, once scientists and physicians began to construe the human body as a machine, it became 
necessary to also ensure its optimal functioning, and so attention turned to producing knowledge 
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of the secret workings of nature – understood as an expendable resource – to fuel the human 
machine. 
 The Promethean approach was accordingly mirrored in the policies which sought – in 
concert with the capitalist imperative – to bring under human ownership and control the open 
spaces which surrounded cities. In this regard, Child explains that prior to the 1700s, the 
predominant approach to farming was called the open air method, and this entailed both the division 
of land surrounding villages for use by local tenant farmers, as well as the allocation of common 
land where residents were allowed to forage for firewood and food, and to graze their livestock 
(1995: 10). However, the “acceleration of population growth” that occurred as a result of 
widespread urbanization and industrialization, and which characterized the mid-1700s, called for 
new and  more efficient methods of farming, not only to better meet the needs of soaring urban 
populations, but also to increase profits (Hudson 2005: 135). In order to do so, landowners sought 
to consolidate their land, through Parliamentary bids known as Enclosure Acts,31 to achieve greater 
geographic control so that new, and more efficient, agricultural practices could be introduced and 
enforced (Child 1995: 10).  
 Yet, while the increased output and organization of farm labor fed the cities and enriched 
landowners, it also crippled yeoman and subsistence farmers who could not survive without the 
use of common lands, and who were often forced to move to the cities where they were absorbed 
into the burgeoning industrial communities – further swelling urban populations and thereby 
exacerbating the conditions which drove the exodus from the countryside in the first place. 
Relatedly, while the enclosure of common lands allowed for larger yields of greater quality, which 
in turn fueled the rampant growth of industry, they also proved to be the “locus of profound 
environmental challenges … and social problems ranging from pronounced poverty and uneven 
access to the most basic of human necessities, to crime, violence, and even warfare” (Chen et al 
2013: 6). Indeed, de Compos Mello points to the failure of industrialization to manifest the 
widespread social betterment that proponents initially advanced. Instead, she points to the 
establishment of new, as well as the entrenchment of pre-existing, inequalities, and an institutional 
distancing of humans from their natural environment and associated forms of knowledge. In 
particular, she advances that land “enclosure … had tragic consequences for both nature and 
society,” because the “enclosure of land … fundamentally restructured society and people’s 
                                                          
31 These Enclosure Acts entailed “the subdivision and fencing of common land into individual plots which were 
allocated to those people deemed to have held rights to the land enclosed” (Fairlie 2009: n.p). Between “1750 and 
1810, there were over 4000 Enclosure Acts” passed in Britain (Child 1995: 10).  
65 
 
relationship to nature,” specifically through how “the enclosure of knowledge” it entailed 
exacerbated “social and economic inequalities and further alienate[d] people from nature” (2001: 
133). And this increasingly compromised and impoverished relationship with nature, brought about 
by the demands of industrialization and capitalism, also “fundamentally restructured the way 
people perceived themselves, each other, and the land” (Miller 2001: 111). In short, everything 
became a means to the end of Promethean aspirations, so that it was not just people in the new 
disciplinary societies that were subject to the discipline of enclosure, but also nature which was 
disciplined through this technology. Moreover, the time of nature – just like the time of disciplinary 
subjects – became an object of focus for scientists, who sought to regiment it in terms of a variant 
of the temporal control of activity, highlighted above, in relation to the principle of exhaustive use.  
 That is, the scientific and technological advances, entailed by what has been hailed as the 
agricultural revolution, enabled humans to harness and control the outcomes of nature, in order to 
boost productivity in the interest of meeting the needs of a growing urban consumer class. Nebel 
and Wright point to a trend in evidence since the birth of agriculture, but particularly prominent in 
light of the changing needs of disciplinary Europe, “of a growing population creating bigger and 
bigger settlements (cities) supported by ever-expanding agricultural production” (1993: 41). Such 
growth necessitated a myriad of innovations in the field of agriculture, as the predominantly small-
scale, subsistence-based models which had characterized the past proved incapable of meeting the 
abovementioned calls for agricultural produce. And this shift away from many small self-sustaining 
agricultural units, toward larger, and more centralized, productive commercial agricultural 
ventures, was largely enabled by the (often forced) exodus of tenant farmers from the country to 
the cities. Something which occurred with growing frequency as soon as wealthy landowners 
realized that it was immeasurably more “profitable … to push their tenants off the land, enclose it, 
fence it off, [and] to raise sheep for wool,” or partake in large-scale food production incompatible 
with previous models of tenant farming (Weiner et al 2007: 4).  
 These changes were necessarily bolstered by several advances in the key drivers of labor, 
as well as by new methods and techniques resulting from exhaustive scientific research and 
experimentation. Both Nebel and Wright, cite the use of fossil fuels and increasingly mechanized 
implements to perform labor as the primary driving forces of change in the agricultural revolution 
(2007: 41). This is because, along with increasingly easy access to fossil fuels such as coal, 
extracted in excess to fuel the Industrial Revolution in the cities, the internal combustion engine 
revolutionized agriculture, and rendered many centuries-old practices redundant (2007: 41). Chiras 
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in turn, explains “the motor-powered tractor could plow as much land in a week as one of our 
forebears could work in a lifetime using hand tools” (2016: 137). Other key technological advances 
of this time included the cast-iron plow, perfected by Jethro Wood to replace wooden plows that 
were less effective and also far more susceptible to damage, while another labor-saving device 
pioneered at the time was the mechanical reaper, invented by Cyrus McCormick, which replaced 
the labor-intensive process of harvesting by hand, or by the use of scythe or sickle (Chiras 2012: 
126). However, Wren and Greenwood explain how such technology, while increasing productivity, 
also rendered large numbers of farm laborers redundant, and thereby fueled dynamics of 
urbanization and the centralization of farming ventures:  
 
[P]reviously grain was cut by workers wielding a scythe, who were 
accompanied by binders, other workers who bound the grain into sheaves, and 
shockers, who stacked the sheaves to await further curing and subsequent 
threshing. With this labour-intensive method one reaper and two or three 
binders and shockers could harvest two acres of grain per day. The earlier 
McCormick reapers could cut ten acres a day. .... [Thus,] less labour was 
required, less grain was knocked loose to rot on the ground, and productivity 
was increased tenfold. (1998: n.p) 
 
Advances in agricultural methods, alongside the technological advances mentioned above, also 
contributed to the agricultural revolution. Inventions such as fertilizer increased yields, and thus 
profit, and the introduction of new crops – both as a result of imperialism and plant breeding – led 
to the emergence of “American crops of corn and potatoes” from the new world, as well as the 
breeding of hardier, more disease resistant strains of indigenous crops (Weiner et al 2007: 4). New 
agricultural methods, such as Jethro Tull’s approach of sowing crops in rows (rather than by 
broadcasting seed) to increase ease of cultivation, and Charles Townsend’s crop rotation which 
soon displaced the practice of allowing fields to lie fallow, allowed again for increased output per 
hectare, and particularly in the case of crop rotation, served to fuel interest in other agricultural 
ventures, such as meat or wool production. The way this process works is that the main crop of 
grains would be followed with a crop of turnips and clover, and then by a season of alfalfa, all of 
which aided in the restoration of the soil through their ability to fix nitrates, and advantageously – 
in contrast to the previous practice of leaving soil to lay fallow, the harvest of these crops could be 
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used to feed livestock. Then, in the following season, the main crop – generally wheat or cereals – 
could be sown again, and the cycle would repeat, from season to season, each time restoring the 
nutrients used in the previous season while at the same time diversifying agriculture (Weiner et al 
2007: 4-5).  
 It is important to note, though, that while these Promethean advances appear at first glance 
to be massive strides toward a better quality of life for all, they in fact had dire social, ecological, 
and ideological implications. That is, large commercial farming ventures often entailed, as already 
discussed, the displacement of small farming communities, who were forced off their land, more 
often than not into lives of destitution and exploitation in the squalid slums of the new sprawling 
cities. Furthermore, Nebel and Wright point out that in the pursuit of increased productivity and 
profit, these commercial farms very seldom took into account the ecological consequences of their 
rapid expansion, which saw vast natural ecosystems being replaced with overworked monocultures 
(1993: 41). This, Nebel and Wright maintain, is a result of the change in worldview which occurred 
in concert “with the advent of agriculture,” and was effectively solidified or entrenched in the 
disciplinary period; they explain that 
 
before agriculture[,] nature was seen as the provider of all things: food, skins 
for clothing, materials for building, and so on. With the advent of agriculture, 
nature became the enemy. First, nature must be cleared away to make room 
for crops and pastures. Then crops and animals must be protected from wild 
animals, weeds, and pests. (Nebel & Wright 1993: 41) 
 
Thus, the Promethean approach to nature in the disciplinary era not only sought to extract through 
any means necessary, the secrets of nature for the benefit of humans; in addition it also entailed 
guarding against the vicissitudes of wild nature, which were now deemed as a threat, and indeed, 
as something which humans either had to triumph over, or retreat from.  
 
Reflections of Socratic Withdrawal in the Disciplinary Era  
Socratic withdrawal is very much reflected in the Age of Enlightenment’s continuation of the 
Renaissance project of humanism, insofar as the withdrawal from nature that it entailed persisted 
along a similar trajectory through the trend toward urbanization. Murphy and his colleagues explain 
that this withdrawal from agrarian ways of life, in favour of life in urban hubs, may largely be 
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attributed to industrial development. After all, the “hallmark of the industrial phase was a great 
increase in city size, prompted by the gravitation of the majority of the European population to 
urban, industrialized areas” (2009: 310). And this migration escalated over the course of the 
disciplinary eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to the extent that by the early twentieth century, 
much of Europe had in excess of half its population residing in its cities (Murphy et al 2009: 310). 
These widespread migrations were not only underpinned by the capital incentive proffered by 
industry, but also by the continued prevalence of philosophies which enshrined the division of man 
from nature. The work of Hobbes in particular found parity with the ideal of cities as safe centers 
of civilization, in the midst of a dangerous and unpredictable natural landscape. And the vast 
growth of cities, beginning in the Renaissance and escalating through the Age of Enlightenment, 
thus played a significant “historical role in the transformation of culture,” as well as providing “the 
setting in which new states of mind c[a]me into being” (Hutter 2016: 13), which in turn, valorized 
the ways of city life. In general, these disciplinary socio-geographic events were underpinned by a 
sustained belief in the key Renaissance ideals, namely the reification of human reason, which 
increasingly saw humanity framed in terms of its binary opposition to nature, and the “elevat[ion] 
of the human species above nature” (Hall 2006: 138).  
 Accordingly, what this in many respects entailed was a variant of Socratic withdrawal from 
nature. That is, Socrates had advanced an approach which acknowledged the impossibility of 
fathoming nature, and instead suggested pursuing human ethical development in the face of such 
unknowability. And this approach can be understood as informing the dynamics not only of 
Enlightenment society, but also of the ensuing disciplinary society. As Hadot maintains, “Socrates 
was the first to turn philosophy away from the things that have been hidden and wrapped up by 
nature itself, … and to bring it back to the level of human life,” through his suggestion that people 
should concern themselves solely with the pursuit of an ethical life (2006: 91). But while in the 
Enlightenment such an ethical life was couched in terms of the rationality achievable through 
immersion in the cities’ centers of learning, in turn, in disciplinary society, one encounters an 
analogous emphasis on ethical development, although now in relation to an ethos of development, 
based on “efficiency, productivity, and … profit” as guiding principles (Bell 2009: 151). But this 
reorientation also included a different attitude to nature. As discussed, Socrates viewed people as 
ethical agents, and nature as mysterious and ultimately “unknowable,” such that the study of nature 
was conceived as being “of no practical value” in the individual contemplation of the ethical 
questions that existed at the core of human existence (de Bono 1994: 19). In the disciplinary era, 
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however, Socrates’ ethical imperative was re-articulated within the paradigm of societal 
regimentation, advancement, and productivity, where nature was again deemed to be of no practical 
value to the ethical development of the population, yet now it was not because nature was still 
unknowable, but because it was in the process of being known and dominated. Moreover, no longer 
was Socratic withdrawal a conscious act by an ethical subject, because in the disciplinary era such 
withdrawal became an act of coercion effected through the technologies of power upon docile, 
disciplinary subjects. In this way, the Age of Enlightenment appears as a seminal moment in 
history, in which the social, economic, political and philosophical foundations for the operation of 
a new set of technologies within society – namely those of discipline – were laid. Indeed, the 
Enlightenment in many respects served as a “thematic of the modern age, the thought that gave rise 
to disciplinary society” (Dumm 2002: 142), not least because of how the two eras overlapped 
(Harvey 2004: 356). In this regard, Harvey explains the manner in which the Enlightenment 
project, while essentially “liberatory” in the sense that it critically scrutinized many traditional 
forms of power – such as that of  the church and the aristocracy – also operated at the same time 
as “a process of increased discipline” (2004: 356). And he attributes this seemingly contradictory 
dynamic to the prevailing structures of power at the time, and their association with the manner in 
which knowledge was perceived, constructed, and utilized. That is, while people attained “greater 
freedom as power and knowledge became more detailed and controlling,” in this mutually-
reinforcing relationship “more power [also] create[d] more categories of knowledge [and] more 
knowledge refine[d] and extend[ed] the scope of power” (Harvey 2004: 356). In turn, the 
subsequent disciplinary knowledge/power systems not only spurred on ever more extreme pursuits 
of control, such as the widespread confinement of the mad and the poor. In addition, they also 
allowed for increasingly subtle exertions of control, through the mechanisms of discipline that 
infiltrated into the day to day lives of ordinary people – increasing in scope and intensity as the 
disciplines became ever more instantiated in the foundations of normative social life, where they 
turned such people into docile disciplinary subjects.  
 Through such shifts in social, political and economic spheres – which occurred against the 
backdrop of waning sovereign regimes – societies of discipline and their associated technologies 
of power gained momentum from the eighteenth century to reach “their apex in the early twentieth 
century” (Peters 2012: n.p). Perhaps the most distinctive feature of discipline is the exercise of 
power it entails, which no longer takes place overtly, through recourse to a sovereign as its emblem, 
but is rather wielded from behind the shadow of anonymity through a diverse array of institutions. 
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That is, a combination of “total institutions, such as prisons, mental asylums, factories, and military 
barracks” (Ferrone 2015: 36), with other institutions of discipline, such as the school and the 
family. Of course, Foucault underlines the fact that while many of these institutions are 
quintessentially disciplinary in their orientation, their “power to punish [was] ratified in the 
Enlightenment” (Ferrone 2015: 37). Yet the mere ability to apply punitive measures was deemed 
no longer sufficient to meet “society’s growing need” from the late eighteenth century onward, “to 
rationalize, classify, measure, and train bodies, and to educate … them in light of new scientific 
notions” (Ferrone 2015: 36-37). Rather, such powers, in accordance with the ideal of obtaining 
maximum value, were instead increasingly “exercised over bodies through a system of surveillance 
and via a grid or network of material coercions which affected an efficient and controlled increase 
… in the utility of the subjected body” (Smart 2002: 74). People in systems of discipline were thus 
produced as docile, disciplined individuals, through practices that included, as already mentioned, 
the implementation of a rigid regimentation of space through recourse to enclosure, partitioning, 
and the differentiation of functional spaces, along with the regimentation of time through the 
definition of the optimum articulations of the body with objects and gestures, as well as the 
exhaustive use of time (Foucault 1991: 141-152). Through these, maximum productivity and 
increased social order were pursued, not only in carceral or punitive institutions – such as the prison 
or the asylum – but also in both urban spaces and the natural spaces of agriculture.  
 But beyond such distribution and organization of space and time, Foucault also attributes 
the success of discipline’s covert coup in the social body to “its use of simple instruments,” namely 
“hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and their combination in a procedure that is 
specific to it, the examination” (Foucault 1991: 170) all of which are predicated on surveillance. 
That is, key to disciplinary power is the increasing surveillance and visibility of the subject. In 
terms of this, something akin to an inversion occurred, because where once public figures of power 
– such as sovereigns – made visible the scope of their power through public displays and ceremony, 
by contrast in the disciplinary era, the functioning of power is covert, anonymous, and multifarious. 
Here, instead, disciplinary subjects are thrust into the spotlight, constantly individualized, 
scrutinized, and thereby rendered docile by “constant but unverifiable surveillance and the 
possibility of punishment” (Alasuutari 2004: 69). Pickett concurs, stating that in an appeal to the 
overarching value of maximum efficiency, disciplinary power assumed a form that was “politically 
inexpensive,” insofar as it was discreet and relatively invisible as opposed to the “extravagant and 
costly [displays] of power” exhibited by the erstwhile sovereigns. Moreover, the unassuming 
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exercises of the powers of discipline, through their inconspicuity, often tended to “provoke little 
resistance” (Pickett 2005: 12). And it is for this reason that Foucault names Bentham’s Panopticon 
the “model” or “ideal figure of disciplinary society” (O’Brien & Penna 1998: 115).32 By subjecting 
the individual to near-constant observation, “the economy of visibility [is transformed] into the 
exercise of power” (Foucault 1991: 184), particularly because of how uniformity of such forms of 
coercion facilitate a degree of internalization on the part of the disciplinary subject. As O’Brien 
and Penna suggest, a significant transformative aspect of the power of such disciplinary 
surveillance is their ability to bring about the “‘internal’ exercise of discipline” in the subject, by 
means of the “‘external’ organization of power and the … interrelation of multiple centers of 
power” (O’Brien & Penna 1998: 117). In turn, the technology of hierarchical observation, Marsden 
explains, comprises of two key components: “the first is to observe, measure, compare and classify 
individuals’ performance,” and the related assessments are made on the basis of an individual’s 
efficiency and ability to comply with the demands of discipline; through this process the subject is 
held in an individualizing gaze. The second “is to calculate averages and inscribe them in norms 
or rules of conduct,” or standards for performance against which a subject – worker, soldier, student 
– is assessed, and toward which they must aspire (Marsden 2005: 152). These judgements, and the 
context in which they are applied, correspond strongly with the industrial models established 
around the same time. Like hierarchical observation, the function of normalizing judgement 
operates on two levels, insofar as it effectively constitutes a “binary operation that works by means 
of both conformity and individualization” (May 2014: n.p). Accordingly, the first level of this 
operation is to examine an individual in relation to a normative benchmark, and in that way to 
gauge their relative standing in relation to their peers, co-workers, or fellow inmates, which allows 
for the individual to be “[distributed] along a scale” and thus hierarchized (Marsden 2005: 152). 
The second level is one of re-education or training, and was generally carried out through 
punishment or the imposition of some sort of repetitive or tedious activity, designed to correct any 
contravention of a given norm. Here, May draws into conspicuity the impact of this particular 
                                                          
32 From the “Greek, pan meaning all, [and] optikon meaning seeing” (Maly & Horne 2014: 8), the Panopticon is 
described by Bentham as “a circular building, with an inspector’s tower … in the centre and cells arranged radially 
around. [In] the central tower” resided “the prison warden” and from here he would observe, or appear to observe, the 
prisoners confined around him in cells described as follows: a “four-sided cell, completely cut off from its neighbours. 
The interior facing side is open (aside from floor to ceiling bars) and the exterior side has a view to the outside world 
through a window on the outer wall,” which allows the warden absolute powers of surveillance, without himself being 
seen (Maly and Horne 2014: 12-13), particularly through how the prisoner is illuminated via back lighting.  
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technology on punitive institutions and conceptions of punishment, which contrasted markedly 
with what had existed before.  
 
Foucault describes normalizing judgement as directly opposed to earlier approaches 
to punishment, which operate ‘not by hierarchizing but quite simply by bringing into 
play the binary opposition of the permitted and the forbidden;’ … in earlier forms of 
punishment, one does not worry about where one stands in relation to the norm 
[because] … there is no norm or normal. There are acts that are forbidden, and the 
others – the rest – that are permitted. For the former there are dire consequences, if 
one is caught. For the latter there is no need for intervention. There may be traditions 
governing behaviour, but there are no norms of the kind that discipline develops. 
(May 2014: n.p)  
 
The examination – a combination of the preceding two techniques – accordingly facilitates the 
introduction of “a whole mechanism that is linked to a certain type of … formation of knowledge 
to a certain form of the exercise of power” (Foucault 1991: 187). This technique entails three 
elements outlined by Foucault: firstly, the transformation of the “economy of visibility into the 
exercise of power;” secondly, the introduction of the individual “into the field of documentation;” 
and thirdly, the examination which “makes every individual a ‘case’” (Foucault 1991: 187-191). 
In short, the examination is a means of constituting a disciplinary subject, through writing, in a 
manner which draws into conspicuity the degree of their assimilation into, as well as their relative 
standing in accordance with, the dominant power structures.  
 All of these measures were mobilized in the pursuit of greater social control to the end of 
bringing into being a more efficient and productive society, and to extract from both human and 
natural capital the “maximum utility” (Matthews 2009: 40). For Foucault, the resultant relations 
and ordering of society as a whole were largely determined by the prevailing disciplinary modes 
of production. Yet these influenced not only human relations, but also the manner in which humans 
inhabited, utilized, interacted with, and attempted to know, nature – including madness as that point 
where nature reaches through us.  
 That is, the particular coalescence of an ethical anxiety over the natural periphery as a 
source of unreason, and the condemnation of social uselessness or any disruptions to the 
productivity which characterized disciplinary society, is most clearly demonstrable through 
disciplinary treatment of social ‘Others,’ such as the mad, the poor, “the disabled, the deviant, and 
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the morally disreputable;” in short, all of those “who displayed an incapacity for productive work” 
(Scull 1989: 18). From the disciplinary point onward, they were viewed as obstacles to the 
flourishing of the envisioned ethical and productive society, and Foucault explains the correlation 
between the rise of such industrial society and the formation of institutions such as the Hôpital 
Général in France, and the workhouses and asylums of Britain and other European cities. 
“Beginning in the seventeenth century, roughly, industrial society was formed and the existence” 
of anyone who could not contribute – by reason of disability, poverty or criminality – to the 
developmental and productive imperatives of industrialized Enlightenment society “was no longer 
tolerated” (1998:337). Thus, in “response to the requirements of industrial society, large 
establishments for confining [these individuals] were created almost simultaneously in France and 
England” (Foucault 1998: 337). Indeed, these institutions sprung up at an alarming rate, and 
individuals who fell afoul of the bourgeois sensibilities and industrial work ethic of the day were 
summarily incarcerated, as the widespread adoption of confinement as something of a panacea saw 
Hôpital Générals, workhouses, bridewells, and asylums proliferate across continental Europe and 
the United Kingdom. 
 That is, driven to action by the perceived threat posed to the social order by those on the 
natural margins of disciplinary society, power structures within society mobilized to curb such 
individuals’ freedom – defined by their lack of work ethic – and their apparent will to disorder, 
through confining them indiscriminately, more because of the work imperative in a society that 
largely condemned idleness, than because of any “therapeutic intention” (Foucault 1998: 341). 
Described as closer to jails than hospitals, Foucault accordingly dismisses as a false representation 
of humanitarianism the justification of these institutions in terms of the burgeoning study of mental 
illness (Palmer 2004: 74). This is particularly because, having classified madness as a ‘mental 
illness’ in terms of the medico-scientific models of the day, madness became for the first time “an 
object of science” (Foucault 1998: xv-xvi) that was articulated exclusively in terms of its 
subordination to reason. Accordingly, these tentative steps toward a vocabulary of psychiatry 
effectively comprised a “monologue of reason about madness;” one which rested upon the 
precondition of the continual silence of madness (Cranston 2002: 78). Moreover, the ‘treatment’ 
of madness relied on similarly skewed power relations, because while “asylums presented their 
work as medical, they operated with the principles of bourgeois ethics, creating new ways of 
repressing and disciplining those regarded as mad in an attempt to normalize their behaviour” 
(Palmer 2004: 74-75). Indeed, in an economy where cultural value was often placed upon one’s 
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ability to work, and where the primary “criterion for madness” was “the incapacity to work,” the 
logic of the cure was simple – “teach the patients to work” (Foucault 1998: 341). Harsh treatment, 
such as shackling, beatings, and forced labor, were thus often applied in these institutions and 
justified as remedial by the disciplinary momentum of the age. Chief among them was the 
madman’s classification as subhuman – in terms of Descartes’ determination of a human as a 
thinking being, capable of the exercise of reason – which when coupled with the inability to work 
that madness often encompassed, led to the madman being conceived as an example of “humanity 
in an ultimate state of degradation” on account of his alignment with natural lethargy instead of 
societal toil (Palmer 2004: 74).  
 In this way, European society’s “reorganization and reorientation of the financial 
infrastructure of exclusion took place,” and within this context, “the new isolates were … the 
pariahs of non-productivity” (Boyne 1990:6). This may be viewed as a wholesale marginalization 
of difference, or the exclusion of “all elements in society which stood for unreason,” because these 
elements – comprising the mentally ill, the unemployed, the infirm, and the old – “found 
themselves at risk of being shut away, [for] constituting (as it was claimed they did) a scandal to 
law, order, and productive labor” (Porter 1992: 281). Furthermore, it should also be noted that these 
institutions were irreconcilable with “any medical idea in either purpose or functioning;” instead, 
they constituted “rather an instrument of … the new bourgeois … order,” which was gaining 
precedence across Europe at the time (Foucault 1998: 50). Accordingly, these institutions 
functioned not only as spaces in which to hide social elements that were considered an “affront to 
bourgeois sensibilities” (Scull 1989: 18), but also as useful tools in upholding social order and 
maintaining the newfound affluence of the age. As Foucault explains, in the Age of Enlightenment, 
it 
 
was no longer simply a question of hiding away the unemployed, but now also of 
giving them work which could serve the interests and the prosperity of all. The cycle 
was clear: in times of high wages and full employment, they provided a low-cost 
workforce, while in a slump they absorbed the unemployed, and protected society 
against unrest and riots. (1998: 66)  
 
From the above it is clear that madness was not confined alone, not identified as a singular sin, but 
rather deemed part of a pantheon of social ills which together garnered the mistrust of a society 
founded upon the tenets of disciplinary order and progress. But Huffer (2010: 103) also points to a 
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crucial discursive break between the medieval and Enlightenment traditions, which has an 
important bearing on the disciplining of nature under discussion here. That is, earlier, the mad were 
relegated to the natural margins of societies, where they remained excised from the social but 
allowed all the freedoms attached to their liminal status as witless wanderers in nature, because it 
was understood that “mental wandering [would] not tolerate physical confinement” (Montiglio 
2005: 39). But in disciplinary society, such fruitless wandering was considered anathema, because 
nature was no longer a free and liminal zone but rather an enclosed and functionalized space, and 
thus the mad came to be viewed as offenders against the public good, and were accordingly 
criminalized and incarcerated. In other words, the mad, condemned “as the absolute negation of 
reason and bourgeois subjectivity,” now “disappear[ed] within the city” [emphasis added] (Huffer 
2010: 103), because the enclosed and functionalized natural surroundings no longer entailed any 
liminal spaces, but rather only productive and disciplined zones, in which the presence of the mad 
constituted a potential obstacle to progress. Within this discursive milieu, the emblem of 
Renaissance insanity, namely the ship of fools, accordingly became all the more incongruent. That 
is, while pilgrims, wanderers and vagabonds were being “methodically trapped and contained by 
systematic doubt” (Huffer 2010: 103), the “imaginary ship … turned into a dismal hospital” 
(Merquior 1987: 21-22). This dynamic, which may be seen to occur somewhat simultaneously 
across Europe and the United States, is neatly illustrated in Braslow’s telling of the fate of the 
Euphemia, and the transition of its inmates from a position of liminality – or internment on the 
natural margins – to total immersion in the burgeoning system of confinement within the city. The 
Euphemia, a British ship captured in the early 1800s by the American navy, was initially purchased 
by the city of San Francisco as lodgings for the city’s insane and criminal population. But by the 
mid-nineteenth century, wharves and other maritime structures had encircled the vessel, so that 
after decades of deterioration, the ship was eventually demolished and, shortly thereafter, the first 
hospitals for the “physically and mentally disordered” were sanctioned in 1851 (Braslow 1997: 
15).  
 Of course, forms of confinement undoubtedly existed on smaller and more informal scales 
before the Age of Enlightenment, but it was only with the advent of confinement in the disciplinary 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the “trend became established, … and … led, in Europe, 
to the multiplication of asylums to marginalize what were deemed to be deviant minds” (Beaulieu 
& Fillion 2008: 83). And from that time onward, as a result of the foundations laid during the 
Enlightenment, an established machinery of exclusion that was both physical and discursive, 
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became instantiated for the purposes of ethically re-orientating the ‘Others’ in society, against the 
benchmark of the ideal disciplinary subject. The disciplinary subject whose docile acquiescence to 
the new forms of spatio-temporal regimentation under the ever watchful panoptical gaze and 
accompanying processes of examination, all served the ethical function of ushering in an ever more 
efficient and productive society, through an enforced variant of Socratic withdrawal.  
 
Reflections of Aristotelian-Inspired Faith in Teleology in the Disciplinary Era 
For Mokyr, the disciplinary era saw the communion of scientists and engineers who “shared a 
mutually reinforced rational faith in the orderliness and physical processes” of nature, a belief 
which gave rise to a climate of scientific discovery, technological innovation and ultimately vast 
industrial and economic development (1989: 11). Arguably, such faith was strengthened by what 
Foucault refers to as “‘[e]volutive historicity”, or the construction of a “linear” conception of time, 
through which “moments are integrated, one upon another, and … orientated toward a terminal, 
stable point; in short, an ‘evolutive’ time” (1991:160). Importantly, such ideas worked in concert 
with the prevailing technologies of discipline in such a way that they were imbued with credence, 
through being “legitimated as the latest, and hence most advanced, evolutionary phase of social 
development” to such an extent that they appeared “utterly incontestable” (Konik 2009: 35). 
Understandably, though, within this discursive milieu, the worldview of the time underwent 
corresponding shifts toward secularization. Eron explains that secularization is often “defined as a 
process of differentiation” which involves “the process of separation between self and other, God 
and man, [and] the immanent and transcendent” (2014: 5). Accordingly, the prevailing disciplinary 
trend toward secularization was accompanied by a widespread “skepticism regarding the primacy 
of religion as a source of knowledge” (Kendall 2013: 9-10), and this de-emphasis of religion was 
accompanied by a proportional intensification in rationalist and scientific pursuits. 
 Yet, while industrialization and secularization “undercut the place of religion in Western 
life” (Stearns 2003: 105), they also adopted certain religious motifs – particularly that of the 
shepherd and the flock which had over the preceding centuries been subject to varying 
interpretations and degrees of instantiation. In particular, Foucault maintains that, where before the 
Shepherd-God of the Hebrews was seen as a benevolent figure, duty-bound to gather together and 
give succor to the flock (1999: 137-138), through Christianity pastoral power emerged, as the figure 
of the pastor created a “form of power” that was “salvation-oriented … oblative .... [and] 
individualizing” and which via confession became “co-extensive and continuous with life” 
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(Foucault 1982: 333). But later, the disciplinary era saw the application of an analogous 
individualizing gaze upon, and knowledge of, not only the flock but rather every member of 
society. Relatedly, as Foucault conjectures, in the Enlightenment there emerged a secularized 
“confessional practice, a mode of dealing with the populace […] by getting them to ‘confess’ their 
desires, and at the same time encouraging them to think about these desires according to a strictly 
formalized institutional code” (Milbank 2006: 288). Accordingly, it became “a question of no 
longer leading people to their salvation in the next world but, rather, ensuring it in this world,” 
while the “officials of pastoral power increased” and “focused the development of knowledge of 
man around … the population [and] the individual (Foucault 1982: 334-335). In this way, 
disciplinary power and its technologies – notwithstanding how it was couched in reason and science 
– assumed the mantle of religion, not simply on account of how its various technologies borrowed 
from the technologies of pastoral power and the Christian “religious method” (Foucault 1991: 143), 
but also through how the disciplinary project as a whole was articulated in quasi-religious terms. 
In this regard, he explains that 
 
[i]n its mystical or ascetic form, exercise was a way of ordering earthly time for the 
conquest of salvation. It was gradually, in the history of the West, to change direction 
while preserving certain of its characteristics; it served to economize the time of life, 
to accumulate it in a useful form and to exercise power over men through the 
mediation of time arranged in this way. Exercise, having become an element in the 
political technology of the body and of duration, does not culminate in a beyond, but 
tends towards a subjection that has never reached its limit. (Foucault 1991: 162)  
 
And it was the belief in the legitimacy of, and interminable need for, such subjection, to ensure that 
evolutive historicity could unfold as it was supposed to that constituted a variant of Aristotelian-
inspired faith in teleology – a faith which moreover validated both the disciplinary variants of 
Prometheanism and the disciplinary variants of Socratic withdrawal, discussed above, which 
abounded at this juncture in history.  
 
 
Reflections of the Hippocratic Pursuit of Balance with Nature in the Disciplinary Era 
Despite the near hegemony of the above Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, there 
nevertheless remained – albeit more or less on the margins – Hippocratic voices which sought to 
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strike a healthy balance with nature, and in this regard psychoanalytic practice emerges as a case 
in point. Thinkers such as Foucault have, of course, viewed psychoanalysis as somewhat 
problematic for its propensity to reflect and entrench the effects of discipline as they manifested in 
the later bio-power. As Taylor explains, Foucault in many respects problematized psychoanalysis, 
maintaining that it “is normalizing, that it presents a totalizing history, [and] that it involves a 
relation of domination” (Taylor 2009: 137).  In fact, this is a rather consistent theme in Foucault’s 
work, encountered not only in his doctoral thesis, The History of Madness,33 where Freud is 
characterized as the inheritor of Tuke and Pinel’s repressive approach to madness (Foucault 2006: 
222), but also in Volume One of Foucault’s later work, The History of Sexuality, namely, The Will 
to Knowledge, where psychoanalysis is advanced as a medicalized secular version of pastoral 
power (Foucault 1998: 65-67). To elaborate, foremost among the new generation of late nineteenth 
century thinkers attempting to plumb the mysteries of the human psyche was an Austrian 
neurologist, Sigmund Freud, whose investigations laid the groundwork for the psychoanalytic 
method, and who is hailed as precipitating “the second revolution” in mental health (Beard et al 
1989: 22-24).34 Introducing revolutionary ideas into the emergent field of psychiatry, Freud not 
only theorized explanatory models for human development, thought, and behavior, and the 
existence of the unconscious, but also identified a seemingly universal tension or anxiety that 
underpins human existence in civilized society. This signified a dramatic break from previous 
conceptions of madness, which viewed it either as an anomaly, a somatic ailment, or a blight 
inflicted upon the morally bankrupt by a vengeful god. Instead, Freud posited that “people are 
driven by unconscious forces which affect how they behave and how their personalities develop” 
(Beard et al 1989: 24). And he moreover maintained that, as children, we undergo a series of desires 
and disappointments in the process of psychosexual development,35 through which we learn to 
temper physical or libidinal desires in order to conform to the demands of society. However, if a 
child experiences difficulties in reconciling what Freud referred to as the pleasure principle with 
the reality principle, it could result in various neuroses or anxieties manifesting later in life. Thus 
what was presented was a universalizing image of madness, in terms of which Freud proffered 
                                                          
33 This work was originally published in French in 1961 as Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique.  
34 Beard and his colleagues identify the interventions of Pinel, Tuke, Rush and Dix as resulting in the more humane 
treatment of the mentally ill in the nineteenth century, as the first revolution in mental health care, and the more recent 
development and widespread adoption of psychotropic drugs for the treatment of mental illness, along with the 
resultant increase in outpatient-based treatment – generally referred to as deinstitutionalization – as the third revolution 
in mental health (Beard et al 1989: 22).  
35 This theory was initially outlined by Freud in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905).  
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common experiences – such as breastfeeding, toilet training, and masturbation – as potential origins 
of pathology, arguing that “ordinary behaviour stemmed from the same roots as the pathological,” 
and thus that “the gap between neurotic and normal behaviour” was very narrow (Horwitz 2002: 
41).  
 However, it has been argued that while the more moderate and humane approach of 
psychoanalysis is widely credited with having effected many positive changes in the treatment of 
the mentally ill, these new systems can also be seen to embody many of the defining characteristics 
of disciplinary society. In particular, Polizzi and Draper point out that more than representing a 
spontaneous humanitarian impulse, “this sudden shift in perspective concerning the mentally ill 
merely reflected a shifting of the strategies of control,” rather than any “fundamental 
transformation of the power relationships implicit in these new types of medical interactions” 
(2016: n.p). Furthermore, while the related relaxation of the apparent exercise of physical 
dominance over patients within institutions of confinement occurred in concert with numerous 
similar shifts in a variety of disciplines at the time, but these were made possible by the new 
emphasis on visibility and panoptical power in disciplinary institutions and society. To substantiate 
this, Polizzi and Draper point to developments in the field of law and criminology during the 
eighteenth century as demonstrative of this tendency, and they cite renowned Italian criminologist 
Cesare Beccaria’s insights concerning 
 
the relationship between humane laws and the eradication of crime. This new 
approach sought to fundamentally transform the way [the] mentally ill were treated. 
Central to this new understanding was the belief that if the care and treatment of the 
mentally ill was gentler in its approach and temperament it too could cure insanity, 
in much the same way as Beccaria postulated that humane laws could put an end to 
crime. (Polizzi & Draper 2016: n.p) 
   
However, for them, the above intimates the link between the disciplinary retreat of visible forms 
of power, and the emergence of less visible, but no less pernicious technologies that promised 
greater control over social deviancy. As discussed, this exchange occurred quite pervasively in the 
transition from sovereign to disciplinary regimes across Europe, particularly after the French 
Revolution, and it was indicative of the developments that would occur in the treatment and 
perception of madness in the years following these reforms. In short, while the treatment of the 
mad became less vicious, the scope of madness – as well as the social scrutiny surrounding 
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behavior which did not conform to the normative standards of the time – increased dramatically. 
Among others, Taylor concurs that, much like “the progress of Christian confession, the move from 
psychiatric treatment to psychoanalysis is one in which therapy becomes increasingly gentle (from 
prison to asylum to couch) but also more pervasive;” moreover, through this development, 
“psychotherapeutic confession, like Christian confession, became a desired habit for everyone 
rather than an ordeal for a few” (2009: 140). This may be seen, for example, in the transformation 
of dungeon-like institutions for the mad, presided over by cruel wardens, into places characterized 
by “clean and livable conditions and a kind and tolerant response from the physician,” along with 
the exchange of brutal physical treatment of the insane for the exercise of “moral vigilance” to 
regulate behavior (Polizzi and Draper 2016: n.p). After all, this exchange implies a level of 
internalization of the institutional standards on the part of the patients, and which accordingly is 
illustrative of the pervasive nature and extent of disciplinary power.  
 There are, of course, also certain resonances between these new techniques in the 
burgeoning field of psychiatry and the dominant techniques of discipline in the wider disciplinary 
social sphere. That is, patients in these new institutions, while now free of physical constraints and 
violent treatment, were nevertheless subject to a rigorous regimen of examination, as these new 
methods called for “fastidious record-keeping” (Beard et al 1989: 23), in much the same way as 
disciplinary subjects in the wider community were simultaneously examined and documented. 
Similarly, patients were now bound not with chains anymore, but by discourse and their own 
correlative conspicuity in the field of writing. Taylor also explains that Freud’s work effectively 
served to expand the domain of mental illness, with Freud himself acknowledging “that normality 
is something of a ‘fiction’” (2009: 140), on account of how neuroses and related disorders are 
ubiquitous in modern society. The effect of this, in turn, was a radical “broadening [of] the concept 
of insanity or mental illness to incorporate … [many] minor mental illnesses or neuroses” (Bowers 
1998: 136), unlike only a generation before, when mental illness had referred to only the most 
severe forms of psychoses and unsettling antisocial behaviors. Accordingly, normalizing 
judgements arising from constant examination allowed for a proliferation of categorizations of 
mental illness to arise. As Horwitz explains, prior to the 1900s, mental illness was understood quite 
simply as madness, and “the label of mental illness was mainly reserved for people who seemed to 
be ‘out of their minds’ … or for people whose deep depressions did not arise out of any 
recognizable social cause” (Horwitz 2002: 38-39). However, in the climate of the clinicalization 
of mental illness that arose within the new therapeutic – as opposed to punitive – disciplinary 
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institutions, a plethora of new classifications emerged. No longer was the distinction merely 
between that of sane or insane, because now patients could be discursively confined in a myriad of 
new categories, such as “chronic quiet, … acutely excited, … chronically disturbed, … depressed, 
[or] convalescing” (Braslow 1997: 28). And as a result, the field of psychology, and the resultant 
demand for psychotherapists, underwent an exponential expansion at this time (Beard et al 1989: 
25); a phenomenon which is viewed with no small measure of suspicion by Foucault, as part of 
“the swarming of disciplinary mechanisms” (1991:211). This is because, subsequent to such 
‘swarming,’ the “recognition that everyone is somewhat abnormal does not make psychoanalysis 
less pernicious, gentler, or more forgiving than we might have otherwise supposed. On the contrary, 
the claim that everyone is abnormal simply extends the net of psychoanalysis such that no one is 
immune” to its judgements (Taylor 2009: 140). 
 This broadening of the definitions of madness that occurred in the late 1800s not only 
affected cultural perceptions of madness, with the boundary between sanity and insanity becoming 
ever more permeable, resulting in an increase in the number of people admitted for care in mental 
hospitals or asylums. In addition, it also influenced the internal structures of these asylums, with 
the instantiation of the ward system, a reflection of the distributions of space and organization of 
time occurring concurrently in factories, schools, and military barracks beyond the confines of the 
asylum. And in all those institutions throughout disciplinary society, such distributions can be seen 
to “increase control” of subjects, inmates, workers or patients through a process of “reifying 
behaviour,” normative standards, or performance (Braslow 1997: 28).  
 However, having said that, such developments can also be understood as relating more to 
the specific ‘swarming’ of disciplinary mechanisms which co-opted psychoanalysis and 
institutionalized it, and less to the orientation of psychoanalysis itself, which instead entailed 
features that are highly Hippocratic, in its approach to the aspects of nature within the human being, 
with which it sought to strike a balance. That is, while the Freudian imperative to acknowledge the 
reality principle can be argued to imply disciplinary normativity as inevitable and interminable, 
such Foucauldian critique also tends to deemphasize the element of balance in psychoanalysis. 
That is, for Freud, the process of psychosexual development, as well as that of psychoanalysis 
itself, are underpinned by the notion that the attainment of balance is preferable, in order to achieve 
a degree of equivalence between basic instinctual urges (referred to by Freud as the id) and the 
complex moral expectations of society (referred to by Freud as the superego) – with the arduous 
task of mediation that is carried out by the ego. In terms of this, Hartmann outlines the series of 
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balancing acts which must take place for an individual to function in, and meet the expectations of, 
normative society. He explains that the ego is responsible for  
 
(a) maintaining a balance between individual and external realities; (b) establishing 
harmony within the id among competing instinctual drives; (c) maintaining balance 
among the three mental agencies: id, ego, and superego; and (d) maintaining balance 
between its role in helping the id and its own independent role that goes beyond 
instinctual gratification. (Hartmann 1939: 39).  
 
Indeed, in line with the humoral views espoused by Hippocrates – and later Galen – who 
emphasized the necessity of a qualitative and quantitative balance between bodily substances as 
the key to physical health, Freud postulated that a failure to achieve or maintain balance between 
the seemingly oppositional psychosexual forces of the id and superego, may result in pathological, 
disruptive, or neurotic behaviors. Correlatively, his treatment of such patients was geared toward 
identifying the source of the imbalance, and restoring equilibrium. And for this, Freud proposed a 
new method which he referred to as psychoanalysis, a method underpinned by the practice of free 
association and the premise that by carefully attending to the analysand’s “renditions of their 
thoughts and feelings,” an analyst could determine sources of psychological turmoil or 
psychoneuroses – often rooted in early life experiences – which continue to afflict subjects into 
adulthood on a subconscious level (Lichtenburg 1985: n.p). In this regard, Freud concluded that if 
one was able, under the guidance of a psychoanalyst, to discern problematic encounters which have 
resulted in disruptions in one’s psychosexual development, the analysand could theoretically 
“resolve conflicts and restore an integrated sense of self” (Lichtenburg 1985: n.p). In this way, in 
a radical departure from the practices of the past, the analyst sought not to confine or exclude the 
neurotic individual, but rather to understand and ameliorate or harmonize dissociations or breaks 
between the unbalanced individual, their problematic past experiences, and the pressures of an 
increasingly disciplinary environment; and approach which arguably involved far more than simply 
endorsing the normative expectations of disciplinary society.  
 This much is thematized in Freud’s later works, particularly Civilization and its Discontents 
(1930), in which he extends these notions beyond the scope of the individual, advancing that life 
in civilized – or disciplinary – society is not conducive to true satisfaction, and hence tends to result 
in a state of frustrated neurosis. Indeed, in this text, which may be read as a scathing indictment of 
aspects of disciplinary society, Freud theorizes that in constructing civilizations as a means of 
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mitigating the threats posed by an external natural world beset by various perils, we “hope to be 
freed from a part of [our] sufferings by influencing the instinctual impulses” (Freud & Strachey 
1948: 26). In so doing, we subscribe to the normative requirements of society and thus relinquish 
the potential for unchecked satisfaction in order to gain protection from the unchecked dangers of 
the wild, whether real or imagined. But because of this, he concludes, modern society brings about 
a state of collective neurosis, derived from the imposition of an authority which consistently 
demands that citizens curb their instinctual desires, in order to submit to the reality principle (of 
disciplinary normativity). And this ongoing repression, Freud believes, results in unspeakable 
atrocities committed by the neurotic “human animal at war with civilization – and itself” (Gay 
1989: 722). These new interpretations of mental instability also brought about a significant change 
in the manner in which the mentally ill were viewed, and accordingly precipitated new means of 
treatment, particularly when the psychological horrors wrought by the First World War on soldiers 
returning home from the trenches, served to further solidify this need.36 In this regard Freud’s 
methods signified a marked break from the erstwhile forms of treatment that relied heavily on 
methods such as restraint – both literal and/or figurative (Smith 2008: 253).  
 Thus, despite an apparent resonance with the disciplinary infrastructure out of which it 
arose, its orientation around pursuing a balance between such infrastructure and natural instincts 
saw late nineteenth and early twentieth century psychoanalysis reflect the Hippocratic emphasis on 
balance, despite being situated within the disciplinary social milieu. In this regard, the “theoretical 
triad” of “mental entities,” namely the id, ego, and superego articulated in Freudian theory 
(Rottschaefer 1998: 102), has been understood as harking back to the prevailing Cartesian 
dualisms, which exercised considerable influence over contemporary thought. For example, the id, 
says Delaney, has been conflated with “Cartesian ‘animal spirits’ sapping the strength of reason” 
represented by the superego (2003:241). But instead of forming the foundation of a monumental 
discursive battle of ‘us’ against ‘it,’ or reason and civilization against the monstrous demands and 
aberrations of the passions  (Delaney 2003: 241), psychoanalysis also advances the interminable 
need for constant negotiation between the demands of our civilization and our natural desires. A 
negotiation which recognizes the primacy of such nature within us, that it will never be fully 
                                                          
36 In 1917, a survey of British wartime physicians and shell shock victims conducted by Dr. Thomas William Salmon, 
leader of America’s mental hygiene movement in the early twentieth century, found that “at the time, 15% of British 
soldiers had been discharged because of [shell shock and war neuroses]” (Pols & Oak 2007: n.p). In 1921 Salmon 
estimated that a staggering 46.7% of ex-servicemen could be diagnosed with neuropsychiatric ailments as a result of 
wartime trauma (Pols & Oak 2007: n.p; Scull 2014: 511).  
84 
 
conquered, and that we ignore its promptings at our peril, when we fail to follow Hippocrates in 
pursuing a balance between its imperatives and those of our surrounding disciplinary society. 
  
Reflections of Orphism in the Disciplinary Era 
Occupying a similar position of marginality at this time is the Orphic approach, which sought a 
non-invasive means of fathoming the secrets of nature, by accessing “the secrets of nature, not 
through violence but through melody” (Hadot 2006: 96). As already discussed, this Orphic 
approach entails the understanding that humans can seek the divine secrets of nature only by 
mimicking the generative processes of nature through the creation of discourse and art. 
Understandably, though, during the Enlightenment and attendant scientific fervor, these gentler 
and less obtrusive aesthetic approaches to understanding nature were largely sidelined in favor of 
the more violently penetrative methods advanced by the recognized scientific authorities of the 
day. Nevertheless, Orphic sentiment remained a feature of the time, and was most vividly expressed 
by the Romantics, described by Saul as a complex and heterogeneous movement which flourished 
in the early nineteenth century and which was largely influenced by thinkers such as Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe and Friederich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (2009: 209). In short, the 
Romantic Movement gave voice to the profound sense of anxiety at what was viewed as the 
debilitating effects of Enlightenment scientism, and advocated instead for a turn “against what they 
perceived as the soul-less mechanical natural philosophy of the Enlightenment,” in favour of 
“seeking rather a spiritual and dynamic insight into the natural world” (Cunningham & Jardine 
1990: xix). Such thinkers lamented the turn of Western science from “seeking ultimate reality and 
human purpose to reducing and quantifying as many forms of mechanism at work in the universe 
as possible;” a change neatly summed up by Dunbar as a shift from “Logos to logic” (2017: 96). 
Such changes, the Romantics asserted, have “helped [to] debase the ecstatic, spiritual dimensions 
of being human,” and “along with modernity’s unbridled [Aristotelian-inspired] faith in progress 
and technology,” have thereby “encouraged degradation and the psychological disarray” of the 
Enlightenment subject (Dunbar 2017: 96). Against the disciplinary backdrop and the 
power/knowledge systems that informed it, which were viewed by the Romantics as inherently 
“fragmented” – the latter hoped to establish a “unifying perspective on nature, achievable only 
through a higher synthesis of exact knowledge and speculation, scientific experiment and intuition 
or, ultimately, science and art” (Saul 2009: 209). In particular, the Romantics hoped to achieve this 
in two ways. Firstly, through the destabilization of the Cartesian-inspired dualistic view of matter 
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in favour of the recognition of a “monistic, spiritual ‘world soul,’ which encompasses the physical 
and the metaphysical [,] the object world, the human spirit, body and mind” (Saul 2009: 210). 
Secondly, by means of a critical interrogation of the contemporary scientific method, which they 
viewed as incompatible with any meaningful discovery or understanding of nature.  
 Schelling, said to have largely inspired the Romantics with his two influential texts, Ideas 
for a Philosophy of Nature (1797) and On the World-Soul (1798), in which he problematized the 
Cartesian dichotomies entrenched in contemporary scientific and epistemological thought, 
believed that this separation of mind from matter had “effectively destroyed any notion of a unified 
and integrated cosmos” (Ørsted et al 1998: xxiv). Accordingly, he levelled severe criticisms at 
adherents (of Socratic withdrawal) and (Promethean) proponents of mechanistic conceptions of 
nature, such as Bacon and Newton, specifically these advocates of the theory of nature outlined in 
Newton’s Principia, in which Schelling “saw an irreconcilable gap [established] between the 
physical world as “dead brute matter … and consciousness” (Ørsted et al 1998: xxiv). 
Correlatively, Schelling held that for any holistic conception of the world it was necessary to 
conceive of a bridge between Descartes’ disparate mind and matter, or the human consciousness 
and the external natural world, henceforth popularly conceived of as inherently separate entities. 
In response to this philosophical oversight, in On the World Soul, Schelling sought to develop a 
metaphysical understanding of nature and the world, as part of a critical response to the above 
widely accepted mechanistic view. Ostaric insightfully outlines Schelling’s objective in On the 
World Soul as “the construction of the concept ‘life’” in a way which sought to overcome “the 
separation between mechanism and organism” (2014: 58). In this regard, Schelling appealed to 
ancient scholarship surrounding the “universal soul of nature” which “serves as the connecting, 
third principle, between the world and nous,” or human consciousness/intellect (Ostaric 2014: 58-
59). Such a worldview, for the Romantics, was immensely important because it facilitated new and 
unprecedented opportunities both for understanding and for connecting with nature. This is 
because, having debunked the dualisms of Descartes and bridged the gap between mind and matter, 
they were able to “experience the world in deeply intimate ways because [, for them,] ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’ are just different aspects of one creative activity” (Fideler 2014: n.p).  
 Following on from this, Goethe similarly problematized the scientific method of the day, 
positing instead an aesthetic or “artistic vision of nature,” which allowed for an element of human 
perception that necessarily encompassed “an emotional element of pleasure, admiration, 
enthusiasm or terror” (Hadot 2006: 263). In this regard, thinkers aligned with the movement of 
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German Romanticism – Goethe foremost among them – felt that the subjective, sensory 
experiences fundamental to our perception of the world around us had been undermined by the 
cold, linear logic of science and the attendant mechanistic worldview. Accordingly, Goethe 
spurned knowledge of nature which had been extracted by the force of mechanical apparatuses or 
experiments – knowledge he referred to as having been “exhorted with levers and screws” 
(Cunningham & Jardine 1990: xix). And instead he sought to restore the natural spontaneous and 
sometimes irrational interactions between humanity and the world it sought to observe and 
understand, which involved a remedial approach after the application of logic had served to 
distance and alienate us from nature. Furthermore, he maintained, the forcible unveiling of nature’s 
secrets through the use of instruments or experimentation served only to occlude the phenomena 
which one actually sought to observe. This sentiment is strikingly captured in Goethe’s poem:    
 
The changeful dragonfly 
Flutters around the fountain;  
Long it delights my view.  
It is now dark, now light; now red, now blue. Yet when it stops and one seizes it in 
one’s hand, one no longer sees anything but a funeral blue: ‘this is what is in store 
for you, o you who dissect your pleasure’. (Hadot 2006: 149-150) 
 
In relation to this poem, Hadot recalls, Goethe’s view that the only way to glean any understanding 
of the secret workings of nature is through passive observation, oriented around “perception and 
the aesthetic description of perception,” because “only nature – that is, mankind’s senses, 
understood as free from all intermediaries – can see nature” (2006: 149). 
 To be sure, besides authoring impressive literary works – Faust primary among them – 
Goethe was also a practicing scientist, and he contributed throughout his life in varying degrees to 
the fields of “botany, cosmology, and theories of color, [and] evolution,” in a manner which merged 
science with aestheticism by infusing his scientific explorations with art; most notably through his 
use of “prose and poetry to describe ‘God-Nature,’ ‘World-Soul,’ and ‘Mother-Nature’ as the force 
that guides nature’s unending metamorphoses” (Dunbar 2017: 210). His attempts are thus rightly 
lauded for enlivening the otherwise rather static and reductionist scientific method of his era, and 
in so doing, “helping to form a richer field from which to contemplate nature,” through establishing 
a space of overlap between the two seemingly disparate practices of art and science, as a foundation 
for a new practice of science and mode of understanding the world (Millan 2014: 396).  
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 And while such thought did gain ground in intellectual circles, it was also popularly 
articulated in Bohemian movements, as a general “protest of the conforming powers of 
industrialism and consumerism,” which were considered to be plagued by binarism, a mechanistic 
worldview, and the development imperative – all of which the Romantics rallied against.  Thus, 
such reflections occurred not only in the works of those associated with Romanticism, and later 
Bohemianism, but also in related splinter movements such as that of naturalism, as well as 
unconventional or alternative modes of self-expression in relation to nature. In this regard, Dunbar 
points to the Bohemian communities at Ascona in Switzerland, which from the nineteenth to early 
twentieth centuries, partook in a variety of experimental or alternative practices and beliefs, ranging 
from erotic psychotherapy, through Mother Goddess worship, to holistic health therapies, all of 
which broadly extolled “nature and freedom and sought spiritual communalism” (2017: 123). In 
particular, Dunbar asserts that the founding in 1933 of the Eranos Foundation,37 speaks to the 
influential and resonant feature of these ideas of nature. The goal of the foundation’s annual 
colloquiums at Asconda were also closely attuned to the objectives of the Romantics, and consisted 
chiefly of a desire to “recover and re-activate the early, animistic powers” of Goddess traditions 
and eco-centric thought. Indeed, many Eranos contributors sought not only to bridge the gaps 
enforced by the dichotomizing traditions of science, but also to incorporate Eastern spiritual and 
religious practices as a means of “re-identifying the self with the ultimate reality” (Dunbar 2017: 
126), in an ongoing reflection of profoundly Orphic sensibilities.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite the above colloquiums enjoying great longevity – existing even into the contemporary era 
and drawing a great many influential thinkers – it is nevertheless important to note that such thought 
never managed to dislodge the prevailing disciplinary discursive network in any significant way. 
Rather, while they do suggest an enticing alternative to the linear and exclusionary discourses of 
empiricism, binarism, progress, and scientism, such Orphic thought remained largely marginalized, 
along with its Hippocratic counterpart, by the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus discussed 
earlier. And this marginalization persists into the present. To gain insight into the complexities and 
                                                          
37 Since the 1930s, a colloquium of thinkers has met in the Foothills of the Swiss Alps, to create, in founder Olga 
Fröbe-Kapteyn's vision, a “free space for the spirit, a meeting place between East and West … where the relation 
between the individual, the spirit and the peculiar images of the soul were to be unceasingly re-imagined.” The name 
Eranos was derived from the Greek term for a banquet, providing for both physical and spiritual needs, and meetings 
accordingly took the form of formal presentations, lectures, and discussions, as well as song and poetry performances 
by the participants (eranosfoundation.org 2017: n.p).  
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variations of the dominant practices of confinement established during this time, it is helpful to 
refer back to what may, in this context, be viewed as a blueprint for the multidimensional of 
disciplinary confinements which emerged. In this regard, da Vinci’s castle- highlighted at the 
beginning of this chapter – represents both the enclosure and confinement meted to the social 
‘Others’ of the time, and the disciplinary demarcation of space by excluding threatening elements 
from without. In this way, da Vinci’s castle may be seen to correspond with the disciplinary 
enclosure of the world – society and nature – and the confinement of the last vestiges of errant 
nature within this domain, as they manifested in the figure of the madman, so that he could be kept 
in view and obliged to act ethically; that is, to work. 
 Moreover, as will be discussed next, in light of the eschatological crises brought on by the 
Second World War, and the flourishing of global capitalism which followed it, holistic and 
universalizing Hippocratic and Orphic ideas have been pushed further into the recesses of the 
collective consciousness of a culture that operates within a climate of commoditization and 
development, predicated upon the maintenance of the human/nature dichotomy, and reliant on an 
unceasing pursuit of progress. Accordingly, the alternatives voiced by the Hippocratic and Orphic 
approaches, while they continue into the present, also tend to be drowned out by the siren call of 
the profit incentive, and attendant environmental exploitation. This is because the dynamics of the 
Promethean-Aristotelian-Socratic nexus remain dominant, and are expressed through mechanisms 
of increasing control that mutate, multiply, and assume ever more complex and pervasive forms.  
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Chapter 3: The Extended Hadotian Framework in the Context of Control Society 
 
Introduction  
Up until World War Two, the idea of da Vinci’s castle remained an anchoring concept of  a domain 
that is insurmountable, enclosed, rigidly partitioned, and accordingly impervious to both assault 
from without and resistance from within – a veritable blueprint of the tenets of the disciplinary era. 
But in the wake of the Second World War, cracks began to appear in its once impenetrable façade. 
That is, with the emergence of societies of control in the mid-twentieth century, the rigidly-striated 
and hence discontinuously controlled spaces of discipline were eroded, progressively dissolved by 
regimes of unceasing digital control, under the auspices of the neoliberal juggernaut. In this regard, 
Hardt maintains that the landscape of control society is “best characterized by the shifting desert 
sands, where positions are continually swept away” (1998: 32). This is because, in societies of 
control, the carefully regimented partitions and enclosures of discipline are subsumed within a 
shifting, fluid network of control, which exists in a state of perpetual flux, involving the continuous 
“smooth surfaces of cyberspace, with its infinitely programmable flows of codes and information,” 
replacing discipline’s contiguous architecture of institutions of brick and mortar (Poster 2006: 61). 
 But this raises the question of how the reflections of the five approaches to nature of the 
extended Hadotian framework manifest and inform perspectives in the contemporary era. Again, 
such consideration is important to undertake because, as already indicated, Hadot’s analysis in The 
Veil of Isis only extends as far as the enlightenment, such that it is necessary to close the gap 
between this period and the contemporary era before the extended Hadotian framework can be used 
as a lens through which to critically view DiCaprio’s The 11th Hour and Before the Flood. Thus, 
with a view to linking Hadot’s analysis with the current period of environmental crisis, this chapter 
will explore how Deleuze’s theory of control society advances on Foucault’s concept of 
disciplinary society – particularly in light of Foucault’s suggestion that the disciplinary era 
gradually receded after the Second World War – and how the approaches to nature of the extended 
Hadotian framework feature in the dynamics of such societies of control.  
 To begin with, it will be argued that the sustained prevalence of attitudes informed by 
Promethean technological advances in the contemporary era have both enabled and necessitated 
the ever more effective and exhaustive extraction of natural resources, all to fuel the rampant 
consumerism engendered by the globalized neoliberal economy. In this regard, firstly, the key 
economic characteristics of control society along with its digital technologies will be discussed in 
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relation to the dynamics of its disciplinary predecessor, with emphasis falling on the shift from the 
classical industrial capitalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, to the globalized 
neoliberal economy which emerged after the Second World War, in relation to the development of 
information technology.  
 Secondly, how in such a context, individuals become dividualized by being reduced from 
the docile individuals of discipline, to codified, economic units – dividuals – in societies of control, 
will be considered as a variant of Socratic withdrawal. In this regard, the dividual will be viewed 
in comparison with the historical relations to nature considered in the foregoing chapters, as the 
furthest removed from the natural environment. This is because where originally Socratic 
withdrawal had called for the conscious, ethical withdrawal of an active agent from the 
unfathomable majesty of nature – which had its parallels in the Roman era – in the contexts of the 
Middle Ages, Renaissance and Enlightenment, this was rearticulated as a generalized withdrawal 
from nature which was seen, respectively, as evil, as antithetical to humanist endeavors, and as the 
object of progressive domination in pursuit of productivity and scientific progress. But in contrast, 
in societies of control, people cease even to be individuals, insofar as Socratic withdrawal in control 
society entails a withdrawal not only from nature, but also from the erstwhile disciplinary 
individuality, through becoming ever-more digitally immersed in the neoliberal economy whose 
wellbeing takes precedence over human happiness and development.  
 Thirdly, and related to this, it will be advanced that reflections of Aristotelian-inspired faith 
in teleology manifest in control society, in the form of an overriding belief in the neoliberal 
economy as the only viable option, as evinced in the valorization of free market economics by 
Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics from the 1950s onward. In this regard, it 
must be remembered that it was Friedman who advanced that “[j]ust as ecosystems self-regulate, 
keeping themselves in balance, the [free] market, left to its own devices, would create … an Eden 
of plentiful employment, boundless creativity and zero inflation” (Klein 2008: 50). That is, he 
maintained that a state of such utopian economic flourishing would create a context in which social, 
political and environmental ills would all be ameliorated through the technological advances and 
accumulation of surplus value arising as the natural by-product of radical free-market economics 
in what amounted to quasi-religious dogmatic support for unfettered capitalism as the ultimate end 
to which economies have historically been moving. 
 Fourthly, after the environmental effects of the above Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian 
nexus have been considered, manifestations of the Hippocratic pursuit of balance with nature will 
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be explored, in relation to the work of early environmentalists like Rachel Carson, whose seminal 
text Silent Spring that was first published in 1962, helped to initially engender popular awareness 
of the negative effects of human activity, such as industrial-scale agriculture and pest control, on 
ecosystems. In short, Carson’s text, which articulated in simple yet still scientific terms the negative 
effects of commonly-used chemicals such as DDT, not only on the environment and animals, but 
also on humans when such chemicals had accumulated in environments. This facilitated for the 
first time popular awareness of the growing environmental crisis. And through doing so, Silent 
Spring also contributed significantly to the birth and exponential growth of numerous 
environmental movements. Accordingly, reflections of the Hippocratic pursuit of balance with 
nature in subsequent environmental movements, such as deep ecology, ecofeminism and social 
ecology, will be examined at this point. As will be discussed, from the perspective of such 
environmental movements, widespread ecological deterioration as well as phenomena such as 
global warming are the outcome of disproportionate human interference in natural environments. 
Interference that involves both resource excessive extraction and overuse of natural resources, such 
as fossil fuels, along with the irresponsible disposal of the polluting byproducts of the related 
incessant production and consumption. Thus, when such movements advocate – albeit in varying 
degrees – both the curbing of the harmful human excesses associated with the contemporary 
neoliberal economy, and efforts to ameliorate existing environmental damage in order to restore a 
sense of balance between humans and nature, it amounts to a compelling reflection of the 
Hippocratic orientation. 
 Fifthly, in regard to Orphic responses to the degradation of nature in the contemporary era, 
various works of literature, film, and art – by poet A.R Ammons, filmmakers Perrin and Cluzaud, 
and artist Ben Rivers, respectively – will be examined in terms of their endeavor to draw close to 
nature through aesthetic means, in a manner that bypasses the violence of scientific observation. 
Crucial to this appraisal of contemporary manifestations of the Orphic approach to nature is 
consideration of their capacity to enfold elements of digitality in a manner that re-imagines 
Promethean modalities in non-invasive ways, while also destabilizing dualistic thought and 
facilitating novel and imaginative understandings of nature. And as will be discussed, it is 
important to consider these dynamics here, as a precursor to exploring, in the next two chapters, 
the extent to which DiCaprio’s environmental films – The 11th Hour (2007) and Before the Flood 
(2016) – either build on them, or betray them. 
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Post-modern Prometheanism in Control Society 
In his seminal text “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” Deleuze outlines the transition from 
Foucault’s disciplinary societies of the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – 
which, as discussed in the previous chapter, were decidedly informed by the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus – to societies of control.38 According to him, the onset of 
the latter can roughly be placed at around the end of World War Two (1992: 3), defining “a 
chronological period after the modern age that is founded neither on the central control of the 
sovereign nor on the decentralized control of the prison or factory” (Galloway 2004: 3). That is, 
Deleuze describes life within the various closed disciplinary institutions of the family, school, 
factory, military, and so on, between which the disciplinary subject never ceased to move, as 
requiring the disciplinary subject to each time acquiesce to the specific normativity which informed 
each domain. And in this regard, Deleuze explains that in disciplinary society, such enclosed 
institutions fulfilled several important functions, namely, “to concentrate; to distribute in space; to 
order in time;” and ultimately, “to compose a productive force within the dimension of space-time 
whose effect will be greater than the sum of its component forces” (1992:2). This was primarily 
achieved through ensuring the docility of the subject, which served “as the skeleton or backbone 
of civil society,” and which was effected by rigid definition of “the striations of social space” 
(Hardt 1998: 30). In contrast, Deleuze maintains that in societies of control, there exists “a 
generalized crisis in relation to all the environments of enclosure,” because in this context the once-
discrete institutions of discipline are subsumed by control’s “ultrarapid forms of free-floating 
control,” which are unchecked by the rigid striations of discipline (1992: 3-4). That is, in societies 
of control, the social space is marked not by boundaries and barriers, but rather by “the absence of 
confining spatial arrangements in the exercise of domination” (Poster 2006: 59). And while the 
apparent dissolution of traditional disciplinary modes of confinement “may be presented as being 
more closely tailored to the needs of individuals, Deleuze sees little more than a new system of 
domination;” one through which the scope of power is perpetually broadened (Marks 2010: 56). 
Here, by way of example, Deleuze makes reference to reforms undertaken in response to “the crisis 
of the hospital as an environment of enclosure,” which saw the widespread establishment of 
                                                          
38 As Poster points out, the term ‘control society’ was borrowed by Deleuze from William Burroughs’ novel Naked 
Lunch, which constituted a “meditation on drug addiction” and in which “Burroughs obsesses about control both by 
addicts and the U.S. government.” Poster rightly remarks on the disparity between the two usages, noting that while 
Deleuze’s interpretation of control society leans heavily on control through information technology, such technology 
had yet to be developed when Burroughs penned his text in 1959 (2006: 59). 
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outpatient treatment schemes, like “neighborhood clinics, hospices, and day care;” developments 
which have been regarded as “express[ing] new freedom, but [that] … participate as well in 
mechanisms of control that are equal to the harshest confinements” (1992:3). This is also 
observable, Deleuze asserts, in the way in which “the corporation [now] replaces the factory, 
perpetual training tends to replace the school, and continuous control … replace[s] the 
examination,” because through such means the exercise of control is effectively extended 
indefinitely (1992: 5). Thus, in the contemporary era, “power is no longer exerted primarily through 
[a series of discrete] … disciplinary deployments, but [rather] through networks of control,” from 
which the subject is never free (Hardt 1998: 23). To be sure, as Hardt notes, the transition from 
discipline to control has not been a single, complete exchange of one set of oppressions for another; 
instead, he emphasizes that “the forms and structures of social exchange, participation and 
domination” – that is to say, the foregoing modes – have not “ceased entirely to exist, but rather … 
have been displaced from the dominant position by a new configuration of apparatuses, 
deployments and structures” (1998: 30). Similarly, as Poster contends, “it might seem logical to 
conclude from the binary terms ‘societies of discipline’ and ‘societies of control’ that Deleuze sees 
himself going beyond Foucault by discerning forms of domination not recognized by the historian 
of the Panopticon” (2006:60). However, this “is not at all the case. Instead Deleuze proclaims his 
agreement with Foucault,” particularly when “Deleuze writes: ‘… our future will be controlled 
rather than disciplined,” implying that for the moment our world is a strange mixture of disciplinary 
and control technologies (2006: 60). 
 An intriguing example of this stifling co-habitation of modes is provided by Poster, who 
draws attention to the expansion of the quintessential disciplinary institution – the prison – which 
in the United States today, despite the ostensible displacement of disciplinary powers, continues to 
proliferate and expand “under the so-called ‘get tough’ policies of recent and current 
administrations” (2006: 60). Moreover, in the contemporary era, prisons have also become 
increasingly integrated into the neoliberal economy – a key characteristic of Deleuze’s control 
society – through increasing private ownership. Indeed, King states that while these practices 
predate the contemporary era, there was a marked increase in the privatization of prisons around 
“the late 1970s and the early 1980s,” in the form of “both privately owned jails and prisoners for 
lease” in the US (2012:12). In keeping with the objectives of neoliberal capitalism, such practices 
allowed not only a curtailing of state expenditure and intervention, but also opportunities for private 
firms to obtain massive profits derived both from the construction, maintenance, and oversight of 
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prisons, as well as from the cheap convict labor which fuels both “corporations and the military-
industrial complex” (Koros 2011: 29). In short, as Koros explains, in “the era of neoliberalism … 
[and] mass incarceration,” the privatized prison industry “means money. Big money. Big in 
building, big in providing equipment and big in running” (2011: 29). Yet, beyond the relatively 
closed environment of the expansive prison system, technological advances have allowed for new, 
decentralized modes of confinement and surveillance, referred to as electronic monitoring, or EM 
(Nellis et al 2013: n.p). In this regard, Nellis and Mair cite a British Home Office report from as 
early as 1988, evaluating the efficacy of such devices in relation to curfew and probation orders, 
which had previously been heavily reliant on monitoring by the police force. 
  
Electronic monitoring might help to enforce an order which required offenders to 
stay at home … Less restrictively, it could help in tracking an offender’s 
whereabouts. By itself, electronic monitoring could not prevent reoffending, though 
it might limit opportunities to a degree which a court could consider justified 
diversion from custody. (Nellis & Mair 2013: n.p)  
  
Thus, the traditional institutions of discipline can be understood as merging with the dynamics of 
control society and in the process changing, partially disintegrating, and partially fusing with new 
technologies, thereby gradually becoming enmeshed in an overarching Promethean matrix of 
mechanisms from which escape is not only impossible, but also increasingly inconceivable. 
 Such developments, Deleuze conjectures, were made possible by a combination of 
economic and technological conditions arising in the period following World War Two, namely 
the spread of global capitalism or neoliberalism, and the broad spectrum of technological advances, 
referred to by Davies as “ubiquitous digitization” (Davies 2015: 40), which was concomitant with 
it. Accordingly, this digital revolution – in concert with the dynamics of neoliberalism – has 
affected changes not only in production, but also in the understanding of the individual, under new 
forms of surveillance.  
 A significant effect of these new economic organizations and attendant modes of 
production is the capacity, as mentioned above, to develop and mass produce information 
technologies which, in turn, have the capacity to “fold into prevailing systems of domination” 
(Poster 2006: 229). Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari already envisioned an outcome in which an 
individual – or any element – can be traced “within an open environment at any given moment … 
as with an electric collar,” or be granted or denied access to certain spaces, or information at certain 
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times, by virtue of “one’s (dividual) electronic card,” which allows for one’s movements and 
activities to be continuously monitored (Deleuze 1992: 7). And while, for many, this eventuality at 
first seemed only a remote possibility, lifted from the pages of a science fiction novel, Poster 
perceives a very real threat posed in this regard even by existing technologies. He emphasizes that  
 
ubiquitous computing disturbs the sense of physical location, extending and 
multiplying the body throughout the globe … The dangers are already becoming 
apparent, with permanent surveillance as its outcome. Global positioning systems are 
perhaps convenient for the traveler, but considered in their totality, [they] present a 
vision in which any individual can be located by anyone at any time. (Poster 2006: 
229)  
 
That is, the increasing reach of the internet, and our increasing reliance on smart devices, coupled 
with recent technological developments such as satellite mapping and drone capabilities, have 
signaled hitherto unseen levels of surveillance and control, which stand in sharp contrast to what 
Leonard describes as the “early counter-culturalist thrust of the internet” (2010: 261). After all, 
while early proponents of information technology lauded its potential to break with the rigid spatial 
and temporal configurations of disciplinary society,39 Mitchell now believes that these changes are 
“unlikely to result in … [the] galloping decentralization” once anticipated; rather, he points to how 
spatial distributions of resources, labor and power have “been iteratively reaffirmed, rather than 
abandoned in the digital age” (2000: 77). Accordingly, such technologies of control, far from 
fulfilling their once-imagined liberatory potential, have instead largely been co-opted by 
governments and the corporate powers of the free market. And this has resulted once more in a 
confluence of the vestigial modalities of discipline alongside the domination exerted by the 
technological networks of control, in what Lovink claims amounts to “yet another form of colonial 
capture” (in Leonard 2010: 261). In short, the manipulation of technology that seems, on the 
surface, to emancipate us from the gridlock of discipline, in actuality serves to expand capacities 
for surveillance and the exercise of power, and its Promethean orientation in this regard is perhaps 
                                                          
39 Early counter-culture surrounding developmental information technology, particularly the internet, revolved largely 
around a “philosophy of enlightened tool use … with its interests in self-realization and self-expression” incorporating 
a “more general utopian vision of technology as socially progressive and capable of expanding human potential.” In 
the contemporary era, though, this ideology has been largely manipulated and exploited as a marketing gimmick by IT 
powerhouses such as Microsoft and Apple, so that, “paradoxically the counter-cultural legacy of technological 
utopianism has found new expression as part of a more general ideology of neoliberal, libertarian, high-tech capitalism” 
(Gere 2002: n.p).  
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best exemplified by the smartphone. While ostensibly liberatory – in that smartphones grant access 
to information and provide almost ubiquitous connectivity largely undetermined by geographical 
location or spatial demarcations – this unlimited access also brings with it the potential for 
unchecked surveillance or monitoring of, among other things,  movements, financial transactions, 
and social interaction. Something that distinguishes it from the exercise of power in disciplinary 
societies, which was largely limited to the confines of the disciplinary institutions in question, such 
as the school, the barracks, the factory, and the prison. So, in many ways, smartphones and related 
technologies may be seen to combat territorializing powers of discipline, in terms of how they both 
break down the rigid architecture of discipline, as well as pose challenges to the exercise of 
disciplinary power, in ways that allow for the emergence of “new forms of agency and subjectivity 
that disrupt the knowledge/power nexus” (Scott 2016: 53). In this regard, Scott points to the use of 
smartphone cameras to capture incidents of brutality or malfeasance within institutions, such as the 
military, hospitals, schools, and policing, the exposure of which seem “to logically lead to a 
decrease in Foucauldian disciplinary power.” However, “while interactivity, on the one hand may 
provide a solution to the disciplinary state,” online interactivity may also be seen to represent “a 
disciplinary tactic of the neoliberal state in the twenty-first century [, with] … the interactive user 
… being shaped … and reinforced into an active entrepreneurial citizen of neoliberalism” (Scott 
2016: 53). This process of expanding Promethean control masquerading as emancipation is referred 
to as “controlled freedom” (Deleuze 1998: 18) and Draper illustrates this concept with reference 
to Deleuze’s metaphor of a highway. He explains that “control is not discipline. You do not confine 
people with a highway, but by making highways, you multiply the means of control. … People can 
travel infinitely and ‘freely’ without being confined, while being perfectly controlled. That is our 
future” (2012: 14). This process of boundless limitation, of consensual, barely perceptible yet ever-
expanding control, resonates strongly with Andrejevic’s model of digital enclosure (2007: 297), 
which seems in the contemporary era to have overtaken traditional disciplinary enclosures. As Scott 
explains: 
 
[A]s the internet becomes increasingly characterized by private ownership and 
control, … despite the appearance of greater convenience and access provided by 
networked interactive environments (such as mobile smartphone apps), we 
voluntarily enter a space in which our information is recentralized, consolidated, 
commodified and controlled. Andrejevic suggests that the ubiquitous internet 
interactivity in which we engage also has the potential to accelerate the 
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commodification of and centralized control over public information. Interactive 
users thus help to further construct the … force of the neoliberal state. (2016: 53) 
  
Furthermore, beyond their capacity to facilitate ever more control over increasingly dependent 
users, smartphones and similar digital devices further exacerbate the worst excesses of the 
globalized, free market economy, through encouraging and facilitating online consumerism. 
Indeed, this exponential expansion of control brought about by developments in capital and 
technology – particularly in relation to the rise of intrusive digital technologies, and the formation 
of a neoliberal economy driven by services and knowledge – has come to constitute something of 
a hallmark of the contemporary era. It has not only shaped the way that we process knowledge and 
interact with each other, but also moderated our relations with nature, in ways that powerfully 
underscore Hadot’s contention concerning the innately “Promethean character of contemporary 
technology” (2006: 150).  
 As discussed in the previous two chapters, Hadot associates Prometheanism, or “the 
Promethean sensibility,” with attempts to extract the secrets of nature by force, through machinery 
and via trickery; an approach which for Hadot in The Veil of Isis is “epitomized by Francis Bacon,” 
who sought “to unveil the secrets of nature through deception and violence” (Borlik 2011: 36). 
Crucially, this aggressively scientific Promethean disrobing of nature is enacted in order to “force 
nature to reveal her secrets in order to better exploit her” for humanity’s own ends (Chase et al 
2013: xviii). And while in existence since Greek antiquity, such patterns of scientific subjection 
and containment of nature, and later exhaustive use of natural resources, were established and 
entrenched in the Age of Enlightenment, which saw the birth of the modern scientific method as 
well as a massive boom in industry. These developments were also reinforced by the prevailing 
disciplinary sensibilities of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, identified by Michel 
Foucault and outlined in the previous chapters. But while contemporary control society has been 
characterized by the dissolution of discipline’s regimented spaces of confinement, vestigial traces 
of disciplinary discourses remain, and continue to dovetail with the technologies of control to 
inform the manner in which we view and relate to nature. And the continued dominance of such 
attitudes ensures that in the contemporary era, at economic and governmental levels, “it is the 
Promethean attitude that has come to hold sway almost exclusively” (Brown 2017: 21). That is, the 
developmental and industrializing agenda, established in the disciplinary era and described by 
Steinberg as emphasizing a “production-oriented” view of nature – which was heavily inflected 
with the dominant “economic logic” of the time – persists (2003: 71). Thus, Woodard describes 
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contemporary incarnations of Promethean approaches to the environment as largely characterized 
by “exploitative capitalist Cartesianism” (2013: 2). To elaborate, in the context of a prevailing 
neoliberal economic climate, physical nature, with all its irrationality and unfathomability, is 
viewed as an entity secondary to human life and inimical to utility. A mere canvas upon which 
economic ambition can be realized, with nature’s mysteries simply things to be uncovered and set 
to work as part of the pursuit of wealth. In these terms, nature is fixed and defined largely as a 
commodity in the capitalist marketplace. Specifically, the environment is generally appraised in 
terms of its exchange value, or the “single, unitary and reductive account of what makes a good or 
a service valuable” (Franks et al 2018: n.p). In such an economy, the sanctity of environments is 
negated and their stability compromised in deference to an unremittent profit imperative, leading 
to natural resources and ecosystems being commoditized and subsequently plundered to sustain 
the cycles of hyper-production and hyper-consumption necessary for capitalist accumulation. Such 
patterns of commoditization and exploitation are arguably an outward manifestation of a deeply 
Promethean prejudice which centralizes the interests and utility of homo-economicus. Indeed, 
Promethean sensibilities may be seen to lie at the heart of the neoliberal agenda of relentless 
expansionism because in the “the contemporary period … man perceives everything in the form of 
a device and an exploitable supply” (Hadot 2006:150). As Robinson explains, as a result of “the 
accumulation imperative that is at the core of the capitalist system,” there exists an “imperative for 
the system to constantly expand, which is the real meaning of ‘growth;’” the corollary  of this is 
“that a stationary state under capitalism is not possible” (2014: 229). Rather, as markets become 
increasingly saturated and the earth approaches its carrying capacity, there remains a necessity to 
discover ever more innovative measures to better derive valuable products from nature, 
necessitating renewed investigations into her secrets, often at massive cost to the environment as 
well as economic ‘others’ within the neoliberal landscape.  
 In the context of industrialized late/ advanced capitalism, then, “the environment no longer 
limits human populations the way it does for most species” (Spooner 2012: 123). Instead, growing 
populations demand space and sustenance, as well as access to a glut of consumer technological 
goods, along with the energy to fuel such devices – despite how this places ecosystems under 
increasing strain, “over-tax[ing] the capacity of the biosphere to assimilate and disperse” the 
demands and “by-products of human civilization” (Hall 1975: 11). That is, derived itself from the 
scientific inquest, the “rapidly changing information society, characterized by the ubiquitous 
presence of information technology, provides a constant demand for the latest and most capable 
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device, tool or toy” (ACAS Bulletin 2006: 21). And this pattern produces a two-fold result: on the 
one hand, it drives the exhaustive use patterns of nature, in evidence since the industrial revolution, 
and on the other hand, it furthers the digital mechanisms of control discussed earlier – which serve 
in turn to increase the demand for resource extraction through augmenting consumerism. Carter 
also explains this dynamic in relation to contemporary ideological and environmental 
undercurrents, asserting that many capitalist states  
 
support inegalitarian relations of production (that develop the productive forces) in 
order to enjoy the surplus and the environmentally harmful technology thereby 
produced, both of which are essential for the development of forces of coercion, 
which must be developed in order to remain competitive. (2002: 45) 
 
A stark representation of this relation between social coercion and environmentally damaging 
technological production can be seen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s extraction and 
sale of Colubite-Tantalite, a rare earth mineral commonly referred to as Coltan (Pritchard 2016: 
n.p). Dator, Sweeney and Yee explain that, currently, “cell phones, laptops and much of the 
[related] ubiquitous hardware relies on rare earth minerals for their construction,” and Coltan in 
particular is needed “in almost all [such] devices” (Dator et al 2015: 125). Environmentally, the 
processes of extraction and disposal of Coltan – along with similar rare earth minerals – can be 
extremely hazardous for environments. To begin with, the relatively primitive mining methods 
employed, which include the dredging of riverbeds, can prove highly disruptive to local 
ecosystems. But additionally, other significantly negative environmental side-effects of the 
exhaustive use of Coltan and other minerals, such as “lead, cadium, beryllium and brominated 
flame retardants” in the manufacturing of electronics, are posed by a phenomenon referred to as 
“E-waste,” resulting from the irresponsible dumping of products such as cell phones and laptops, 
which have become, by design, increasingly disposable in the twenty-first century (Dator et al 
2015: 125-126).40 The toxic materials which constitute these consumer goods, especially when 
                                                          
40 Designed or planned obsolescence is a strategy employed by corporations and manufacturers to bolster demand for 
goods by deliberately designing and producing products “to have limited durability forcing consumers to replace them 
more frequently” (Model & Model 2010: xviii). Beyond actual technological obsolescence – which entails older 
hardware being rendered outdated and incompatible with current technology in the context of accelerated technological 
innovation – there also exists what Model and Model refer to as “perceived obsolescence,” a process by which 
consumers replace usable goods because they are made to feel, by manufacturers constantly “modifying style, fashions, 
accessories and other accouterments … that their older version was unsatisfactory or unacceptable,” such that they are 
compelled to buy the newer model/device/product (2010: xviii).  
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irresponsibly discarded, can potentially leech into soil and water sources, heralding dire 
consequences for surrounding ecosystems and human communities. Further compounding the 
environmental toll entailed by the extraction and disposal of these minerals, are the devastating 
socio-political effects of such industries. In the case of central Africa’s Coltan industry, for 
example, Coltan deposits have increasingly become an “object of dispute” among warring factions 
from diverse groups of militia based in Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC (Fairhead 2005: 207-208). 
Moreover, although the proceeds from the sale of Coltan and similar minerals to large international 
corporations is lucrative, instead of leading to local upliftment, it both funds and fuels “intense 
conflict” in which “millions of people have been killed over the last 20 years” in the region – 
leading central African Coltan to be classified as a “conflict mineral” (Dator et al 2015: 125).  
 While in the DRC the coalescence of environmental degradation and the means of coercion 
are brutally clear, in the comparatively politically stable global North, these relations can 
sometimes be missed; nevertheless, they remain evident. As Koch and others explain, “Promethean 
technology requires a ‘steady diet of natural resources: fire requires wood, steam engines require 
coal’ [and] ‘each serves as the basis of an ongoing social system’” (Koch 2012: 21; Beard & Londza 
1999: 135). This is because these minerals, and the products they constitute, fold into the complex 
networks of surveillance and control in which contemporary citizens exist. And with such 
technologies becoming increasingly ingrained into the fiber of contemporary life, the coercive 
forces of which Carter speaks are put into action in a variety of ways, with digital and information 
technology enabling not only the extensive surveillance of the individual, but also a myriad of 
invasive investigations into nature, in the form of “genetic research, nanotechnology, space 
exploration, artificial intelligence, and the like” (Tostevin 2010: 9). Indeed, much of the latter 
occurs in the form of investigations carried out to the end of ameliorating the effects of the looming 
environmental crisis, and remain firmly articulated in Promethean terms, as the latest mastery of 
nature through science. In particular, Promethean responses to contemporary concerns – such as 
peak oil and increasingly unpredictable weather patterns – tend to be characterized by their 
rejection of the idea “of reducing human influence on the planet by ending climate changing 
activities such as deforestation and fossil fuel burning,” and their pursuit instead of “increase[d] 
human influence on the climate” through scientific investigation into projects like geoengineering 
and cold fusion (Northcott 2017: 31). What this amounts to, then, is the Promethean pursuit of a 
technological utopia, in which the causalities of nature can be readily understood and undesirable 
outcomes prevented or solved through the application of reason and modern science. The 
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contemporary Promethean outlook thus remains “committed to an unqualified vision of limitless 
material progress, staking everything on an infinitely munificent, cornucopian technology,” while 
at the same time “ignoring all pertinent limiting boundary conditions” (Martins 1998: 157); 
conditions which are ironically emerging with increasing clarity through the very digital 
technology described above, used to monitor the immense and multi-dimensional effects of climate 
change.   
 
Socratic Dividuality in Control Society 
In such a context of ceaseless control and an unparalleled will to technological development and 
dominance, the individual is indelibly marked and molded by the technological and economic 
milieu in which it exists. The individual, referred to by Deleuze in the context of societies of control 
simply as a dividual, is “what might formerly have been understood as ‘the subject’” in disciplinary 
regimes (Franklin 2015: 9). But Deleuze elucidates on the transition from the individual subject to 
the dividual by explaining that in disciplinary society, the construction of the idea of the individual 
was oriented around two poles, the first of which was “the signature that designates the individual,” 
and the second of which referred to “the number or administrative numeration that indicates his or 
her position within a mass” (1992:5). Deleuze thus recognizes the tendency of disciplinary power 
to both individualize and mass together, as a dynamic stemming from what Foucault identified as 
pastoral power, which at once “constitutes those over whom it exercises power into a body and 
molds the individuality of each member of that body” (1992: 5). However, in regimes of control, 
instead of the subject of discipline being individualized and confined, people are dividualized or 
divided within themselves, while at the same time being deterritorialized and liberated from 
traditional sites of confinement (Ruffalo 2016: 95-96). This shift from the erstwhile disciplinary 
subject’s experience of a series of intense, yet contiguous (or sequential) dominations under 
disciplinary power, to the dividual’s experience of the all-encompassing fluid network through 
which digital control is relentlessly exercised, is explained by Hardt and Negri as follows:   
 
Disciplinarity fixed individuals within institutions but did not succeed in consuming 
them completely in the rhythm of productive practices and productive socialization; 
it did not reach the point of permeating entirely the consciousnesses and bodies of 
individuals, the point of treating and organizing them in the totality of their activities. 
... [But today,] power is … expressed as a control that extends throughout the depths 
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of the consciousnesses and bodies of the population – and at the same time across 
the entirety of social relations. (Hardt & Negri 2000: 24) 
 
Additionally, crucial to the abovementioned processes of control, deterritorialization and division 
also see the dividual – unlike the disciplinary subject – embedded in digital networks and 
information technology. As Leonard remarks, the most readily recognizable characteristic of 
contemporary societies is “their dependence on information technology and computers” (2010: 
261-261), leading Franklin in his turn to conclude that “the dividual is the subject digitized” (2015: 
9). Accordingly, far from being limited to an incidental trait of the contemporary era, the 
widespread integration of information technology into the everyday lives of the digitized dividuals 
of control is, in fact, a key component that functions to expand the scope of control by governments 
and corporations. Control that not only shapes the manner in which we communicate, conduct 
business, and process information, but that also radically reshapes the manner in which we 
formulate our identities and understand ourselves in relation to the ubiquitous power of control. In 
this regard, Dumortier neatly sums up how information technologies enable the process of division 
meted out upon the dividuals of control society as follows: 
 
‘[P]hysically embodied human subjects … [are now] endlessly divisible and 
reducible to data representations via the modern technologies of control, like 
computer-based systems.’ [Through] the data collected on us, the technologies of 
control can separate who we are and what we are from our physical selves. The data 
become representations of ourselves within the web of social relations [and economic 
transactions]; the data are the signifiers of our preferences and habits. … [and] since 
we are not physically present, we are [thus] threatened to be reduced to our 
documented interests and behaviours. (2010: 133)  
 
The dividuals of control society are thus entrenched in digital networks primarily linked to the 
globalized free-market economy, and they are thereby codified and understood increasingly in 
terms of their capacity to consume and to “provide a continuous stream of human capital for the 
knowledge economy” (Semetsky 2015: 56). In regimes of control, the dividual is therefore “no 
longer enclosed by institutions but instead … indebted to systems” (Jones 2016: n.p). Yet unlike 
the disciplinary subject who underwent brief intermissions between bouts of discipline – for 
instance, between the completion of schooling and the commencement of military service, or 
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between shifts at the factory – the dividual is the object of endless division and constant subjection. 
This is because, while “the disciplinary man was a discontinuous producer of energy, … the man 
of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network” (Deleuze 1992: 6), where the 
designations of signature and number, or even rank, now matter little; instead, in regimes of control, 
the code or password is paramount. Deleuze explains that “the numerical language of control is 
made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it,” with the consequence that individuals 
“have become dividuals, and masses, samples, data, markets” (Deleuze 1992: 6). Not limited to the 
domain of total institutions, power in societies of control is now by definition ubiquitous and 
exercised universally, “through machines that directly organize brains (in communication systems, 
information networks, etc.) and bodies (in welfare systems, monitored activities, etc.)” (Hardt & 
Negri 2011: 144). And the final product of this, Wall conjectures, is a (digitized) dividual cast into 
“a state of autonomous alienation from the sense of life and the desire for creativity” (2012: 128). 
Yet the cumulative effect of these developments is far greater and further reaching than simply the 
self-alienation through digitality of the erstwhile disciplinary individual. Rather, the mass of 
dividuals embedded in unending networks of production and consumption – of products material 
and immaterial – that are coupled with the ever increasing scope of the marketplace in societies of 
control, has placed the environment under increasing pressure, to the point of an environmental 
crisis. But by the very logic of their digital imbrication, dividuals are not adequately equipped to 
respond to this effectively or, even to appreciate the parameters and intensity of the problem.  
 Considered in the above light, Deleuze’s conjectures concerning the controlled dividual 
speak strongly to the pattern of Socratic withdrawal from nature, which is similarly reflected in the 
prevailing economic and technological patterns. That is, as discussed, Socrates previously 
advanced the impossibility of fathoming nature, and instead pursued human ethical development 
in the face of such unknowability (Hadot 2006: 91). In turn, while such Socratic withdrawal from 
nature had its parallels in the Roman, Christian and Renaissance eras, under the auspices of 
Enlightenment – and thereafter, disciplinary society – such withdrawal from nature underwent a 
further transformation, because instead of an ethical turn by an autonomous subject, the 
disciplinary imperative demanded such a turn on the part of the disciplinary subject toward, for the 
sake of conformity, that could facilitate productivity and profit (Bell 2009: 151). But with the 
advent of control society and the attendant birth of the dividual, the Socratic withdrawal from 
nature has undergone an ever further process of removal. No longer merely enclosed within the 
enclave of civilization – namely the actual city – the dividual is rendered digital, and thereby 
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embedded virtually in the neoliberal economy through being “multiplied in myriad databanks” 
(Hills 2009: n.p). Thus, in the contemporary digital era, the withdrawal from nature seems almost 
complete. Interestingly, Hadot himself recognized this possibility in contemporary spatial and 
social arrangements, stating that today 
  
[t]echnology is engendering a way of life and ways of thinking that have as their 
consequence the ever-increasing mechanization of human beings themselves. It is 
impossible, however, to stop the implacable progress of this kind of civilization. In 
the process, mankind risks losing its soul as well as its body. (2006: 150-151) 
 
Indeed, contemporary life is increasingly being detached from its actual physical environ, and 
imbricated within the virtual world of cyberspace, and as a result, experiences of the 
unpredictability of nature in general and the onset of the environmental crisis in particular, have 
been similarly mediated. This manifest withdrawal from both the natural environment and concern 
for its wellbeing, is clearly discernable in the responses of those who, for one reason or another, 
seek to deny the severity and scope of the environmental crisis, and/or the role of humans and 
industry in precipitating it. Washington attributes this type of denial primarily to “conservative … 
[and] right-wing ‘think-tanks’” (2013: 89), who have a vested interest in maintaining exploitative 
and environmentally damaging relations of production. Yet he, along with others, also notes that 
such denial is by no means limited to these circles, as “conspiracies of silence exist at every level 
of society” and “evolve through the social pressures that cause people to deny what is right before 
their eyes” (Washington 2018: 493-494; Zerubavel 2006: n.p). Elaborating on such silences, 
Washington explains that “the most public form of denial is silence, where some things are not 
spoken of. The silence about the environmental crisis, the silence about the fact that humans are 
dependent on Nature[;] … all these silences are part of denial” (2013: 85).  
 In this regard, on the one hand, Washington points to larger bodies in corporate or 
governmental spheres that tend to engage in “literal” or “interpretive” denial, which entails either 
flatly denying the existence of environmental decline and resource scarcity – as in the case of “the 
counterclaims by oil and coal companies” who seek to deny the correlation between their products 
and environmental phenomena such as climate change – or through their re-interpretation of data 
to de-problematize otherwise worrying statistics, using “euphemisms and technical jargon to 
dispute the meanings of events” (2018: 495). Such manipulations, whether deliberate or not, are 
also evinced in the myriad literature that seeks to refute or obscure the issues of the environmental 
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crisis, which continue to emerge at an alarming rate. In fact, Jacques, Dunlap and Freeman indicate 
that, “between 1972 and 2005 there were some 141 denial books published, of which 130 came 
from conservative ‘think tanks,’ while in the 1990s, 56 denial books came out, 92 percent linked 
to right wing foundations or think tanks” (2008: n.p; Washington 2015: 165). On the other hand, 
theorists including Washington also thematize how the (in)dividual is often part of a process of 
“implicatory denial,” where “unlike literal or interpretive denial, knowledge itself is not the issue, 
but [rather] doing the ‘right’ thing with the knowledge” emerges as the problem. For instance, 
while many people are aware of facts and statistics pertaining to the environmental crisis, and – 
unlike corporations and government – do not dispute the validity of such information, implicatory 
denial nevertheless prevents them from taking any substantive action (Washington 2018: 494-495: 
Cohen 2001: n.p). Hamilton further suggests that the apparent obstinacy of such denial on the part 
of the general public could potentially stem from their reluctance to relinquish the trappings of 
consumer society, or to enact too great a change in the comfortable lifestyles they enjoy (2010: 
n.p). But what Hamilton and to a certain extent Washington miss, is that such failure to act is less 
a matter of agency on the part of the individual – who has in many respects ceased to exist – and 
more a matter of automatism on the part of dividuals embedded in the neoliberal system; an 
embedding that in many ways amounts to the most atomistic Socratic withdrawal from nature to 
date. 
 
Aristotelian-Inspired Faith in the Neoliberal Economy of Control Society 
The economic system of societies of control is accordingly a “capitalism of a higher order,” largely 
removed from the lower functions of the past, such as agricultural and industrial production, which 
are now mostly outsourced to the cheap labor of the global South, while the capitalism of control 
concerns itself with “consumer-oriented” operations (Peters 2001: 106). These include such things 
as “the sale of services (especially in the domain of finance and credit) and already finished 
products,” in what amounts to Surin’s concept of “meta-production” (2010: 58). Moreover, just as 
markets have become increasingly removed from traditional modes of production, so too, the 
monetary system has become increasingly abstract and free-floating in societies of control. Deleuze 
highlights how this increasing abstraction was already evident in the shift in currency valuation 
between disciplinary and control society. While disciplinary society “always referred back to 
minted money that locks gold in as a numerical standard,” in regimes of control the economy 
operates as “a capitalism of circulation and communication,” as opposed to “a capitalism of 
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production centered on ... industrial labour alone” (Peters 2001: 106).  Thus, in control society, 
monetary value is determined by “floating rates of exchange, modulated according to a rate 
established by a set of standard currencies” (Deleuze 1992: 5). This arrangement was adopted after 
World War Two to ensure a network of free trade across the globe by fixing international exchange 
rates in accordance with “the US dollar’s convertibility into gold at a fixed price,” which effectively 
allowed the dollar “to function as the global reserve currency” (Harvey 2005: n.p). And Harvey 
explains that these changes were brought about after the Second World War by “various 
institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, [and] the IMF,” in order to “stabilize 
international relations” in the wake of the apparent failures of “both capitalism and communism in 
their raw forms” (2005: n.p).  
 However, by the 1950s, the interventionist, welfare-oriented Keynesian systems adopted in 
response to the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s, were showing signs of strain. 
As Gorz explains, in the years following the Second World War, the “long cycle of accumulation 
came to an end,” and “market saturation, labor shortage[s] and the exhaustion of the resources of 
technological progress” culminated in a significant fall in “the rate of profit and a long, downward 
spiral” (Little 1996: n.p). And by the 1970s, after pandemic levels of stagflation had greatly 
affected the economies of both Britain and the United States,41 “political leaders and policy makers, 
for the first time since WWII,” found themselves obliged to search “for serious alternative 
economic policies to Keynesian demand management” (Harvey 2005: 215). In this regard, 
neoliberal theorists, like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman of the Chicago School of 
Economics, sought to address the shortcomings of the foregoing systems.42 That is, at this juncture, 
advocates of neoliberalism lobbied for the deregulation of economies, decreased taxation and cuts 
to public spending, all in an attempt “to dismantle the Keynesian welfare state in order to ‘free’ 
capital for private accumulation” (McBride & Teeple 2011: xiii). These ideas also became reflected 
in the political, social, and economic attitudes and policies of the time, particularly after the Powell 
                                                          
41  Jones explains the phenomenon of stagflation as the combination of widespread unemployment coupled with 
rampant inflation (2012: 215).  
42 A distinction must be made between the “radical neoliberalism [which] emerged during the 1950s,” associated 
primarily with thinkers such as Milton Friedman and George Stigler at the University of Chicago, and the earlier 
“liberalism of the older generation of Chicago-based scholars” (Ebenstein 2015: 40). That is, post-war Chicago School 
economics represented a fundamental divergence from earlier economic understandings which advocated “the use of 
the market but recommended redistributive taxes and transfers to mitigate the worst inequalities of the laissez-faire 
system.” Conversely, Friedman’s Chicago School dismissed the earlier “imperative to use the tax system to modify 
economic inequality,” calling instead for a completely free market, unchecked by any government intervention 
(Ebenstein 2015: 94).  
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Memorandum,43 and the Volcker Shock,44 which were bolstered by mass media campaigns, 
influential international organizations, think tanks, and emergent multinational corporations, which 
collectively advocated the ultra-liberal economic policies now referred to as neoliberalism.  
 Neoliberal thinkers, the Chicago School chief among them, essentially “prescribed three 
general policies: liberalization of cross-border transactions; deregulation of market dynamics; and 
the privatization of both asset ownership and the provision of social services” (West 2013: 131-
132). For Hayek and Friedman, among others, “the ideological case for the superiority of the 
market ... amounted to a political faith as utopian as any other” (Jones 2012: 82); one couched in 
the belief that, unconstrained by the restrictive hand of government, the capitalist economy and 
“the powers of private enterprise ... would produce social and political stability, … modernization,” 
and ultimately “a higher standard of living” (McBride & Teeple 2011: xiii). For this reason, 
neoliberals lobbied for the complete withdrawal of government from economic affairs, seeing the 
government’s role as confined to “the maintenance of competitiveness ... and human freedom” 
(Luxton & Braedley 2010: 8). But such changes reflected a fundamental reshaping of the social 
contract, as it pertains to “human rights and equality,” because “the rights to equality” to compete, 
not the right to start from the same starting line, with the same equipment,” are the bedrock of 
neoliberalism (Luxton & Braedley 2010: 8). With such emphasis on competition, coupled with the 
slackening of trade and labor regulations, private business boomed domestically, and with the 
increasing liberalization of international trade, these businesses found greater opportunities to 
trade, earn, and grow at a global level. Moreover, the rapid technological advancement which 
followed, also allowed for the increased “intensity and range of these relationships,” all “facilitated 
                                                          
43 The Powell Memorandum of 1971 refers to a note sent by Lewis Powell, an American corporate lawyer, in which 
he issued a “call to arms to corporate America to answer to the ideological attack on the free enterprise system in the 
United States” (Doogan 2009: n.p). This entailed a strengthening of corporations and the use of strong-arm tactics by 
corporations to aggressively mold “politics and law in the U.S.” (Meyers 2013: n.p). In many respects, this document 
proved instrumental in the foundation of various right-leaning think-tanks, which became increasingly politically 
active and influential, lobbying for causes such as the deregulation of big business and the freeing of markets (Powell 
1971: 4). 
44 The Volcker Shock, occurring between 1979 and 1981 in the US, was engineered by the then-Chairman of the US 
Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker. The shock was intended to stem inflation and shake off the remnants of the economic 
slump of the 1970s, which had seen a sharp decline in the dollar. In effect, Volcker implemented this shock by 
“dramatically [raising] interest rates” to “[restore] the position of finance domestically and abroad,” while plunging 
the developing countries of the Third World into massive debt (Short 2012: 48). The damaging effects of the 
implementation of the policy were not, however, limited to the Third World; domestically, many US citizens were 
faced with massive debt and spiraling unemployment. For many critics, this episode marked the turning point when 
“monetary stability [became] consistently valued over the Keynesian ideal of full employment” and social welfare 
(Evans & Sewell 2013: 44). 
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by the increasing speed and ease of transportation and communications” (West 2013: 131). 
Consequently, by the 1980s, neoliberalism was an established global phenomenon.  
 Indeed, in the contemporary era, neoliberalism “has grown to become an unchallenged 
ideology; nothing short of an overwhelming, mind-controlling ethic,” which patterns economic as 
well as social and political behaviors (Conway & Heynen 2006: 17). Accumulation and advances 
in the fields of communication and information technology, as well as the “emergence and 
consolidation of transnational corporations (TNCs) over the past two or three decades[,] has created 
a global network of transactions and business alliances;” alliances which have largely rendered 
traditional geographic borders and “jurisdictional boundaries” permeable and subject to negotiation 
(Nef & Robles 2000: 31). Thus, in the twenty-first century, neoliberal globalization increasingly 
shapes almost all aspects of daily life, affecting “the nature of contemporary politics, the state, the 
definition of citizenship and the very essence of governance, both globally and within countries” 
(Nef & Robles 2000:32). And while the increased scope for connectivity and communication that 
have accompanied it, along with greater access to consumer goods and services from across the 
globe, may on the surface appear as deterritorializing and hence liberating, in reality, the global 
scope of the free-market economy serves primarily to extend the reach of an elite neoliberal order 
and its associated mechanisms of surveillance and control. In such a cycle, old regimes of 
dominance are perpetuated by cementing global North/South binaries, as well as through paving 
the way for new mechanisms of control. In particular, Conway and Heynen explain that the primary 
beneficiaries of contemporary global production systems appear to be “the consumers of the major 
Core societies,45 who experienced increased choice of commodities, [and] increased 
internationalization of sources of food, clothing and consumer durables” (2006: 27). However, the 
social cost of these consumer freedoms is largely borne by the peripheral nations of the global 
South, to whom processes of extraction and manufacturing have largely been outsourced (2006: 
27; Deleuze 1992: 6). Thus, in the contemporary era, many critics have condemned the ideology 
of neoliberalism for failing to manifest the sweeping advances in social wellbeing that its 
proponents once prophesized. Moreover, such critics have also expressed concerns over the 
capacity for globalized, neoliberal regimes – through their dependence on and advancement of the 
project of digitization – to produce and wield technologies which are either instruments of or 
susceptible to manipulation for the expansion of control.  
                                                          
45 Conway and Heynen define Core nations as those prosperous countries of the global North, comprising primarily 
the Group of Seven nations, namely, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, which became the G8 (Group of Eight) after integrating Russia into their number in the late 1990s (2006: 24).  
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 As already discussed, for Deleuze, the abovementioned economic changes after World War 
Two resulted in a massive surge in technological innovation which, in societies of control, is 
generally equated with the wholesale digitization of society. That is, where previously societies 
operated through simplistic mechanisms such as pulleys and levers (in the sovereign era), and more 
complex steam-powered or electric machines (in the disciplinary era), societies of control are 
characterized by the rise of the computer (1992: 6). And not only has the preponderance of global 
capital enabled the development and proliferation of digital technologies, but digitizing trends have 
also bolstered new understandings of “knowledge and action [as] the fundamental principles of 
capital” in societies of control (Franklin 2015: 10). Trends which have, as mentioned above, 
triggered a shift from economies of production to economies of meta-production, organized as a 
network rather than the Fordist production lines of discipline, with such networks constituting the 
sites of “immaterial labour” or “labour that produces an immaterial good, such as a service, a 
cultural product, knowledge, or communication” (Ruffolo 2016: 97). But far from stemming 
production, the contemporary emphasis on meta-production (or immaterial production) has 
removed the traditional limits to production (Ruffolo 2016: 97), thus theoretically allowing for the 
unchecked expansion of associated organizations. This exchange of the highly regimented 
Fordist/Taylorist disciplinary enclosures, for the fluid and changeable network, is also just one 
effect of the widespread dissolution of the traditional striations of disciplinary society. But the 
extent to which they have been embraced globally to the exclusion of all else, for many theorists 
approximates a form of religious fundamentalism.  
 That is, the decades of sustained economic growth which resulted from such developments 
not only came to characterize the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, but in this climate 
of unrestrained capitalist accumulation, also gave birth, Craven and Davis argue, to “a seemingly 
unwavering political faith in the free market as [a] panacea” (2013: 1). Such a belief in the quasi-
divine and overarching logic of the free market economy, as espoused by advocates of 
neoliberalism such as Milton Freidman, thus in many ways constitutes a mirror-image of 
Aristotelian-inspired faith in Teleology. As mentioned in the foregoing chapters, Aristotle is 
credited with the identification of the four causes, namely, the “formal, material, efficient, and 
final” causes (Veatch 1974:66), or the identification of basic factors by which objects can be 
understood or known. Yet, most pertinent to the discussion of Aristotelian telos in relation to 
manifestations of the extended Hadotian framework in the contemporary era, is the fourth – or final 
– cause, which claims knowledge of “the regular and characteristic consequences or results” of an 
110 
 
object (Johnson 1990: 24). In Hadot’s initial appraisal, this faith in the final cause referred to the 
end-goal of nature, and was couched in belief in the existence of a divine order which governed 
the natural world and its components. However, as discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Two, 
there have been successive reinterpretations of this, with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
seeing this construed as faith in the ends of evolutive historicity – namely, the disciplined 
production of the most efficient society. But in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, in societies 
of control this has once again been interpreted as faith in the invisible hand of the free market 
economy. Such Aristotelian-inspired faith is couched in the notion that the prosperity which arises 
from a largely unregulated marketplace will ultimately not only stem, but also solve the problems 
of the burgeoning environmental crisis. That is, advocates of this view suggest an approach of 
“enlightened self-interest” in which, theoretically, “economy and ecology can be favourably 
combined” (Washington 2015: 127; Ayres & Simonis 1994: n.p). This is because such an approach 
operates in terms of the view that environmental ills are perpetuated as a result of poverty, rather 
than in the pursuit of wealth. And proponents of this perspective accordingly advocate “market-
based solutions” to environmental problems, including the eradication of market restrictions that 
hamper the flow of the free market economy (Washington 2015: 127).  
 Consequently, in the contemporary era, the radical free-market economy is pursued with an 
evangelical zeal, and deified with quasi-religious rhetoric, in much the same way as Aristotelian-
inspired faith in telos was previously co-opted by early proponents of Christianity, such as 
Augustine and Aquinas in the Middle Ages (Payne 2014: 8). In this regard, Klein – along with Bell 
– refers to the contemporary system as one in which “capitalism is envisaged as ‘a jeweled set of 
movements’ or a celestial clockwork,’” the harbinger of “an Eden of plentiful employment” (Klein 
2008: 50-51; Bell 1981 57-58). Interestingly, Chun neatly illustrates this pattern of rhetoric in his 
analysis of the discourses surrounding the decline of Detroit, Michigan, in the late twentieth 
century. He points out that proponents of neoliberalism frame “capitalism in terms of … religious 
faith,” through rhetoric which indicates a belief that “when people believed in capitalism, Detroit 
was prosperous as a result” (2017: n.p). Conversely, the economic downturn and attendant urban 
decay which later blighted the city is blamed on “people not having enough faith in capitalism 
rather than the auto companies deciding to outsource thousands of manufacturing jobs directly 
leading to the city’s decline” (Chun 2017: n.p). And similar patterns of rhetoric continue to emerge 
as the ambit of neoliberalism extends and intensifies globally. Yet despite such idealized 
renderings, there is substantial evidence to indicate the opposite to be true. That is, the climate 
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rampant capitalist expansion and attendant technological developments, along with the persistent 
denial of the environmental crisis, have also served to accelerate environmental degradation and to 
deepen existing rifts between humans and the natural world. Ironically, though many have 
responded to this by simply clinging even more fiercely to their Aristotelian-inspired faith in the 
free-market economy, which further underscores the religious manner in which capitalist telos has 
been embraced. 
  
  
The Environmental Impact of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian Nexus in Control 
Society 
Contemporary environmentalists point to the exponential growth of human populations over the 
past fifty years, enabled by the advances of capitalism and scientific developments, as the primary 
drivers of the environmental crisis. As Ruth conjectures, today “a confluence of changes in 
population, increased energy and materials consumption, loss of habitat and species diversity, … 
and the decline of waste-assimilation capacities[,] are all seen as potentially related to climate 
change” (2005: 146). Yet, in this regard, attitudes and behaviors associated with the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus remain dominant despite being linked to many of the 
greatest challenges to the security of ecosystems globally. As discussed above, the proliferation of 
such worldviews has engendered, in relation to Prometheanism, an increase in resource-hungry 
technological and industrial developments, which have precipitated massive changes in population 
numbers and distributions. In turn, in a manifestation of Socratic withdrawal, these new urban 
arrangements and the attendant birth of the dividual may be seen to amount, in the contemporary 
era, to a near-complete retreat of humans into built and digital environments, intensifying the 
alienation of humanity from nature. Additionally, the Aristotelian-inspired faith in the telos of the 
free market economy, and the fundamentalist belief in the prosperity assured by such economic 
arrangements, has resulted in increasingly consumer-oriented behaviors, which have contributed – 
in concert with those factors listed above – to "large scale environmental degradation due to air, 
water and soil pollution;” all  increasingly observable “in the last few decades due to these 
anthropogenic activities” (Mishra & Pradhan 2007: 145).  
 To begin with, since the time of the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, much of the Northern world has been characterized by patterns of increasing 
technological expansion and production, resulting in the exponential growth of populations 
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specifically around industrial hubs. That is, urbanization entailed a migration of previously 
agrarian, rural communities to swell the populations – and workforces – of industrial cities and 
towns. And while such dynamics may be seen most clearly in the massive migrations of subsistence 
farmers to the burgeoning cities during the Industrial Revolution in the global North, today this 
trend continues in the increasingly industrialized developing nations of the global South. Yet, the 
growth from small-scale cottage industries to the extensive industrial configurations, that 
characterize the contemporary landscape, “involved the assembly of large rural workforces 
engaged in the production of goods” and correlatively promoted “the growth of capital-intensive 
urban industry” (Tilly 2000: 75). Such developments, though, called for extensive workforces not 
only to fill factories, oversee production, and cater to the variety of ancillary needs of growing 
urban populations. In addition, they increasingly required such workforces for the production and 
provision of non-material goods and services. And while “cities existed well before the advent of 
industrial capitalism, the latter and its subsequent post-industrial (or post-Fordist) version have 
provided the basic framework for the development of contemporary forms of urbanization” 
(Hutchison 2010: 109). 
 Anderson and Braun point out that such distributions do not simply amount to a 
reconfiguration of the social and economic environments, but also signify a “process of 
reconstitution of the relationship between humans and the material world of everyday life” (2008: 
n.p). In short, the widespread immersion of populations in industrialized, urban spaces has largely 
shaped the way that we view and relate to nature, in ways which have profound impacts on the 
functioning of ecosystems. As Magdoff and Foster explain, 
 
capitalist production collects the population together in great centres, and causes the 
urban population to achieve an ever-growing preponderance . . . It disturbs the 
metabolic interaction between man and the earth, i.e. it prevents the return to the soil 
of its constituent elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; hence 
it hinders the operation of the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the 
soil. (2011: 68)  
 
Moreover, beyond disrupting the delicate equilibrium between agrarian communities and the land 
they interacted so closely with, the shift of massive swathes of the population from rural to urban 
spaces carried with it significant environmental implications, (Marx 1976: 637) which were not a 
factor in the erstwhile relatively dispersed rural arrangements. That is, “the rapid influx of people 
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to urban environments” synonymous with industrialization, involved an “increased density of 
housing, transportation, and industry [, and] resulted in a noticeable increase in air pollution, water 
pollution, waste production, and noise pollution” (Cahn & Mac 2014: n.p). And while energy-
intensive industry is considered environmentally deleterious in its own right – due to the dangerous 
emissions, toxic waste, and resource depletion that it often entails – Cahn  and Mac believe that the 
environmental impact of such practices are even more problematic when they are concentrated and 
thus exaggerated by the dynamics of urbanization (2014: n.p).  
 Such conditions persist into, and continue to be exacerbated, in the present. Yin points out 
that, in the contemporary era, “for the first time in history, most of the world’s population lives in 
a city” (2012: 40), and forecasts predict even further growth in urban populations in future. Indeed, 
in a report by the United Nations, entitled World Population Monitoring 2001: Population, 
Environment and Development, demographers predict that by 2030, over three fifths of the world 
will be living in cities, as “[v]irtually all the population growth expected during 2000-2030 will be 
concentrated in the urban areas of the world” (UN 2001: 70). But what has also emerged is that the 
growth of environmentally damaging practices accompanies the growth of cities, the effects of 
which have been traced from the burgeoning of industry since the Industrial Revolution. By way 
of example, Dudley describes how increasing concentrations of industrial smoke emissions in 
London, on the rise since the Industrial Revolution, resulted in the winter smog of 1952, in which 
“an estimated two thousand people died as a direct result of pollution” (2013: n.p). Jackson explains 
that the term smog – a relatively new environmental phenomenon – was coined in 1905 “to describe 
the combination of smoke and fog” in the new cities, and that this phenomenon became more 
prevalent across Europe through the increasing industrialization of the 1930s and 1940s 
(2006:161). The winter smog of 1952, which came to be known as the Great Smog of London, 
occurred as a result of “a thermal inversion [which] trapped a particularly deep and impenetrable 
layer of smog over London;” the effect was that “[b]oth hospital admissions and mortality rates 
rose sharply, with most patients being admitted for and dying of, heart and respiratory problems” 
(Jackson 2006: 162). Yet, while much was made of the human cost of this phenomenon in 
subsequent government probes and inquiries,46 critiques largely ignored the impact of harmful 
industry pollutants on nature, with arguments and solutions largely articulated in relation to human 
wellbeing. In the contemporary era, while checked by legislation against pollution in large sectors 
                                                          
46  A government-appointed Committee on Air Pollution – also referred to as the Beaver Committee – was established 
in July 1953. Chaired by Sir Hugh Beaver, an engineer and industrialist, the Committee’s inquiries led to the 
instantiation of Britain’s first Clean Air Act in 1956 (Jackson 2006: 162-163).  
114 
 
of Europe and the US, in many developing countries –  which are often co-opted by Northern 
corporations for their relatively underdeveloped environmental laws – emission-intensive 
industries continue to release large quantities of harmful substances, such as C02 and Sulphur 
dioxide into the atmosphere, accelerating processes of climate change.  
 Another noteworthy side-effect of concentrations of waste which has accelerated with the 
growth of urban pockets and industry is the eutrophication of rivers, lakes and coastal oceans. 
While occurring naturally as a result of the build-up of various minerals and nutrients in older 
bodies of water, human activity has resulted in an exponential increase in incidences of 
eutrophication. These processes of eutrophication occur when, as a result of sewage and industrial 
waste disposal, nitrate-rich acid rain and agricultural runoff into a body of water result in excessive  
 
nutrient enrichment [, which] causes greater biomass productivity of phytoplankton, 
and the resulting flux of organic [carbon] to the bottom waters, where it is broken 
down by bacteria using up the dissolved [oxygen], and results in hypoxia … or 
anoxia (Berner & Berner 2012: 324).  
 
Hypoxic or anoxic dead zones occurring as a result of eutrophication are thus generally the result 
of a proliferation of plant material, also referred to as algal bloom, which depletes oxygen supplies 
within the water, and thereby also severely compromises the habitat of native insects, birds, fish, 
and plant life, after effectively destroying biodiversity within and around the eutrofied body of 
water. A prominent example of this is that of Lake Erie in the 1970s. Freedman explains that the 
watershed of Lake Erie, unlike the other Great Lakes of the US and Canada, “is much more 
agricultural and urban in character,” which accordingly saw higher concentrations of phosphorus 
and inorganic nitrates (1995: 204). As the process of eutrophication advanced, Lake Erie “became 
too oxygen-depleted for most organisms to survive and the entire ecosystem collapsed” (Dennis 
2014: n.p). In light of this, tighter regulations and restoration initiatives were admittedly 
established; however, although these measures resulted in an improvement of the ecological 
wellbeing of the lake and its surroundings, “algal blooms in the summer of 2013” resembling those 
of the 1960s and 1970s brought into question the efficacy of these measures (Dennis 2014: n.p). 
Indeed, worryingly, in the contemporary era, eutrophication now occurs at alarming rates, with a 
marked acceleration of the phenomenon in coastal oceans, such as “the coastal Baltic Sea and the 
Gulf of Mexico where the Mississippi River enters [the sea]” (Berner & Berner 2012: 324). 
Additionally, such dynamics may be seen to exacerbate existing problems such as the rapid loss of 
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marine species due to pollution and overfishing, which are also the result of irresponsible urban 
and industrial dumping and unsustainable behaviors arising from the pursuit of economic growth 
linked to the population boom.  
 With substantial evidence to indicate the increasing impact of free-market capitalism and 
the attendant preponderance of industrial pollution on our environment, it is unsurprising that these 
dynamics have also dramatically changed the way in which we inhabit and interact with nature. 
The great exodus from country to city entailed a retreat from lifestyles embedded in the natural 
world, and relationships of close reciprocity with nature – observable still in certain indigenous, 
rural communities – in favour of urban life, in predominantly human-made environs increasingly 
isolated from nature. In this regard, Clapp and Dauvergne contend that: 
 
The globalization of production and trade … distances an individual’s ability to 
perceive the ecological and social impacts of these behaviors. People are increasingly 
unable to see (or at least are able to forget) how their everyday choices damage the 
environment or injure workers. [And, moreover, that] these forces are eroding the 
autonomy of communities and creating a consumer monoculture. (2005: 42) 
 
And yet, contrary to the assertions of market liberals who believe that “economic growth 
(production and consumption) creates higher incomes, which in turn generates the funds and 
political will to improve environmental conditions” (Clapp & Dauvergne 2005: 4), increased 
economic growth has served, in much of the world, only to aggravate and concentrate 
environmentally damaging behaviors. This is illustrated in the increasing consumer culture within 
urban, as well as growing suburban, spaces,47 which occurred in the context of postwar prosperity 
in the US – and indeed across much of the developed world. Cahn and Mac explain that “as the 
economy readjusted to a peacetime footing, American soldiers left the military to join the civilian 
workforce. Labour costs [then] dropped, and newly employed workers could convert latent demand 
into consumption” (2014: n.p). To this end, suburbs became something of a site of consumer culture 
in 1950s and 1960s middle-class America, and the normatization of such rampant “conspicuous 
and competitive displays of consumption” served an important function in the nascent market 
economy of the postwar landscape (Southerton 2011: 1397). Kenyon elaborates that after the war, 
                                                          
47 This migration by urban populations to the suburbs is described by Tony Champion as a force of 
“counterurbanization … accelerating in the 1960s” (2001: 143). Suburbanization entails the move by urban populations 
to peripheral, satellite communities – or suburbs – removed from, yet still dependent on larger urban or industrial hubs.   
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“suburbanization was part of the immediate social and economic recovery, and … helped [to] 
secure the long-term interests of capital” by providing “the material space for the postwar 
consolidation of capital” (2004: 1-2). This occurred through the confluence of a number of 
economic stimuli such as “the emergence of a new automobile-based economy and a corresponding 
set of federal initiatives” – such as “tax incentives, highway and bridge construction, and home 
mortgage subsidy measures” as well as the entrenchment of a consumption-driven economy – 
bolstered on all fronts by the ideology of consumer culture (Leichenko & Solecki 2016: 134). As 
McPherson maintains,  
  
Mass consumption in postwar America went beyond “keeping up with the Joneses.” 
It was promoted by the United States government as a civic responsibility. Whereas 
consumers were expected to make sacrifices in support of the troops during World 
War II by getting by with less than they wanted, they were expected to reverse the 
course after the war. …The switch from production of war supplies to production of 
consumer goods would only work if Americans were willing to consume en masse. 
(2005: 47-48) 
 
 In this regard, there was a substantial mass media campaign, initiated by government and 
corporations – particularly erstwhile wartime suppliers such as Goodyear, Chrysler and General 
Electric (McPherson 2005: 48) – to change the manner in which the American suburban middle-
classes spent their money and thought about consumer products. Such messages, along with the 
abovementioned confluence of both social and federal conditions, spurred the public to hitherto 
unprecedented levels of “above-subsistence consumption,” through practices which were at that 
time – as they are today – promoted by the “system of mass media” (Southerton 2011:  407). A 
system which not only notified audiences of new must-have products, but which also, more 
importantly, disseminated the belief that the “ideology of consumerism was what a happy and 
satisfying life was all about” (Southerton 2011: 408). It is therefore unsurprising that during this 
period, purchases of houses and cars, as well as the corresponding dependence on the non-
renewable fuels which make them possible grew steadily. Indeed, the move from the overcrowded, 
cramped cities to spacious new homes on the outskirts necessitated the mass consumption of a 
variety of furnishings, gadgets and goods to populate the domestic space. In fact, “the postwar 
splurge has seen Americans consume more resources since 1950 than everyone who lived on earth 
before then” (McPherson 2005: 48). Another significant factor in the increasing impact of 
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excessive consumption may be attributed to the flourishing automobile industry, as a result of the 
relative distance between new suburban communities and urban workplaces. That is, because of 
the dearth of public transport options, the immediate postwar era gave rise to the advent of the two-
car household, with car ownership increasing astronomically between the 1950s and 1960s, with 
four in five Americans owning a car by the 1960s, and ownership largely concentrated in the 
suburbs (Monhollon 2010: 155). To be sure, such patterns of generalized, rampant, hyper-
consumption and massive property development, along with the increasing reliance on the 
automobile and other resource-heavy technologies engendered by the era, served to elevate the 
standard of living of the average American, propel the American economy, and cement the 
country’s role as a global superpower.  
 Yet, while the exponential growth of the US economy and industry “ameliorated some 
problems [, it also] … created or exacerbated others” (Pirages & Cousins 2005: 15). That is, 
alongside significant social schisms and increasing wealth divides – both domestically and globally 
– arising from such patterns of production and consumption and the precipitous economic growth 
that it engendered, environmental impact of such economic and spatial arrangements has garnered 
increasing critical attention. This is because the excessive consumerism which fueled the “rapid 
proliferation of industries, increased human population, [and] urbanization … led to increased 
accumulation of wastes,” placing the environment under massive strain (Mishra & Pradhan 2007: 
145). High concentrations of human activity such as travel, waste disposal – both domestic and 
industrial – and resource extraction, have all significantly compromised the earth’s waste-
assimilation capabilities and depleted many essential resources. Of course, critics argue that “since 
there is no way in which the earth’s fundamental capacity to supply the rapidly increasing demands 
that are being placed on it can increase, the only way in which the problem can be solved is by 
somehow reducing these demands;” yet responses to the mounting evidence of the environmental 
crisis have been largely ineffectual (Foster 2002: n.p). In this regard, Liechenko and Solecki 
advance that it is the relative human isolation from nature, engendered by urban/suburban living 
arrangements, that has affected our ability to effectively respond to environmental issues, not least 
because, “like globalization, suburbanization enables consumers to separate themselves from the 
environmental and social implications of their actions” (2016: 134). In other words, as a result of 
increasingly vast production networks, affluent consumers of the global North, removed from the 
sites of mineral extraction, production and disposal, cannot fully grasp the environmental effects 
of their lifestyle choices and consumption patterns. As Brisman and South explain: 
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Part of the problem is the way that consumerism has been integrated into the routine 
of everyday life as a materially ‘lived’ ideology that underpins habits of 
consumption. [And resultantly,] rather than leading to a rational choice to prioritize 
sustainability and to reduce consumption, the economic and social behavioral 
evidence suggests that ‘consumption tends to converge on higher rather than lower 
levels.’ (2014: 52)  
 
Humphrey moreover suggests that the “alienating effects of modern capitalism” (in Bennet et al 
2011: 2) extend beyond impeding our ability to respond appropriately to the evidence of the 
destructive impact of our behaviors. That is, this degree of alienation from nature has eroded our 
ties to both “preceding generations … and those who will follow” us (Humphrey 2001: 95), both 
effacing the traditions associated with our “agrarian” communitarian past (Rome 2001: 123), and 
obliterating concern for future generations and the environment they will one day inherit. And even 
more worryingly, Leichenko and Solecki point out that with increasing international political and 
economic interconnectivity produced by the globalized, neoliberal landscape of the present and the 
proliferation of Northern mass media which valorize hyper-consumption, analogous trends of 
consumer aspiration are emerging in large sectors of the developing world, where they are similarly 
eclipsing indigenous cultures and environmentally sustainable alternative lifestyles (2016: 131).  
 The dismissal of traditional, sustainable lifestyles, and the instantiation instead of what 
Clapp and Dauvergne refer to as a global “consumer monoculture” (2005: 42), is nowhere more 
evident than in the arena of industrialized agriculture. As discussed, the migration from country to 
city – and thus from subsistence to industry – called for a rethinking of the way in which booming 
urban populations received sustenance. In response, just as in the nineteenth century cottage 
industries were largely subsumed by arrangements of mass production, so too, lifestyles once based 
on small-scale subsistence agriculture were progressively eclipsed by tendencies to live and work 
within urban and suburban environments, and to consume food grown elsewhere. Wrigley points 
out the manner in which these new urban and suburban consumer networks both drove and 
depended on the development of a hyper-productive commercial agriculture industry:  
 
No pre-industrial country could become urbanized to the degree which is now 
commonplace throughout the industrial world. The ultimate reason for the 
comparatively low levels of urbanization in pre-industrial societies is not far to seek. 
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To live one must eat. Only if levels of output per head in agriculture rise to the point 
where one man on the land can feed ten, twenty or even fifty off the land can a very 
high degree of urbanization be reached. (1990: 101) 
 
Shiva similarly explains that while the primary objective of subsistence agriculture is “providing 
nutrition and nourishment,” in commercial agriculture, large-scale food production focuses on the 
highest yield per acre. For this reason, many commercial agricultural ventures tend to conclude 
that to ensure maximum efficiency, and thus maximum yield, large stretches of land should be 
given over to the production of a single variety of crop or food group, even though major questions 
hang over the logic of such calculations. Shiva explains that a significant myth in commercial 
agriculture is that “monocultures increase yields and productivity” (2014: n.p). Since the term 
‘yield’ relates to the quantity of a single crop derived from a specified area, on the surface, “planting 
one crop in the entire field will of course increase its yield;” however, “planting multiple crops in 
a mixture will have low yields of individual crops,” but will nonetheless “have [a] high total output 
of food,” and a significantly lower impact on the environment (Shiva 2014: n.p). For this reason, 
Shiva conjectures that instead of assessing agricultural productivity through the relatively 
inaccurate measure of single crop yield, “a more accurate measure of productivity” is “nutrition 
per acre,” which encompasses all crops harvested and takes into account their nutritional value, 
which is significantly increased in systems which are biologically diverse (Shiva 2014: n.p). 
Moreover, Shiva demonstrates the relative inefficacy of commercial monocultures, which quite 
apart from their environmentally harmful aspect, may be outstripped in terms of output when 
compared to small-scale, traditional, ecologically-intensive systems. In this regard, she points to 
the Mayan farmers of the Chiapas, who when assessed in the simplistic measure of yield per acre, 
are viewed as unproductive because they produce only two tons of corn per acre. However, when 
considered holistically, their total output across a wide variety of crops, including millet, soy and 
cowpea in various proportions and rotations, amounts to twenty tons per acre, which “even in bad 
years, is six times more than industrially farmed rice monocultures” (Shiva 2014: n.p). 
Additionally, Shiva notes that these methods produce crops which are more nutritionally rich than 
those of commercial monocultures, with increased deposits of calcium and iron in crops farmed in 
biodiverse and ecologically intensive systems (2014: n.p). Nevertheless, such arrangements are 
often displaced by the instantiation of biological monocultures, which are profoundly damaging to 
the environment. This is because, by clearing once-diverse ecosystems for the planting of a single 
crop, these agricultural methods profoundly disrupt an ecosystem’s ability to sustain itself. That is, 
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in organic, biodiverse agricultural practices, pests and fungi are kept in check by natural predators, 
and plants are nourished by what Shiva refers to as “the perennial nutrient cycle,” whereby “the 
nutrients produced by plants become food for humans and food for soil organisms, which in turn 
feed the plants that feed humans and the soils” (2014: n.p). However, agricultural monocultures 
destroy these delicate, self-sustaining cycles, and are instead propped up by genetically modified 
crop varieties and an assortment of “pesticides, herbicides, nematicides and fungicides,” along with 
artificial, non-renewable fertilizers, which despite ostensibly enhancing “crop yield and food 
security,” have fundamentally served to further impoverish ecosystems (Mishra & Pradhan 2007: 
145). However, the existence of such inherently destructive practices underpinned by the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus which lies at the very core of contemporary human 
sustenance, alongside the damaging trends of hyper-production and hyper-consumption – fueled 
by resource-heavy industry which drives the contemporary economy – have led some to seek more 
balanced alternatives to these profoundly damaging, anthropocentric relations to nature.  
 
The Pursuit of Hippocratic Balance in Control Society: Contemporary Environmental 
Movements 
Importantly, observations such as those above are by no means a phenomenon unique to the 
twentieth century, with “periodic upsurges in interest in … environmental problems [manifesting] 
since at least the 16th century” (Dudley 2013: n.p). However, Lynch explains that in the nineteenth 
century, new legislation – including the Alkali Acts (1863) and the River Pollution Prevention Act 
(1876) – were indicative of a growing concern over the accelerating environmental and health 
hazards arising from industrialization (2004: 220). Yet, until the twentieth century, such 
observations were not widely acknowledged in the public sphere, and remained instead confined 
primarily to the realm of “experts or interest groups” (Booth 1998: 96). Arguably this changed 
radically with Rachel Carson’s publication of Silent Spring in 1962, which entailed a critique of 
the effects of the widespread use of synthetic pesticides, such as DDT,48 with little or no concern 
for the “alarming threat” they posed to “the basic balance of nature on which human survival 
ultimately depends” (Allchin 1996: 189). In short, Carson’s argument, which combined scientific 
                                                          
48 DDT, or dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, was first synthesized in 1874 but only came into use as a pesticide during 
World War II, where it was used to curb “the scourge of malaria and dengue fever” among allied troops. After the war, 
though, it was introduced into domestic markets and hailed as the “insecticide of choice – for agriculture, for the 
homeowner, for the gardener, [and] for the housewife.” And by the mid-1950s it had become “one of the most widely 
used chemicals in the United States,” both in homes and industry, until it was banned in 1972 due to public outcry as 
a result of its harmful side-effects, such as its connection to cancer and birth defects (Seager 2014:73). 
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facts about the dangers of pesticides with poetic imagery of nature existing as a delicate “web of 
life on Earth” (Radford 2011: n.p), detailed the manner in which pesticides – such as DDT – 
“entered the biosphere” and killed “not only bugs, [also] but made their way up the food chain to 
threaten bird and fish populations” (Griswold 2012: n.p). Indeed, Carson went on to warn that such 
practices, if not curbed, could begin to effect human populations, causing a multitude of 
“degenerative changes to the liver… and other organs” (Seager 2014: 74). Silent Spring was an 
unprecedented success in terms of the awareness it generated, sending shockwaves through the 
hitherto oblivious citizenry and igniting an immediate interest in policies pertaining to the use of 
such chemicals, which led to the eventual banning of the use of DDT in 1972. Yet, the impact of 
Silent Spring transcended even this, sparking as it did a broader concern for the environment as a 
whole, and for this it is often credited with launching “an environmental movement that still 
continues to this day” (Allchin 1996: 186). 
 Such articulations of the imperative for humans, as “managers” of the earth, to “restore the 
lost balance of nature” (Merchant 2002: 170), resonate strongly with the ideals of balance 
associated with the Hippocratic approach to nature, detailed earlier in relation to the extended 
Hadotian framework. As outlined in previous chapters, Hippocrates is widely credited as an 
important early physician, on account of his advancement of a humoral view of human health 
predicated on the principle of equilibrium, which speaks strongly to the environmental application 
of an analogous notion of the need for balance discussed here. To recap, as Wallace and Gagh 
explain, “Hippocrates’ concept of health and disease was based on his belief that Man was 
intimately related to Nature; [that] they were interdependent;” accordingly, for him, “health 
consisted of a balance of forces, and disease resulted from an imbalance in the interaction of Man 
and Nature” (Wallace & Gagh 2010: 787). Thus, for Hippocrates, in order to live healthily, one 
must achieve both internal balance by avoiding excesses of all kinds, as well as external harmony 
with nature. And in this regard, the equilibrium-seeking orientation of environmental movements 
from the mid- to late twentieth century – like Arne Naess’ deep ecology, Ariel Salleh’s 
ecofeminism, and Murray Bookchin’s social ecology – are all cases in point.  
 To begin with, Naess’ deep ecology movement emerged against the backdrop of Carson’s 
Silent Spring as a response to the prevalence of what he refers to as “shallow ecology” (Naess 
2005:16), which expresses concern for the environment, but in a manner that fails “to challenge 
prevailing values and ideals;” in other words, its concerns remain rooted in limited anthropocentric 
interest such as the advancement of the “health and affluence of people in developed countries” 
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(Carter 2002: 336-337). Such attitudes, of course, proliferated in the wake of the publication of 
Silent Spring, with the public at large lobbying for pro-environmental action, but neither 
acknowledging the damage perpetuated under the banner of consumer capitalism, nor reflecting on 
the cultural beliefs which continued to precipitate these abuses. To be sure, Carson managed to 
garner support for environmental causes where others had hitherto failed, but this was largely due 
to her explicit emphasis on the danger to human life posed by practices “which affect a relatively 
large proportion of the population” (Booth 1998: 96). After all, as Humphrey points out, in general, 
“a man’s interests are limited to those near himself” (Humphrey 2001: 95), and  thus the runaway 
success of Silent Spring – and the knock-on effect of this on the burgeoning ecological 
consciousness of the time – derived from a concern for the preservation of human life and 
wellbeing. Yet Naess, while inspired by Silent Spring, also rejects such approaches, which in 
general garner only fleeting interest and tend to elicit only short-lived and mostly ineffectual 
interventions. Instead, he proposed that a fundamental reshaping of our understanding of nature is 
the only way to exact any form of substantive change with regard to human relations to nature.  
 That is, Naess posits, as the guiding principle of deep ecology, that any meaningful, “deep 
relationship with the environment” (Naess 2005: 14) is predicated upon the understanding that 
humans and nature are of the same substance, and that, as such, all forms of “nonhuman life on 
earth have value in themselves … independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human 
purposes;” consequently, non-human life should be accorded equal consideration in our endeavors 
(Naess & Sessions 1995: 49). Indeed, Naess, in sharp contrast to the dualistic notions of 
Cartesianism that tend to characterize Promethean approaches, adopted a pantheistic view, by 
insisting upon the “oneness of God and Nature” (Delahunty 1985: 88); and that “every being and 
object is a manifestation of God or God’s activity,” such that it has inherent “value.” 
Understandably, such a view of Spinozan-inspired “ontological holism” (Carter 2002: 347) in 
many ways “presents a fundamental challenge to the prevailing anthropocentricism” (Taylor 2010: 
8) of the shallow ecological approaches, mentioned above. Moreover, a deep ecological approach 
relates not just to concerns of “pollution and the depletion of resources” (Carter 2002: 336), but 
also to concerns over our “basic beliefs and assumptions about the universe,” and accordingly 
provides what Naess refers to as a “total view.” Such a view, Naess posits, constitutes an 
“ecosophy” that entails not only knowledge, but also “related … practice,” which seeks to balance 
a philosophical consciousness with external action (2005: 17). In this regard, Naess suggests both 
an ontological overhaul, as it were, along with related systemic reforms, “which will affect our 
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basic economic, technological, and ideological structures” (2005: 19). In particular, he lists the 
fundamental characteristics for the conception of a “green society” as one in which government 
takes the form of a “decentralized … grassroots democracy,” and communitarian values such as 
“social responsibility, mutual aid and nonviolence,” are upheld. Furthermore, he advances that the 
inhabitants of such a society will “live in voluntary simplicity,” as well as engender “an 
appreciation of the quality of life rather than an adherence to [the] increasingly high standard of 
living” demanded by our contemporary social and economic context (Naess 2005: 14-19).  
 Such a voluntary shift toward a simpler, less resource-intensive lifestyle on the part of deep 
ecologists, entails an attempt to replace the damaging orientation of erstwhile human activity, with 
a more balanced, equitable, and sustainable relationship with nature. And in The Greening of the 
Cities, Nicholson-Lord underscores the obvious philosophical parities between the work of 
Hippocrates and the outlook of the deep ecologists, whose theories 
 
find a ready echo in that classic treatise on environmental determinism, Hippocrates’ 
Airs, Waters and Places, which saw men not as cut off from the rest of creation by 
virtue of their consciousness – broadly, the scientific and the Judeo-Christian view[s 
of today] – but rather as vital units of a vital world, of a piece with that world and 
vulnerable to its moods and influences. (2005: 32) 
 
Furthermore, Nicholson-Lord elaborates on how the Hippocratic humoral model underlines the 
oneness of man and nature, “which through an elaborate series of correspondences … portrayed 
man and matter as composed of the same physical stuff,” in a manner akin to the deep ecologists. 
However, as already discussed, with the progression of Promethean science, and the attendant rise 
of substance dualism, theories of the humors were progressively discredited and marginalized, and 
this “destroyed [the] easy dialogue between man and nature” (2005: 32) that Hippocrates had 
sought to engender, and which the Deep Ecologists seek to revitalize.  
 Similar articulations emphasizing the oneness of human and non-human life, and a 
correlative prevailing skepticism of the viability of current human dominance of nature – as well 
as social and economic ‘others’ – is to be found in ecofeminism. In this regard, Mulvaney defines 
ecofeminism as “a social, political, and academic movement that views the oppression of women 
and the exploitation of nature as being interconnected;” accordingly, for ecofeminists, many of the 
most pressing social and environmental problems of the contemporary era are the “inevitable 
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outcome of ‘masculine’ behaviour” (2011: 119). 49 Instead, in terms of the extended Hadotian 
framework, ecofeminism – like the Hippocratic worldview – disputes the “dualistic thinking, in 
particular the distinction between culture and nature,” associated with Descartes and the 
Promethean logic of the enlightenment (Mulvaney 2011: 119). Indeed, ecofeminism may also be 
viewed as a critical response to the Promethean relations of domination, legitimized by such 
dualisms and carried out by ‘men,’50 against both nature and marginalized social groups; relations 
of domination that take place within the wider context of “transnational […] capitalist oppression” 
(Salleh 1995: 21), and which are propagated primarily in the contemporary context under the 
auspices of the Promethean ideology of the neoliberal market. 
 That is, as Eaton explains, “ideologically, economic globalization appeals to” traditionally 
masculine ideals, such as “adventure, entrepreneurship and superiority” (2003: 24). 
Simultaneously, it consigns less aggressive but more sustainable alternatives, which appeal to 
traditionally feminine ideals, such as nurturance, empathy, closeness to nature, and altruism, to a 
space of exteriority (McCartney 1990: n.p). And because of this, Ritzer and Ryan contend, while 
“patriarchy predates capitalism and exists beyond its boundaries,” the two may be viewed as 
intrinsically linked and mutually reinforcing, insofar as they exist in a constant symbiotic 
interchange of oppression (2011: 587).  
 Accordingly, such tendencies have resulted in the instantiation of asymmetrical ontological 
dualisms into institutions, discourses, and society as a whole (Salleh 1991: 130). Moreover, in the 
widespread ratification of such dualisms, “economic valuing and the social dominance of men” 
have become “directly connected” (Mellor 2009: 252). Consequently, in a context which 
increasingly reifies capital and the attendant values of masculinity, there is today a “focus on paid 
work,” which is dismissive of both “women’s work” and “feminist concerns” (Ritzer & Ryan 2011: 
                                                          
49 Admittedly, in Ecofeminism and Rhetoric, Bile problematizes the notion of any one, all-encompassing definition of 
ecofeminism, for much the same reason that environmentalism or feminism defy any one definition. Instead, he 
suggests that because any “singular understanding of ecofeminism would be problematic,” the movement is best 
described as a multifarious collection of “ecofeminisms” (2011: 9). For these reasons, the movement has garnered 
some criticism for being “a-theoretic or pre-paradigmatic,” although Quinby contests that rather than a weakness, this 
comparative fluidity constitutes “a major strength” in that it encompasses “a diversity of practices and perspectives” 
(1992: 11; Bile 2011: 9). 
50 Such dominations are generally classified as inherently masculine in orientation, and are typified by responses such 
as those of Mary Daly, who in Gyn/Ecology (1978) argues that “‘the evil of men’ is at ‘the root of rapism, racism, 
gynocide, genocide and ultimately biocide’” (Williams 2017: 157). Yet Williams contests this dichotomizing approach, 
positing instead a more nuanced outlook, which seeks to reconcile the alienation between men and women – and 
indeed, nature – and direct critique instead toward “toxic” stereotypical masculine behaviors, such as aggression, 
competition, and the exercise of dominance. In this regard, Williams reiterates that “today’s panic is not directed at all 
men but rather at … toxic masculinity” (2017: 157-158), and related behaviors which seek to dominate and exploit 
both the feminine and the natural to the ends of ambition and acquisition.  
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587). This is because, in such systems, all that falls beyond the exclusive circles of hegemonic 
masculinity is systematically sidelined and/or exploited; here, women, “like nature,” are viewed as 
“readily available and disposable” (Salleh 1995: 30), and are similarly “resourced” by men in the 
unceasing quest for acquisition, dominance and progress (Salleh 1991: 132). For ecofeminists, 
these approaches serve to support, not only a continuation and intensification of patriarchal 
oppression, but also a steady “disintegration of the earth” under the auspices of capitalist 
development (Eaton 2003: 27). Moreover, these abuses, Merchant argues, both crystalize and 
exacerbate “the alienation of women from men and from each other, and both from nature” (2014: 
n.p), in a dynamic which occurs as a necessary side-effect of capitalism, and in which the 
“heterogeneous and socially enfolded” self “is drowned out by the chorus of possessive 
individuality” (Salleh 1997: 190). The cumulative effect of this, then, is a society in which 
estrangement and injustice are inherent, and in which – despite massive accumulations of power 
and prosperity – “people do not feel secure, […] happy” or connected (Mellor 2009: 256).  
 Furthermore, beyond the scope of the socio-economic, ecofeminists point to the 
perpetuation of discursive schisms which serve to divide the masculine from the feminine, and 
culture from nature. In this regard, Haning explains that woman have become increasingly 
“culturally tied to nature,” as a result of discursive patterns which have consistently “naturalized” 
women, and correlatively “feminized” nature (2007: 1). Indeed, this is often evident in everyday 
speech patterns in which women are referred to in animalistic terms – as chicks and bitches – and 
in which the feminine gender is imposed upon nature through references to mother nature (Haning 
2007: 1). And Salleh asserts that discursive patterns such as these, which consistently reify the 
masculine and devalue the feminine, coupled with the conflation of the feminine and nature, have 
dire “structural outcomes” (1991: 130), insofar as they rationalize and reinforce the “master-slave” 
dynamic that characterizes the interaction of men with women/men with the environment (Salleh 
1984: 340). In contrast, ecofeminism “opposes [this] ancient splitting” (Salleh 1984: 25) of humans 
from nature, men from women, and indeed, the global North from the global South, and instead 
advances the need to implement “an empathic, cyclic, reflexive logic” that is free from the “incisive 
categorical boundaries” (Salleh 1984: 33) which have historically distinguished man from woman, 
and nature from culture. Accordingly, through the introduction of these new discursive forms, what 
is pursued is a “dismantling” of the oppressive and alienating “ideological artifice” of patriarchal 
capitalism (Salleh 1991: 133). Relatedly, ecofeminists have emphasized ideals which oppose both 
the prevailing structures of patriarchal and dualistic logic, and their respective manifestations in 
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society. In this regard, the recognition of the transformative potential of difference, a high valuation 
of women’s work, and an emphasis on the importance of connectedness – both with each other and 
with nature – continue to be underscored in ecofeminist thought, in a manner highly resonant with 
the Hippocratic pursuit of balance. 
 In terms of this difference, ecofeminists argue that, due to the manifold repressions and 
subjugations of women’s day to day lives, their “relation to ‘nature’ and therefore to ‘capital’ and 
‘labour’ is constructed differently from men’s” (Salleh 1995: 22). Yet, while this inequality is 
recognized, ecofeminists choose instead to frame such disparities as a mode of transgression 
against the status quo. This is because, such a strategy at once bypasses the risk of lapsing into 
“another dichotomy, [namely] that of oppressor/oppressed” (MacCormack & Strathern 1998: 43), 
and instead enables those “who are sexed female and denigrated because of that … to affirm their 
difference as a source of empowerment” (Salleh 1991: 131). With this in mind, ecofeminists 
interpret the imposition of gender-based difference as providing an “immediate ‘living’ social basis 
for [an] … alternative consciousness” (Salleh 1984: 340), as it is through traditionally female roles, 
practices and functions – and the lens of difference associated with these – that the intrinsic 
connections between humanity and nature can be glimpsed. Accordingly, through women’s 
perception of their own innate difference, through their inscription of “symbolic associations of 
feminine relations to nature” (Salleh 1995: 22), and through their appropriation of a both/and logic, 
precipitated by their proximity to nature through their day to day work, the boundaries between 
man and woman, and humans and nature, can be blurred into a “flow [or] continuum.” One in 
which all exists in a continuum of masculine, feminine and natural characteristics (Salleh 1984: 
35), in opposition to capitalist ideologies that endeavor to individualize, hierarchize, and alienate. 
In short, the ecofeminist approach seeks to foster an awareness of the intrinsic connections between 
humans, as well as the link between the “human and non-human world” (MacCormack & Strathern 
1998: 172). 
 From the above, the parallels between the pursuit of Hippocratic balance and the 
ecofeminist objectives of restoring equilibrium after the harmful and exploitative behaviors and 
discursive patterning of contemporary patriarchal/capitalist networks, is readily apparent. This is 
not only through the ecofeminists’ endeavor to ameliorate the worst environmental and social 
excesses of the contemporary era, via an approach which both problematizes the invasive violence 
of the Promethean social and economic distributions, and seeks to restore a sense of balance to a 
system characterized by inequity on all fronts – between the masculine and feminine, as well as 
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between humanity and nature. Additionally, on a discursive level, ecofeminists – like Hippocrates 
– emphasize the parity between human and natural life, thereby problematizing notions of 
hierarchy, dominance and inherent separation.  
 In many respects, such Hippocratic pursuit of balance is also reflected in social ecology, as 
conceived of by Murray Bookchin, which also “stresses the link between the domination of humans 
and the domination of nature,” and views the dismantling of existing hierarchies and relations of 
domination as the key to a progressive, socially equitable, and environmentally-sustainable society 
(Mulvaney 2011: 371). To be sure, Bookchin underscores the need to shift away from the purely 
ontological perspective of “attending to ‘Gaia’ to achieve planetary ‘oneness,’” toward a more 
pragmatic approach which attends to concrete social and systemic failings – failings which he 
identifies as lying at “the core of the most serious ecological dislocations we face today” (Bookchin 
2007: n.p). Yet Bookchin nevertheless appeals to ideals of Hippocratic balance, insofar as his social 
ecology seeks to mitigate the harmful effects of contemporary society by rethinking the unbalanced 
social configurations which have led to generalized ecological decline particularly over the past 
decades. Configurations based on the overuse and exhaustion of environments and resources, and 
which have precipitated a myriad of human-made ecological catastrophes. For this reason, 
Bookchin asserts “that the real battleground on which the ecological future of the planet will be 
decided is clearly a social one, particularly between corporate power and the long-range interests 
of humanity as a whole” (2007: n.p).  
  In the tradition of the Marxian dialectic, Bookchin advances a vision of “nonstratified 
‘organic societies’” in which humans live in “a state of harmony with nature,” and which he 
maintains prevailed in the Neolithic period. In such social arrangements, human freedom and 
environmental flourishing were assured, due to social egalitarianism and interconnectedness with 
the natural world (Mulvaney 2011: 373). In contrast, over time, and through the processes of 
industrialization, urbanization, the division of labor, and attendant class differentiation and 
hierarchization, Bookchin believes that contemporary capitalist societies have made “authentic 
freedom impossible,” and that such economic organization moreover serves only to divide “the 
human species against itself as sharply and brutally as it [divides] society against nature” (Bednar 
2003: 70). This division, for Bookchin, occurs through the drives for individuality, competition, 
and the untenable living arrangements that are engendered by advanced capitalism in the 
contemporary era.  
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 Particularly problematic for Bookchin is the capitalist city which, as discussed earlier in 
terms of the extended Hadotian framework, may be viewed as a key functionary of the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus. That is, indicting the modern city for its capacity to 
alienate and impose hierarchical relations of dominance upon both its inhabitants and the natural 
world, Bookchin argues that the communitarian and mutually-beneficial aspect of early 
communities and city centers has become increasingly strained under the demands of globalized, 
consumer capitalism. As Biehl elaborates, over time, the function of cities has changed, “from 
ethical arenas with a uniquely humane, civilized form of consociation, … into immense, 
overbearing, and anonymous marketplaces,” which are “centers primarily of mass production and 
mass consumption, including culture as well as physically tangible objects” (1999: 92). These 
distributions accordingly tend to “reduce all citizens to mere buyers and sellers and [to debase] all 
the ecologically varied social relationships produced by history to the exchange of objects called 
commodities.” And in this way, “capitalism in its characteristically modern and dominant form 
threatens … to undermine every ‘natural economy,’” as well as “the integrity of the natural world” 
– including “soil, flora, fauna, and the complex economies that have made present day life-forms 
and relationships possible by turning everything ‘natural’ into an inorganic, essentially synthetic 
form” (Biehl 1999: 90-91). Thus, if these trends are to continue unimpeded, Bookchin and fellow 
social ecologists argue, “hierarchical capitalism will continue to move toward both totalitarianism 
and the destruction of ecological systems” (Mulvaney 2011: 373).  
 In contrast, social ecology advances a radically new form of social and economic 
arrangement, one which both respects the integral human right to freedom from exploitation and 
oppression, and which – through the instantiation of small-scale, sustainable communities – 
dismantles the oppressive and resource-intensive capitalist megacity and its networks of 
production; all in an attempt to mitigate its worst social and environmental excesses. Biehl explains 
Bookchin’s perspectives on such social distributions as nuanced and, in particular, balance-
seeking, stating that  
 
Bookchin did not interpret the ecological crisis as the consequence of a rift between 
[the] pristine natural world and human culture as such, or as a basic antithesis that 
could be overcome only by exalting wilderness over civilization. Rather, from the 
outset he thought in terms of attaining a reconciliation between human and 
nonhuman nature in a particular kind of society, in which “rounded” human 
communities would be sensitively embedded in nonhuman nature. (1999: 14)  
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That is, for the environmentally-responsive communities of the post-capitalist world, Bookchin 
“proposes a communitarian model of interdependent individuals living in small-scale communities, 
confederated into a network of participatory democracies in which all those affected by decisions 
help make them” (Mulvaney 2011: 373). These societies, in Bookchin’s view, hold as their central 
tenets “community as against urbanism, mutual aid as against competition, communism as against 
property, and, finally, anarchism as against hierarchy and the state” (1986: 18). And Bookchin 
maintained that with these values in mind, power may be wrested from political and corporate elites 
who seek only to amass wealth, regardless of the human and ecological cost. Furthermore, in such 
living arrangements, individual freedom and creativity would be ensured and cycles of “natural 
economy” – comprising of non-invasive, local “small-scale agriculture, artisanship, [and] simple 
exchange relationships” – would be restored (Biehl 1999: 90-91). This is not least because, in 
Bookchin’s view, such cycles remove the need for the large scale, resource-intensive production 
and distribution networks of the capitalist megacities, which have since the industrial revolution 
progressively eroded the integrity of the environment.  
 However, with regard to social ecology movements in general, and the work of Bookchin 
in particular, it should be noted that while there is a prevailing skepticism of Promethean 
worldviews and social organizations – for how they entrench harmful dichotomies and hierarchies, 
propagate the pursuit of progress for progress’ sake, and perpetuate unsustainable and inequitable 
modes of production – there is also a distinctly different outlook on technology from that of deep 
ecology and ecofeminism. That is, instead of regarding technology with the suspicion accorded to 
other Promethean subsidiaries, Bookchin views technology not as inherently destructive, but rather 
as something which has revolutionary potential, even though at present it is misused by capitalism. 
Indeed, he claims that “the Manichean dualism imputed to technology” by many environmentalists 
and Marxist theorists alike, “is not a feature of technology as such,” because “the capacities of 
modern technology to create or destroy are simply the two faces of a common social dialectic – the 
negative and positive features of hierarchical society” (Bookchin 1986: 19). Thus Bookchin argues 
that while our current use of technology necessitates careful and critical rethinking, “modern 
science [still] has an essential part to play in social ecology’s goals,” because “the scientific 
knowledge that produces it has brought humans to a place where almost anything is possible” 
(Mulvaney 2011: 373).  But in this regard, instead of detracting from the Hippocratic pursuit of 
balance, Bookchin emphasizes the need for such equilibrium, underscoring the importance of 
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equitable and responsible applications of these potentialities, to turn away from the mere pursuit 
of profit and toward both the liberation of humanity from menial unimaginative labor, and the 
freeing of the environment from the pressure of ceaseless cycles of “production for the sake of 
production” (Bookchin 1986:19). Indeed, this logic entails a critical yet pragmatic view of 
Promethean technology which encompasses its new capacities to document and portray the natural 
world, as well as its mass media which has become increasingly able to disseminate messages and 
link concerned parties. Moreover, social ecology acknowledges how these technologies have 
directly contributed immensely to the increased interest in environmental issues and the growth of 
correlative movements from the late-twentieth century onward. And, as will be discussed next, 
echoes of this may also be discerned in contemporary reflections of the Orphic approach to nature, 
and the manner in which such Orphic representations of nature are disseminated.  
 
Orphic Representations of Nature in Control Society: The Co-option of Digitality 
As has been demonstrated in the foregoing chapters, the Orphic approach to nature, over time, has 
been largely eclipsed by the towering edifice of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, to the 
extent that, “within [the] wide sweep of Western intellectual history, traces of the ‘Orphic tradition’ 
have become largely invisible in twenty-first century culture” (Kuzniar 2017: 143). Indeed, cultural 
practices and representations which seek to draw close to nature aesthetically have, since the 
Enlightenment, been progressively overshadowed by traditions which seek to master, dominate 
and forcibly expose the mysteries of nature. Yet, despite this gradual marginalization, Orphism 
remains “an alternative interaction, one in which the musical or poetic metaphor of harmony 
characterizes the relationship to the natural world” (Kuzniar 2017: 143). In this regard, in what 
follows, Orphic pursuits of verse, namely the work of nature writer John Elder, who in his work 
reconceives nature poetry in the contemporary context through readings of Robert Frost and A.R 
Ammons, and of music – primarily the work of French composer, Olivier Messaien – will be 
explored, alongside the emergent digital cinematic and artistic reimaginings of the Orphic approach 
through new media technology. And it will be argued that these novel endeavors effectively reflect 
the contemporary practice of Orphism and the representation of nature in the Orphic tradition. In 
particular, what will be advanced is that, by co-opting digital technologies developed to pursue the 
Promethean objectives of control society – namely the continuous cyber-surveillance of dividuals 
and the hegemonic promotion of the neoliberal agenda – select contemporary creators have found 
new ways through which to draw close to nature aesthetically. That is, much like Bookchin, these 
131 
 
contemporary artists have not only recognized the potential of certain technologies, often dismissed 
as Promethean in orientation by exponents of deep ecology and ecofeminism, to engage with the 
majesty of nature. In addition, they have also utilized the established neoliberal distribution 
networks to engage broader audience groupings in Orphic experiences – with filmmakers Jacques 
Perrin and Jacques Cluzaud, and artists like Ben Rivers, being cases in point.  
 To begin with, born in 1947, American-born nature writer, academic and environmentalist 
John Elder has consistently sought to oppose, through poetry, the Promethean tendency to divide 
humans from nature, stating that “America’s poetry of nature arises from the fever of cultural 
dividedness – man against nature, past against present, [and] intellect against senses” (1996: 1). In 
this regard, Elder draws upon historical monoliths of nature writing, such as that of Robert Frost, 
whose work – despite its evident preoccupation with natural imagery and landscapes – has been 
seen as somewhat ambivalent in its approach to nature, at times appearing to stage a Promethean 
struggle between man and nature. Such ambivalence is particularly evident in Frost’s poem “On a 
Tree Fallen Across the Road” (1923), which uses verse as a means of situating man in nature and 
thereby attempts to understand both nature and culture. That is, Frost’s poem appears at first 
contrary to the Orphic sentiment, describing as it does a sleighing party stopped by a tree that has 
fallen across their path in a storm. Fagan explains that “the powers that nature has over humanity 
and that humanity has over itself were of great concern to Frost,” so “people often find themselves 
in confrontation with nature in his poems, and these confrontations are usually a cause for reflection 
and an opportunity for learning” (2007: 248). Thus, the first stanza of the poem appears to sustain 
notions of the Cartesian dualism, with nature posing a challenge to humans who must, through use 
of wit, strength, or tools, overcome this obstacle, in what Bagby describes as a “remarkably 
Promethean moment” (2003: 124). However, this is undercut in the following stanzas, which read 
as a critique of Promethean methodology, insofar as Frost condemns humankind’s domination of 
nature through the brute force of science and mechanical trickery; for example when he asserts that 
to negotiate the unpredictability of nature, “we do not have to seize and restrain it” (Fagan 200: 
248). Admittedly, critics have remarked upon a sustained thread of Promethean thought in Frost’s 
work, insofar as, in this struggle between man and the unpredictability of nature, “the prevailing 
force is human will” (Fagan 2007: 248), which seemingly reiterates the Promethean mastery of 
nature by man, in a manner underpinned by the Cartesian assertion of mind over matter. Yet, his 
negotiation through thought and verse of material problems posed by nature to the progress of man 
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– as attested to by the subtitle “to hear us talk” (Frost 1964: 296) – as well his sustained critique of 
Promethean violence, also speaks strongly to an Orphic sensibility.  
 It is to the end of reconciling such contradictions that environmental scholar John Elder 
works. In this regard, Elder does not seek to deny or condemn culture outright through the 
imposition or reiteration of any nature/culture dualisms; rather, his interest “is in that grounded 
cultivation which today’s poetry manifests,” because for him “there [can] be [no] simple 
progression from estrangement to reconciliation; there must rather be a form of dialectic” (Elder 
1996: 1). In relation to this notion of dialectical reconciliation, Elder points to the work of American 
poet A.R Ammons; in particular, in Imagining the Earth: Poetry and the Vision of Nature (1996), 
he refers to Ammons’ poems “Dunes” (1972) and the more famous, “Corson’s Inlet” (1965), both 
of which are rooted in the imagery of the windswept New Jersey coastline, and Ammons’ 
experiences of traversing this landscape. Immediately apparent, in the wake of the foregoing 
appraisal of Frost’s “On a Tree Fallen Across the Road,” is that in Ammons’ metre, there is no 
reinforcement of nature/culture dualisms. Instead, his verses are erratic and structurally amorphous, 
mimicking the ebbs and flows of the ocean rather than imposing man-made strictures of form upon 
the rugged and changeable landscape he seeks to record. Elder attests to this, claiming that in 
“Dunes,” the “constant motion of the wind and sand meets the movement of [Ammons’] 
accommodating mind” (1996: 139). Moreover, the poem, in its reiteration of the imagery of 
germination, rooting and growth, as seen in the lines: 
 
In a loose world though 
    something can be started— 
a root touch water, 
    a tip break sand— (Ammons 1993: 582)  
 
evokes the generative processes of nature in a manner akin to Hadot’s Orphism, which seeks to 
understand and assimilate it through artistry. Indeed, by speaking of the capacity of the natural 
world and its myriad events to “make available a human fertility of imagination corresponding 
directly to nature’s superficial instability” (Elder 1996: 139), both Ammons and Elder emerge as 
distinctly Orphic in orientation.  
 Similar tropes are also identified in Ammons’ lengthier and better-known “Corson’s Inlet,” 
which employs an analogously informal structure. Elder explains that “Ammons is determined to 
impose ‘no form of/formlessness’ on the ‘millions of events’; he wants, like the bayberry along the 
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dunes, only ‘disorderly orders’” (1996: 143). And this preoccupation with the kaleidoscopic 
randomness of the natural world is reified and reflected in the seeming haphazardness of Ammons’ 
poetic form, in contrast to manmade forms such as “perpendiculars/straight lines, blocks, boxes, 
binds/of thought” (Ammons 1988: n.p),  from which he finds release in nature. Accordingly, this 
reads as a comment on the restrictive nature of more traditional constrained forms of verse, and 
corresponding thought. This presentation thus also brings nature/culture dualisms under scrutiny; 
an idea which is repeated several times throughout the poem and speaks strongly to the notion of 
Elder’s reconciliation of traditional dualisms and contradictions. Crucial to this reconciliation, 
Skillman asserts, is the manner in which Ammons conflates the processes of nature with those of 
human thought. That is, “[a]s ‘Corson’s Inlet’ proceeds, the congruent but discrete motions of the 
mind, of the walker’s body, of the dunes and the sea, and of the poem’s dynamic form all come to 
reflect one another, generating an impression of numinous symmetry” (Skillman 2016: 112). 
Through such processes, it is argued, dualisms are challenged, and Orphic understandings of the 
natural world are engaged in such a way that “each creative act is the universe incarnating itself as 
one” (Whitehead 1978: 245; Elder 1996: 138).  
 In later works, such as “Capture,” Teicher points to another crucial reconciliation, namely 
that of nature and science, explaining that a further key aspect to Ammons’ work is “related to his 
love of the sciences, [which] finds him closely observing nature — and its interactions with human-
made things — in search of surprises” (2018: n.p). In this way, Ammons’ poetry does not proceed 
by indiscriminately eschewing the trappings of modernity and the human-made, but rather looks 
to this new context for poetic inspiration, in order to gain new Orphic insights and understandings. 
This attentiveness to the interaction between the natural and the man-made can be observed in his 
short poem “Capture,” in which he describes the process of snow melting in rivulets down the side 
of a car in the sunlight, only to refreeze:  
 
After the long snow, 
the sun strikes a winded-free 
side of the car: 
the air twenty, metal, though, 
takes up heat and 
melts trickling down 
freezes like mangrove 
roots, 
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grounding the car still. (Ammons in Teicher 2018: n.p)  
 
Through this poem, the reader encounters an alternative interaction between the natural and the 
human-made, as “the snow and the sun work together to repossess this car, to make it a part of 
nature” (Teicher 2018: n.p). In “Capture,” then, the reader sees a product of technology and the 
workings of nature melding to form an image that is unified and beautiful, in contrast to the 
dramatically different traditional portrayals of the intersection of these two ostensibly incompatible 
forces. For example, in Promethean articulations, the binary is underscored, as we see either images 
of man’s triumphant mastery of nature, or of nature’s cataclysmic irrationality decimating 
humanity; seldom do we see such careful attention to the manifold ordinary coalescences of the 
two. Such depictions, stripped of their violence and duality, thus allow for contemplation, artistry, 
and imaginative thought on nature and the sciences in the contemporary era. Moreover, in 
Ammons’ poetic process there is a further crucial distinction. That is despite his apparently 
scientific gaze, his observations appear oriented not to the end of uncovering the secrets of nature 
through Promethean surveillance or empirical observation, but rather through inspired 
philosophical attentiveness that reflects on these inevitable interactions between the natural and the 
human-made, and focuses on the generative act of creating art that understands the workings of the 
former in a non-invasive aesthetic manner. In this way, Ammons demonstrates a readiness to 
incorporate aspects of science and technology into nature poetry, to the end of reconciling dualisms 
and reimagining critical environmental approaches, all in order to speak to the potentialities of 
modern technology if only as subject matter. This approach may thus be seen to reflect aspects of 
other environmental thinkers, particularly the social ecology of Murray Bookchin, discussed above, 
who advocates a circumspect application of traditionally-Promethean technologies in a manner that 
is responsive to the social and environmental needs of the contemporary era. And it is important to 
recognize this because such thoughtful appropriation of the technological, mechanical and human-
made by Orphic environmentalists, extends beyond literature into the ambit of musical 
composition.   
 In particular, composer Olivier Messiaen, who worked with birdsong in the mid-twentieth 
century, can similarly be seen as engaging in a thoughtful application of traditionally-Promethean 
technology to the end of drawing aesthetically close to nature. Hill and Simeone explain that 
Messiaen’s use of recordings of birdsong allowed him scope “to revise and refine his notations, 
and as a result to make rapid progress in developing a varied and complex birdsong language,” in 
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a manner that was impossible to do simply by observing birds in their natural habitat (2007: 106). 
Of particular interest here is his 1955 composition, Oiseaux Exotiques, which is composed almost 
exclusively from gramophone records; as Hill and Simeone explain, it was   
 
intended as a collage of birdsong, independent of time, place or habitat … [and 
evinced Messiaen’s] decision to include oriental and tropical birds in a work that 
until then had been almost exclusively about North American birds. This created an 
ornithological impossibility, thereby giving Messiaen a free hand. As a result, in its 
conception, Oiseaux Exotiques is entirely imaginary. (2007: 106) 
 
Nevertheless, what is important for Hill and Simeone, and indeed for an Orphic reading of the work 
of Messiaen, is the degree to which “the composition of Oiseaux Exotiques … crossed the line 
from transcription to creative intervention” (2007:106). This is because the technique involved 
enshrines a strong Orphic element in that it moves beyond mere dictation, for the purposes of 
scientific cataloguing of birdsong for ornithological study, and also defies the processes of simply 
recording birdsong by electronic means. Instead, Messiaen employs various techniques as a means 
by which to meaningfully and creatively engage with nature, specifically birds, which he viewed 
as “the great songsters of creation” (Philharmonia Orchestra 2008: n.p).  
 This legacy of critically appropriating technologies as a means of drawing close to nature 
through aesthetic endeavor also persists into the present where it increasingly manifests in the 
medium of film, which in the contemporary era is embedded in digitality, and yet can still offer 
critical Orphic contributions. In this regard, co-directors Perrin and Cluzaud, with their series of 
nature films, Winged Migrations or le Peuple Migrateur (2001), Oceans or Océans (2009), 51 and 
more recently Seasons or Les Saisons (2015), arguably facilitate a crucial reimagining of Orphic 
sensibilities, against the backdrop of societies of control in which Promethean, Socratic and 
Aristotelian tendencies prevail. Accordingly, these films stage an important contradiction, namely 
that of a product which is strongly informed by Orphic sensibilities, but which is only made 
possible through the use digital technologies tethered to the context of Promethean technological 
advancement. Nonetheless, their films remain largely Orphic in orientation and in terms of their 
recourse to affect comprise a critical admixture of visual art and nature documentary. In short, 
                                                          
51 The collaborations of Perrin and Cluzaud have been well-received by critics and audiences alike, with Winged 
Migration being nominated for an Academy Award in 2001 (McNary 2016: n.p), and Oceans grossing $82,7 million 
worldwide (Box Office Mojo 2018: n.p).  
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through their breathtaking visuals of animals and landscapes, these films constitute a powerful 
attempt to draw close to these natural phenomena through an aesthetic medium. To be sure, in the 
creation of these films, Perrin and Cluzaud make extensive use of technologies commonly 
associated with Promethean digitality; for example, as Konik and Konik explain, in the case of 
Océans, 
 
the cinematography was ultimately only accomplished through the assistance of 
engineers who collaborated with the filmmakers to provide suitable housings for the 
digital cameras for underwater filming, and with the help of the French Navy 
working with these engineers to develop underwater camera drones. (2016: 37).  
 
However, it is important to note that in the making of these films, these technologies – while 
unavoidably enmeshed in the “military-technological complex” (Konik & Konik 2016: 37) – were 
not turned to any Promethean purpose. That is, they were not utilized to surveil nature and thereby 
demonstrate humankind’s mastery over it by forcibly unveiling its secrets, but instead help 
audiences to draw close to the volatile and generative qualities of the natural environment and its 
inhabitants, through striking depictions of “beasts of all varieties and sizes” from the perspectives 
of the creatures themselves, as they “gallop and play, fight and reproduce” (Casoulis 2016: n.p). 
 To elaborate, in terms of form, these films veer away from mainstream cinematic 
conventions, such as the centralization of a particular protagonist or celebrity narrator. In this way, 
Perrin and Cluzaud’s cinematic works constitute a break with the traditions of Anthropocene media 
and the related discourses of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus associated with it, insofar 
as the filmmakers attempt not to depict a narrative for the purposes of identification with particular 
audience groupings on an anthropocentric level. Rather, the films involve a visual activity through 
which the nuanced creativity of nature is reflected as it unfolds in the absence of both humans and 
their particular point-of-view as a species. This shift from the conventions of more traditional 
nature documentary filmmaking is, of course, paralleled by the directors’ apparent break from the 
profit-orientated production methods of the contemporary neoliberal media industry. As Konik and 
Konik explain, Océans alone took a staggering six years to complete, at a cost of $75 million, and 
because of this extremely high production cost, profits for Océans were comparatively low when 
viewed alongside similar productions, such as BBC’s Planet Earth (2016: 37; GEF 2010: 4; BBC 
2016: n.p). Yet it is asserted that “the financial underperformance of Océans is … counterbalanced 
by its success as a critical-aesthetic film” (Konik & Konik 2016: 37), and indeed this aspect is 
137 
 
crucial to our understanding of the film as an Orphic product which moves beyond the space of the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian network of production. 
 Similar in its pursuit of the Orphic ideal of fathoming nature through artistic creativity and 
non-violence, is British artist and filmmaker Ben Rivers’ 2015 exhibition entitled The Earth Needs 
More Magicians. In this regard, Scott points to the exhibition of Rivers’ work at the Camden Arts 
Centre in London, in which Rivers, in a series of short films, “display[s] insights on small, remote 
cultures and landscape views of the elements” (Scott 2016: 9). Scott describes the viewing 
experience as immersive, particularly with reference to the staging of the exhibition, as well as its 
use of new technology as a means of drawing close to nature through the creative process:  
 
Dwarfing the viewer, heavy pieces of wood lined the walls and created not only a 
claustrophobic effect but more importantly, left no option to escape the message and 
context of Rivers’ work. In a world of depleting attention spans, what does this tell 
us about our relationship with nature? Being immersed within it is sublime; this is 
not new information, as identified by Edmund Burke in the eighteenth century, but 
replicating the natural environment is a different experience entirely, and in a world 
where we can access these static images on Google [and] Instagram … contemporary 
art must look to new methods of engaging with the viewer once more. (2016: 9) 
 
Such tropes and strategies can also be discerned in Rivers’ earlier works, particularly his short film 
This is my Land (2005) and his later feature-length production Two Years at Sea (2011), in which 
he documents the experiences of Jake Williams, a man who lives alone in a remote forest in the 
Scottish Highlands. These films, as well as many of Rivers’ other works52 – like the works of Perrin 
and Cluzaud, described above – do not dissect nature or portray man’s mastery over it, but aim 
instead to approximate nature through aesthetic means which resonate strongly with the Orphic 
sensibility. Alongside striking shots of natural imagery, Rivers particularly thematizes lifestyles 
embedded in nature, as spaces of creativity and imagination in the context of an otherwise fast-
paced, digitized society. And in this regard, Hattrick identifies a “fascination with hermitic ways 
of living” emerging as a key theme of the work of Rivers (2012: n.p), which involves a striking 
parallel with the focus on ancient practices of Orphism, ranging from “ascetic lifestyles to rituals” 
                                                          
52 These include, but are not limited to, works such as Origin of the Species (2008) and I Know Where I’m Going 
(2009), which all thematize “a figure in a landscape” removed from society (Hattrick 2012: n.p).  
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as alternative ways of life, which stood in contrast to the prevailing Greco-Roman, and later 
Christian, social mores of the day (Edmonds 2013: 295) 
 
Conclusion 
In terms of their widespread acclaim, and the relative ease with which the above products can be 
accessed through digitized channels, we may surmise that the Orphic, along with the Hippocratic, 
approaches to nature – which have historically been largely marginalized by the ascendency of the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus – are currently enjoying something of a resurgence. 
However, that said, it is crucial to remain cognizant of the fact that representations, both in culture 
in the form of the various balance-seeking Hippocratic environmental movements, and in cultural 
products such as the aesthetically-oriented Orphic works detailed above, are still in danger of being 
overshadowed by contemporary consumer culture, and the irresponsible renderings of nature and 
the ecological crisis arising from it. Indeed, as will be discussed next, the Hippocratic and Orphic 
approaches to nature can even be marginalized within nature documentaries that focus on the 
environmental crisis, on account of a celebrity host’s ultimate endorsement of 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian means as the only viable solution to climate change. 
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Chapter 4: DiCaprio’s The 11th Hour (2007) through the Lens of the Extended Hadotian 
Framework 
Introduction 
Ecocritic Simon Estok characterizes the contemporary era in which there is a glut of environmental 
media messages, both fictional and factual, but a lack of corresponding action, as the “Age of 
Spectatorial Complicity,” because of how contemporary audiences in many ways constitute 
“spectators to future ruin” (2014: 49; Morton 2010: n.p). Indeed, the contemporary era is ripe with 
such paradoxes: On the one hand, there is an increased output and broadening of what is considered 
environmental film, which ranges from narrower conceptions of environmental film as consisting 
solely of “environmental documentaries and blatantly ecological features,” through “avant-garde 
film” with a distinctly environmental thrust, to both fiction films that thematize natural disasters 
and pit humanity against nature, and the more nuanced representations of the “ecocinema” 
described by  Scott MacDonald (Murray & Huemann 2013: n.p).53 In fact, even films that do not 
specifically thematize environmental issues have at times been subject to ecocritical readings, 
resulting in a broadening of the scope of ecological cinematic productions – or ecocinema – and a 
concurrent increase in scholarship in the genre from the late 1990s (Rust & Monani 2013: 1).  And 
all of this has been coupled with a concomitant augmentation of academic interest in such media 
products and the issues they thematize. Against this backdrop, Rust and Monani have asserted that 
in the contemporary era, “cinema is a form of negotiation, a mediation that is itself ecologically 
placed as it consumes the entangled world around it, and in turn, is itself consumed” (2013:1).But 
on the other hand, despite the exponential expansion of environmental film over the past decades, 
audiences seem to remain for the most part incapacitated by the deluge of other consumerist 
messages, that simultaneously rain down upon them through the mass media, and render them 
unable or unwilling to effect substantive changes, either in their way of life or at the level of policy. 
For philosopher Erazim Kohák, this can largely be attributed to consumerism which constitutes 
one of the three main drivers of ecological decline (in addition to overpopulation and the power of 
technology). In this regard, Kohák advances that in contrast to the more moderate lifestyles 
necessary for environmental repair, consumerism “is the conviction that the purpose of life is the 
                                                          
53 Ecocinema, as distinct from generic one-dimensional environmental narratives, is described by Alex as “cinema that 
takes ecology seriously” or “overtly engage[s] … environmental concerns … by exploring specific environmental 
justice issues” (Alex 2014: 22) and engaging philosophically with environmental concerns instead of merely 
incorporating the environment as a mere setting or incidental narrative element.  
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continued increase in the level of material consumption, which will solve problems and guarantee 
happiness to people” (Zahrádka & Sedláková 2012: 32; Kohák 2000: 170). Furthermore, Higgs 
explains that “the appetite for ever more consumer goods has deepened in the first world, and its 
extension to new sections of the new middle classes in China, India and Latin America” constitutes 
a significant additional environmental challenge (2014: 281). 
 The reason for this ironic increase in interest in environmental concerns, coupled with an 
incongruous lack of action, has also been broadly speculated upon by ecocritics. To this end, 
numerous scholars have pointed to the somewhat problematic nature of environmental film as a 
genre that contains within it several profound contradictions. Concerning the material 
contradictions of this genre, criticisms have been levelled against the often resource-intensive 
methods they require for their production – which tend to be in and of themselves environmentally 
harmful – such as extensive travel by production crews, chartering of helicopters to provide the 
generic panning landscape shots, as well as an uncritical reliance on an arguably unsustainable 
consumer-driven film industry network for distribution and marketing of the finished products. But 
beyond even this, Estok raises questions about the suitability of the related narrative forms in 
generating new and sustainable attitudes toward nature. That is, he believes that a major pitfall of 
environmental films in the current era of passive audiences, who are characterized by their “poor 
focus,” is that they serve only to generate limited narrative interest; in other words, “we [simply] 
want to know ‘what happened’ … rather than [feel] a desire for activist engagement” because of 
what “the film promotes” (2014: 50). Correlatively, Duvall and others point to the inability of these 
films to synthesize their content with environmentally-sound ideological outlooks. This is because 
while they at times centralize environmental themes or concerns, they often do so in a manner that 
“affirms rather than challenges the culture’s fundamental anthropocentric ethos” (Duvall 2017: 26; 
Willoquet-Maricondi 2010: 47). Thus, in many respects, environmental film today fails to present 
a cohesive, environmentally-progressive message, and for this deficit it has consistently been 
critiqued. Indeed, their reflections of concern for the environment and their capacity to engender 
of related activism have all too often tended to be undercut by Cartesian notions of the related 
primacy of humanity and the triumph of science, along with a deep-seated unwillingness to 
challenge the damaging entrenched modes of thought and practice which have helped bring us to 
the brink of ecological collapse.  
 Over the preceding chapters, the evolution, merging, and growing precedence of the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus as an approach to understanding and interacting with 
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nature, has been outlined in relation to the correlative gradual waning of Hippocratic and Orphic 
environmental approaches. Accordingly, this chapter examines the contemporary manifestation of 
these dynamics in the 2007 environmental film The 11th Hour directed by Nadia Conners and Leila 
Conners Petersen, and featuring Leonardo DiCaprio, by viewing its form and content critically 
through the lens of the extended Hadotian framework. This will be carried out in order to identify 
whether or not the film has assimilated those contemporary trends in which the balance and artistry 
of, respectively, the Hippocratic and Orphic approaches to nature, have been progressively 
sidelined by the dominance of nature via the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus. To this end, 
after a brief synopsis of The 11th Hour, the film will be analyzed through the lens of the five 
approaches of the extended Hadotian framework, in order to identify the significance accorded to 
each approach. In conclusion, the cogency of such respective thematization within the film, and of 
the extent to which this stands to precipitate positive environmental action, will be considered.  
 
DiCaprio’s The 11th Hour (2007) through the lens of the Extended Hadotian Framework  
Released on the heels of Al Gore’s Academy Award winning An Inconvenient Truth (2006), 
DiCaprio’s 2007 environmental documentary The 11th Hour (co-written and -directed by Leila 
Conners Petersen and Nadia Conners) broadens the scope of those issues drawn into conspicuity 
by Gore, through looking beyond his focus on global warming. Instead, DiCaprio considers a 
variety of further concerns, from the problematic ties between US government and corporate 
interests, to questions of biodiversity and global climate phenomena, as well as possible solutions 
thereto. The film, billed as a “series of interviews presented by Leonardo DiCaprio” (Conners 
Petersen & Connors 2007) sees the celebrated actor consult a wide array of experts and pundits 
from a variety of fields, including politicians, scientists, environmentalists, and entrepreneurs, 
whose ideas and responses are compiled into a series of talking-head shots. This structure, 
commonly used in environmental documentaries, is referred to by Duvall as the “expository or 
compilation model, which intercuts interviews with recognized experts on a given subject with 
either original or stock footage to add visual support to the interviews” (2017: 31). However, 
Duvall goes on to elaborate on both the relative strengths and weaknesses of such a model, stating 
that while such a technique – as the name suggests – allows for the compilation of a large volume 
of information and opinion into a fairly condensed form, it also runs the risk of losing the attention 
of audiences if it presents them “with an overwhelming amount of scientific testimony, or if the 
program loses focus by spanning to broad an area of subject matter” (2017: 31). Interestingly, The 
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11th Hour has been critiqued for falling prey to both of the latter pitfalls. That is, its recourse to 
relatively unvarying structure and its tendency to lack focus has been repeatedly highlighted by 
scholars, along with film critics, as one of The 11th Hour’s most serious shortcomings (Duvall 
2017: 31). Indeed, acclaimed film critic Roger Ebert neatly sums up such contentions when he 
remarks that “too much of the footage of [the film] is just standard nature photography, as 
helicopter-cams swoop over hill and dale and birds look unhappy and ice melts. This is intercut 
with 50 experts, more or less, who talk and talk and talk” (2007: n.p).  And the veracity of his 
summation readily emerges when the structure of the film is considered.  
 To begin with, the film opens with a series of images depicting both natural and human 
activity. First, idyllic images of nature – a rainforest, a turtle swimming over a coral reef, a glacier 
– are presented, and then these are gradually interspersed with images of natural disasters and 
pollution, such as a hurricane, a landfill, and a burning oil well, before the film progresses by 
cutting even more rapidly between ever more explicit images of the cruel destruction of nature; 
from butchered chickens, through a howling baboon, to forest fires. The dire admonitions of 
environmentalists then follow on from this apocalyptic montage, leading into what Crust describes 
as the first of three interrelated segments. The first segment deals with the contemporary context 
of ecological decline, describing a “convergence of crises” encompassing “deforestation, soil 
degradation, the pollution of the air and the ill health of the oceans” (2007: n.p). The second 
segment, in turn, deals largely with the array of economic and socio-political driving forces of 
climate change, and the numerous related environmental issues facing society today. This is 
achieved largely through an interrogation of the principles and practices of prevailing social, 
corporate and political organizations. Finally, the third segment reflects on possible solutions to 
the problems outlined in the forgoing segments, with a general emphasis on scientific and 
technology-driven solutions, such as renewable energy sources, innovative and sustainable 
architecture, and a move toward biomimicry as a design philosophy (Crust 2007: n.p). As a direct 
counterpoint to the opening scenes, the film then concludes – somewhat optimistically – with 
bracing words from prominent environmentalists about our potential for environmental 
redemption, provided we act collectively and urgently. And these statements are interspersed with 
images of vast and unspoiled environments, rivers, mountains, and clear blue skies, all of which 
mirror these hopeful and uplifting sentiments.  
 While from the above, there may appear to be a unified theme within the film which is 
progressively communicated as its narrative unfolds – from the cataclysmic precipice of the 
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environmental crisis portrayed in the early parts of the film, to the technological, solutions-oriented 
optimism in its closing minutes – it can also be argued that there is something of a discontinuity in 
the thematic thrust of DiCaprio’s approach. That is, the film both opens and closes with archetypal 
messages of the need for moderation, balance, and the displacement of binary thought which 
separates humans from nature, with the latter in particular proffered by prominent 
environmentalists as guiding insights for our future interactions with the environment. 
Accordingly, such sentiments reflect to the Hippocratic approach discussed in the forgoing chapters 
of this dissertation, particularly the previous chapter where correlations were drawn between such 
balance-seeking modalities and their prevalence in contemporary environmental movements. But 
while initially this seems apposite for an environmental film – whose aesthetic dimensions also 
render it part of the Orphic approach to nature, discussed earlier – over the duration of The 11th 
Hour, representations of the Hippocratic attitude become increasingly sporadic and are 
progressively drowned out by echoes of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus. Echoes 
which, as the documentary unfolds, gain in prevalence and precedence to the extent of co-opting 
and enfolding the both Hippocratic and Orphic voices.  
 Of course, this parallels the progression and expansion of the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus described in the preceding chapters. That is, as discussed 
in Chapter One and Two, from the early mathematicians of Classical Greece to the unbridled 
excesses of the steam age, which in turn enabled massive industrial growth and correlatively 
cemented nature as little more than a resource for the purposes of human utility and enrichment, 
the Promethean approach has, over the course of human history, become the accepted mode of 
understanding and interacting with nature. Moreover, another significant factor underpinning the 
increasing prevalence of the Promethean approach is its capacity to co-opt, or to enfold within it, 
perspectives which had previously posed a challenge to its dominance. This was observed 
particularly in Chapter Three, in the seamless absorption of Socratic withdrawal and Aristotelian-
inspired faith in teleology into the overarching regime of Promethean societies of control, through 
digitized dividuality and fundamental belief in the neoliberal economy, respectively. Accordingly, 
the latter three were understood as constituting what is referred to as the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, which by and large represents the key cultural, 
technological, and economic markers of contemporary society, and which thereby mediates our 
interactions both with each other and with the environment. The features of this paradigm were 
thus advanced as including separation from and dominance over nature, and similarly either the 
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sidelining of, or the gradual co-optation of, the alternative perspectives of Hippocratic balance and 
Orphic aesthetic endeavor. As will be discussed in what follows, such dynamics are readily 
apparent in the narrative of The 11th Hour.  
 
Promethean Sensibility in The 11th Hour  
In the earlier parts of the film that seek to establish our contemporary cultural and ecological 
context, there is – as mentioned above – a strong emphasis on human “opportunism and … greed” 
(Soleri in Conners Petersen & Connors 2007) as contributing factors to the environmental crisis, 
in conjunction with the fundamental conceptual divide between humanity and nature, which is also 
advanced as a major source of current environmentally damaging human activity. However, what 
is remarkable is that these Hippocratic perspectives on the need for balance, which are advanced 
by renowned environmentalists like David Suzuki and Wangari Maathai, and which seek to identify 
the possible discursive underpinnings of the imbalanced attitudes of society toward nature – 
including the notions of nature as fundamentally separate from humanity – are directly followed 
by more scientific reasoning which effectively pushes them aside. Moreover, from this point on in 
the film, the environment is viewed at arm’s length, as it were, through the lens of scientific 
rationality. Accordingly, viewers are progressively distanced from both any reintegration of 
humanity and nature, and any re-conceptualization of the socially-constructed hierarchies which, 
since the age of Enlightenment as discussed in Chapter Two, have privileged humans over nature, 
and legitimated human exploitation of the environment. In this way, the crucial schism dividing 
humanity from nature is henceforth largely negated, reducing the contemporary environmental 
crisis to a question of various chemical concentrations, thermal fluctuations, and scientific 
statistics. This is visually illustrated as the natural imagery of the opening sequence of the film is 
soon superseded by a variety of graphs and diagrams, illustrating statistical trends within natural 
phenomena, such as the greenhouse effect, and the link between increasing atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon-dioxide and a rise in temperature. Through this process, nature is thus 
further reduced from a complex, dynamic, and variegated system that encompasses all life on earth, 
to an overly-simplified schematic configuration of orbs, arrows, and periodic symbols. And while 
this occurs visually, a similar tendency manifests on a rhetorical level in later parts of the film, 
particularly those relating to biomimicry, when the discourses of science, technology and 
engineering are superimposed upon the natural world and its processes. In many ways, this 
discursive pattern of presentation may be seen as an attempt not only to render nature 
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understandable, but also to impose human order and rationality upon it, so as ultimately to cast 
over nature some semblance of human control, so that it appears less threatening. An approach to 
nature that, as discussed in Chapter One, underpinned the creation of the Olympian deities – 
particularly the second more human generation – and which continues unabated through the 
techno-speak of The 11th Hour. This tendency is evident particularly in the third segment of the 
film, where rhetorical expressions of this sort are fairly commonplace. From John Todd’s rather 
fatuous summation of complex and multifarious organic processes as “nature’s operating 
instructions,” to the statements of Bruce Mau, of Mau Designs, who asserts that “all of life is 
essentially a design process” (Conners Petersen and Conners 2007), one encounters clear attempts 
to strong-arm nature into the realm of human ken through discursive manipulation. Accordingly, 
such attempts intimate a sense of human determination, coherence, utility, and most notably, 
control over nature, which remains comforting despite being completely illusory. This is because 
representations such as these, at the level of visuals and rhetoric, render the natural and organic 
processes of biospheres static, linear, and more readily intelligible in terms of human scientific 
knowledge than they actually are. And while the use of such discursive and framing devices may 
also be helpful in facilitating the understanding of complex scientific processes and dynamics 
among lay-audiences, so to speak, they nevertheless still perpetuate and propagate an 
understanding of nature that is reductive and filtered through the lens of science and human 
rationality. Arguably, such exclusive recourse to scientific inquiry as the sole means of “knowing” 
our environment, as opposed to questioning the Cartesian and Baconian frameworks within which 
it assumes such precedence, serves only to reiterate and thereby endorse the harmful perspectives 
from which the environmental crisis stems. 
 Moving through the documentary, we also see the environment described less as a vital 
system of which humans constitute only a tiny part, and with which we should reconcile, and more 
as a menacing ‘other.’ In this regard, the two speakers who to a large extent offer the concluding 
remarks of the first segment of the film, unequivocally advance nature and its current changes as a 
threat to human life and happiness. First, Peter Demenocal maintains that: 
 
What global warming does, or what the climate changes linked to global warming 
does is they add another dimension of uncertainty. It threatens your food security, 
for example, it threatens your water security, it threatens your sea level security, it 
threatens your security against storms and hurricanes. [emphasis added] (Demenocal 
in Conners Petersen & Conners 2007) 
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Second, James Woolsey – who is a diplomat and former head of the CIA – argues in a similar vein 
that nature is effectively our enemy today, when he advances that: 
 
It’s a national security problem in the sense that Florida might be the first effected 
as well as other coastal parts of the United States, but more importantly than that it’s 
an international security problem. (Woolsey in Conners Petersen & Conners 2007) 
 
The effect of including such views is the inflection of the narrative away from the Hippocratic and 
Orphic approaches to nature, and toward an underlying bias against the environment for its 
ostensible aggression toward humans. Moreover, such framing of nature as threatening negates the 
human culpability for climate change alluded to in the earlier parts of the film, while at the same 
time dovetailing with trite tropes of nature as hostile and capricious. And in this way, the earlier 
messages of the need for moderation, reconciliation, and balance, are powerfully undermined by 
statements which not only cast nature as ‘other’ – reinforcing the binary thinking of Cartesianism 
– but also underscore the threatening aspect of nature; something which easily justifies the 
continued misuse of the environment.  
 This approach, by which a broad focus on the environment as a whole is progressively 
narrowed to focus on an exclusively human element, in terms of which the environmental crisis is 
depicted as a concentrated threat to human life, continues for the remainder of the first segment, 
and indeed a good way into the second segment. That is, after a brief interlude in which DiCaprio 
lists a series of environmental issues, namely “deforestation, soil erosion and vanishing wetlands,” 
he goes on to state that these are “a concern for life” (DiCaprio in Conners Petersen & Conners 
2007). Notably, though, he makes no distinction between human and non-human life, again 
appealing (albeit superficially) to the ‘oneness’ with nature which was alluded to briefly in the 
opening sequence of the film. To be sure, in symmetry with these earlier sequences, DiCaprio’s 
brief narration is followed by speakers – environmentalists Paul Hawken and Wes Jackson – who 
briefly echo these sentiments, reiterating a view of the world as a “seamless” series of 
undifferentiated living systems (Jackson in Conners Petersen & Conners 2007). However, this 
perspective is not explored at length, because instead, through the next speaker – Tim Carmichael, 
the President of the Coalition for Clean Air – issues such as pollution are abruptly reframed in a 
manner which again speaks strongly to human wellbeing, rather than overall environmental 
integrity. Here, instead of elaborating on the complex, manifold and far-reaching effects of 
147 
 
escalating C02 emissions,
54 the extent of this problem is explored through a set of comparatively 
minor human side-effects, such as “headaches, drowsiness, [and] lethargy” (Carmichael in Conners 
Petersen & Conners 2007). This tendency to cover in a very laconic manner the more significant 
global effects of environmental problems, in favour of an emphatic focus on human inconvenience, 
speaks strongly to an underlying sense of “human exceptionalism;” an idea that is firmly tethered 
to “Promethean discourse … which asserts that human beings rightfully dominate nature,” and 
through which “people are viewed as being different from and superior to other forms of life” such 
that they “shouldn’t feel constrained in their activities” (Carl et al 2012: 246). This approach in 
The 11th Hour also establishes a benchmark for the subsequent treatment of several other 
environmental issues that are explored in the second segment of the film. That is, from overfishing 
to chemical dumping and deforestation, all are largely explored through the narrow parameters of 
their cost to human wellbeing and food security, with even the increasing health risks associated 
with recreational swimming in the ocean featuring as a concern. 
 While the above all constitute strong reflections of a Promethean sensibility, both through 
reference to science as a means of ‘knowing’ nature and via the reiteration of human primacy over 
nature, arguably the most emphatic manifestation of Prometheanism occurs in the third and final 
segment of the film, in which various thinkers speculate on possible solutions to the environmental 
crisis. The solutions suggested are by and large oriented toward science and the more effective 
utilization of nature for human purposes, such as through the development of renewable energy 
sources, the augmentation of green technology, and the application of biomimicry. Biomimicry is 
defined by Janine Benyus as “a new science that studies nature’s model, and then imitates or takes 
inspiration from these designs and processes to solve human problems” (Benyus 1997: 1),55 and it 
is heavily emphasized as an important part of the solution to the environmental crisis in the latter 
parts of the film. In the opening lines of her seminal text entitled Biomimicry: Innovation Inspired 
by Nature, Benyus claims that biomimicry adopts nature as a “measure … to judge the ‘rightness’ 
                                                          
54 Alongside the well-documented contributions of industrial C02 emissions to the accumulation of greenhouse gases, 
and thus to phenomena such as acid rain and global warming, Johansen points to a complex array of interactions 
occurring in oceans as a result of these emissions, which are often overlooked. Here, the accumulation of pollutants 
such as C02 has contributed to a steady “acidification of the oceans,” which poses an increasing threat to “marine 
organisms, beginning with plankton at the base of the food chain” that, if compromised, could cause “reverberations 
throughout the food chain” (Johansen 2009: 4). Beyond this, it is predicted that as C02 becomes increasingly 
concentrated within marine systems, the ocean’s natural ability to absorb or filter emissions will be progressively 
inhibited (Johansen 2009: 4).  
55 Benyus is considered the pre-eminent expert in the field of biomimicry, and while she herself did not conceive of 
the concept, she is widely credited with popularizing the idea of biomimicry in her 1997 book entitled Biomimicry: 
Innovation Inspired by Nature (Biomimicry Institute 2018: n.p). Biophysicist Otto Schmidt is credited with coining 
the term biomimicry, or biomimesis, in the 1950s as “a biological approach to engineering” (McKeag 2017: 249).  
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of our innovations,” and accordingly it aims to reshape our interactions with nature, orienting 
thought toward “what we can learn from [the natural world] … not what we can extract from [it]” 
(1997: 1). Yet, while this statement appears at first glance to be a step toward a more balanced and 
less invasive relationship with nature, a closer look reveals its underlying Promethean orientations. 
That is, while Benyus appears to advocate a shift away from the rampant resource extraction of the 
more traditional Promethean approaches – seen in the industrial revolution and the era of control 
society, discussed in Chapters Two and Three, respectively – she nonetheless advocates the close 
scientific examination of nature for the purposes of extracting knowledge.  
 Indeed, in The Veil of Isis, Hadot elaborates on this specifically, explaining that from its 
earliest incarnations, “mechanics is situated within the perspective of a struggle between man and 
nature,” in terms of which “technology allows us to regain the upper hand over nature” (2006: 102).  
While initially these methods constituted an attempt to mitigate human suffering in the face of 
nature’s unpredictability, over time they have been progressively reshaped for the purposes of 
fulfilling vain curiosity, of furnishing humanity with lifestyles of increasing comfort and ease, and 
most recently, of providing consumers with an ever-broadening selection of technological goods. 
In light of this, biomimicry emerges as little more than the latest development in the long series of 
rearticulations of Hadot’s Promethean “trickery,” or “mēkhanē,” since antiquity (2006: 102). This 
is particularly insofar as, in its attempts to mitigate the inexorable process of climate change and 
extinction set in motion by the expansion of industrial society, biomimicry  
 
relies on the ‘reasons’ that are immanent in nature, and ultimately on its mathematical 
qualities … and physical qualities … in order to obtain results that seem to be 
contrary to the course of nature. … From this perspective, the secrets of nature are 
rather the unsuspected resources that can be gleaned from natural processes. (Hadot 
2006: 102-103)  
 
From this perspective, biomimicry emerges as strongly Promethean in orientation, not least 
because, beyond its superficial appeals to moderation and balance, it is closely attuned to the ideals 
of scientific observation of nature for the end of human mastery and improved well-being. This is 
quite clear from Benyus’ appraisal of the complex biological processes executed by spiders as they 
spin silk, which she describes as a mastery of resource utilization and a process that she thus hopes 
will soon be assimilated into human industry. Indeed, in a manner which clearly illustrates Hadot’s 
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above contentions, as Benyus observes the processes of silk production in order to glean insight 
into the fabrication of Kevlar, she remarks upon the spider’s ability to   
 
basically [take] flies and crickets into the web and [transform] them in …  chemistry 
and water, in the abdomen, and out comes this material that’s five times stronger, 
ounce for ounce, than steel. Silently, in water, at room temp. This is master chemistry 
– the manufacturing of the future, hopefully. (Benyus in Conners Petersen and 
Conners 2007) 
 
Beyond this, biomimicry as a strategy for environmental change also emerges as 
counterproductive, because of how it reinforces, rather than challenges, the exploitative neoliberal 
status quo. That is, rather than addressing the conceptual, discursive and strategic shortcomings 
which have ushered in the contemporary ecological crisis, biomimicry accepts ideals of endless 
growth and development as imperative, and seeks correlatively to sustain patterns of economic 
expansion – albeit by different means – even in the face of earth’s declining carrying capacity. As 
Porritt explains, biomimicry endeavors to meet “the overarching challenge of aligning 
humankind’s model of progress and growth with nature’s systems and processes” (2005: 161). But 
it does so even though it has become increasingly clear over the past decades that the continued 
expansion of the neoliberal economy, and the network of industrial production and mass 
consumption it entails, is incongruent with ecological stability, let alone flourishing. Additionally, 
much of the scholarship surrounding biomimicry is couched in terms of sustainable development, 
particularly “the belief that industrial growth and economic development can easily be reconciled 
with the green values of sustainability” (Luke 2015: 333). However, the increasing integration of 
the term ‘sustainable development’ as something of a panacea or buzzword in contemporary 
environmental discourses, has drawn much criticism. As Manahan points out, the idea of 
sustainable development – if not accompanied by sweeping action – remains little more than “an 
oxymoron without substance,” which is unlikely to precipitate any substantive change (1997: 112). 
And as Wolfgang Sachs argues, worse still is when the emphasis is placed on sustaining 
development, even in the face of mounting evidence that in the long term this will be impossible to 
do (2008: 17). To be sure, a biomimicry approach has the potential to contribute to the discovery 
and development of cleaner and more efficient industry, renewable fuels, and associated green 
technologies. But insofar as it fails to address the ideological and systemic failings which have in 
the first place allowed for the continued exploitation of the environment to the point of ecological 
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collapse, it is a problem. For Mulvaney, at the heart of this disconnect lies the fundamental failure, 
on the part of such techno-optimists, to grasp the finite nature of earth’s resources. In this regard, 
he states that for “the Prometheans, natural resources on the Earth are infinite because the resources 
are themselves products of the human ability to develop technologies;” consequently, “[i]t is the 
constant development of new technologies that converts matter in the world to new resources that 
will counter any scarcity” (2011: 304). And this is precisely the message which is so strongly 
underscored in the final segment of The 11th Hour.  
 In the opening of the final solutions-driven section of the film, DiCaprio – again leaning 
toward increased scientific inquiry into nature’s secret processes – adumbrates the focus on 
biomimicry which will follow by asking: “what can we learn from nature? (DiCaprio in Conners 
Petersen & Conners 2007). The proposed ends to which this inquiry should be directed are then 
soon made clear in the statements of Thom Hartmann, who disparages the appeals of, for example, 
deep ecologists and ecofeminists, who want simpler, less wasteful and more naturally-embedded 
lifestyles, in favour of valorizing technology-driven solutions that will allow for business and 
consumer lifestyles to continue as usual. His derogatory iteration of a naturally-embedded, 
sustainable lifestyle as “[having] to go out into the woods and put on animal skins and live on roots 
and berries” (Conners Petersen & Conners 2007), is clearly a case of reductio ad absurdum, that 
negates the complex material and ideological realities of the issue, as well as the plethora of 
innovative solutions to everyday needs being created by those not rooted in technological/industrial 
consumer networks. Nevertheless, through this, Hartmann relegates the idea of less resource-
intensive lifestyles to the margins of consideration, as idealistic, outmoded, impractical, and 
unnecessary in the age of abundance offered by technology and science. This perspective is also 
corroborated in the film by Ray Anderson, who envisions an ideal society functioning as “a waste-
free industrial system” (Conners Petersen & Conners 2007). Here again, here, the extensive 
industrial network of the contemporary era – along with the neoliberal values which accompany it 
– are taken for granted, despite the brief evidence of the harmfulness of such organizations 
presented in the earlier parts of the film. In particular, ecological designer John Todd demonstrates 
a similar oversight. He speaks strongly of the idea of reconciling the excessively high standards of 
living enjoyed by many in the developed world today, with environmental sustainability, stating 
that with sufficient research and implementation of sustainable design, “we can live beautifully on 
this planet with one tenth or less the resources than our current civilization uses” (Conners Petersen 
& Conners 2007). This utopian statement is then visually reinforced, as a series of images of 
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towering, modernistic, glass-clad homes, landscaped gardens and a parking lot – albeit clad in solar 
panels – roll across the screen as Todd speaks. This accordingly reinforces the idea that 
environmental change can be effected without a significant downscaling of contemporary 
lifestyles, as these images propagate the idea of a technological paradise, in which human 
populations enjoy the same – if not a greater – standard of living with no significant environmental 
consequences. Yet such sentiments remain idealistic in the extreme, not least because the demands 
placed on the environment grow “due to population growth,” and as “the demands for higher 
quality of life grow,” the earth’s “ability to supply these needs is questionable” (Cohen & Reich 
2016: 11). In short, in order to effect the kind of sweeping remedial measures necessary to address 
the present ecological crisis – and to ensure future sustainability – there is a need to move beyond 
a simple exchange of fossil fuels for renewable energy. Manahan, among others, emphasizes the 
importance of a comprehensive approach in this regard; one which involves a broad spectrum of 
practical measures, such as “promoting soil conservation” as well as implementing “significant 
behavioural changes, particularly limiting population growth and curbing humankind’s appetite for 
increasing consumption of goods and energy” (1997: 112).  This is not least because, there is 
significant evidence to suggest that the “products of eco-modernization are thoroughly polluting as 
well” (Konik 2018: 74). That is, these products, while often touted in environmental 
documentaries, such as The 11th Hour, as a magic bullet for the environmental ills of the present, 
have significant negative environmental implications of their own, which are often overlooked by 
techno-optimists. As Shanthini, among others, points out, commonly suggested alternatives to 
fossil fuels, such as solar panels and wind energy technologies, entail highly unsustainable 
manufacturing processes and depend upon toxic, rare earth minerals, respectively (2016: 6); facts 
which the speakers in the documentary remain either blind to, or worryingly silent on. 
 What emerges from the above, then, is that a strong vein of Promethean sentiment spanning 
the duration of The 11th Hour can be identified, because despite sporadic moments of critique, the 
majority of both spoken and visual elements attest to the pre-eminence of the Promethean approach 
to nature and the environmental crisis. But as will be discussed next, this also occurs in association 
with a particularly powerful orientation around Socratic withdrawal.  
 
Socratic Withdrawal in The 11th Hour 
While seeking to thematize and address the human causes of the ecological crisis, The 11th Hour 
in many ways remains ironically bound up with a limited anthropocentric viewpoint. Admittedly, 
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the film does draw the attention of audiences to the relations between large corporate interests and 
consumer-society in general – and policy-makers in particular – as problematic forces in this 
regard. But it nevertheless tends to quantify the ill-effects of these excesses largely in terms of the 
human costs they entail. And by doing so, this aspect of the film is largely informed by Socratic 
withdrawal into human society.  
 We see this foreshadowed already in the opening scenes of the film, where DiCaprio 
describes our world as “a global civilization created by the human mind” (Conners Petersen & 
Conners 2007), which resonates strongly with a Socratic philosophical outlook that seeks to 
distance itself from natural inquiries by bringing everything “back to the level of human life” 
(Hadot 2006: 91). Indeed, DiCaprio’s statements at this point effectively detract from notions of 
unity with nature, and instead serve to insulate human society within synthetic domains that are 
presided over and controlled by digitized dividuals; dividuals who are now largely unable to 
conceive of themselves as embedded in the natural world, because of their thorough imbrication 
with the digital networks of control society. To recap, as demonstrated in the preceding chapters, 
such Socratic disavowal of vain curiosity in the secrets of nature, in favour of the pursuit of human 
ethical flourishing, over time became increasingly aligned with the Promethean outlook. That is, 
in Chapter One, due consideration was given to Hadot’s description of the Socratic worldview as 
“amount[ing] to a refusal to discuss things that, on the one hand, transcend human beings, because 
they are inaccessible to their investigative powers, and, on the other hand, have no importance for 
them, since the only thing that must interest them is the conduct of moral and political life” (2006: 
91). However, as discussed in Chapter Two, this perspective became increasingly marked by the 
separatism and hierarchism of the Promethean approach, progressing from the imposition of 
religious morality in the Middle Ages, to the disciplinary imperatives of conformity and 
productivity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. An increasing separation from nature that, 
in many respects reached its apogee in the figure of the dividual in what Deleuze calls the control 
society of that late twentieth century, elaborated on in Chapter Three. In this respect, Hadot himself 
may be seen to offer a critical counterpoint to DiCaprio’s civilization of the human mind, when he 
states that today “we live in a world so completely transformed by man that we everywhere 
encounter structures of which he is the author: the use of instruments in daily life, the preparation 
of food by machines, the transformation of the countryside . . . , so that man no longer encounters 
anything but himself” (2006: 150).  
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 In this regard, the variant of Socratic withdrawal discussed in the previous chapter attains 
one of its most extreme manifestations, in a detachment from nature so profound as to support the 
denial of the severity – and in some cases, even the very existence – of the environmental crisis. 
Such denial should also not be construed as something corrected either by The 11th Hour or 
environmental film in general. This is because, while such media products may provide insights 
into the environmental crisis, which audiences receive and understand, there still exists, on the part 
of the general public, what Washington refers to as a pervasive “implicatory denial” which 
“prevents them from taking any substantive action,” even in the face of overwhelming evidence 
that such action is urgently needed (2018: 494-495). But beyond even this, a more nuanced 
manifestation of such Socratic withdrawal can be identified in The 11th Hour itself.  
 This is primarily showcased in the second segment of the film, which investigates “why 
these things are happening [in the environment,] and apportions blame in varying degrees” to 
various social, cultural and political institutions (Crust 2007: n.p). Yet this framing – while 
important for how it scrutinizes environmentally-damaging production and trade relations – largely 
neglects a more holistic approach which might otherwise take into account broader ideological 
dynamics in society that are equally problematic. That is, much as in the first section of the film, 
lofty sentiments about the interconnectedness of all life systems on earth soon give way to, and are 
essentially undermined by, considerations that are largely confined to the narrow ambit of human 
causation, human cost, and human solutions involving political and economic critique; 
considerations from which meaningful engagement with nature itself is conspicuously absent. To 
illustrate this, one only has to recall how the segment opens with narration by DiCaprio pointing 
to the jarring fact “that ecosystems that sustain life are unravelling, systems that have evolved for 
hundreds of millions of years” – a viewpoint which resonates strongly with cognizance of an all-
encompassing natural world (Conners & Conners Petersen 2007: n.p). But this is followed directly 
by a rapid succession of speakers who proceed to negate such notions point for point and in their 
entirety, and to construe the environmental crisis instead exclusively through the paradigm of 
human structures, such as economic systems, corporations, property rights, production methods, 
and constitutional concerns (Assubel; Linzey; Gelobter in Conners & Conners Petersen 2007). This 
shift in focus from nature to humanity, is also further underscored by a shift from the natural 
imagery, which accompanied DiCaprio’s narration, to that of human institutions and creations, 
such as oil rigs, protests, stock markets, and assembly lines. And this retreat – both visually and 
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thematically – from the natural world in favour of focus on insular human pursuits, resonates 
strongly with the Socratic withdrawal of the extended Hadotian framework.  
 Jerry Mander, the Director of the International Forum on Globalization, provides insights 
concerning what might underpin this rift between urbanized populations and their natural 
surroundings, as well as alluding to another key constituent of the contemporary Socratic 
withdrawal from nature, namely digitality. He states that digitized   
 
media really [are] the instrument by which knowledge is passed in our society. We 
no longer get knowledge directly from the earth. We’re no longer in touch with the 
sources of our survival. We’re no longer, for the most part, in Western, industrial 
society, growing our own food or taking care of our own sustenance or learning 
directly from our own experience … Basically we’re like an astronaut in space, we’re 
floating in a metallic, recreated universe, disconnected from sources on the earth; 
and we’re completely dependent on the information that is sent to us from very, very 
far away. (Mander in Conners and Conners Petersen 2007).  
 
The important point is the manner in which, through successive societal, political, and 
technological advances, we now exist in a state of near complete isolation from nature, to the extent 
that we can often no longer even imagine ourselves as embedded in nature. Yet through the 
persistent renderings of the environmental crisis as a human problem, the cost of which is 
calculated in terms of human suffering, and the solutions to which are thought to rest with human 
rationality, The 11th Hour does little to challenge this separation. This is not least because, as Estok 
explains, “the ethical assumptions we wittingly and unwittingly carry as we produce and consume 
environmentalist narratives are as consequential as the latent affective ethics of engagement and 
activism clearly central to such narratives” (2014: 52). Accordingly, these ideological challenges 
are further exacerbated by their digital medium which drives dynamics of further alienation and 
isolation from the world around us. In this regard, amid the proliferation of digital media in the 
contemporary era, “technologically accessible realms have been given primacy over (as more real, 
important, or simply more interesting than) the primordial world in which we are ‘bodily 
immersed’” (Hailwood 2015: 213; Abram 2007 152). And such digital embeddedness, and the 
correlative isolation from nature which it inculcates among contemporary (in)dividuals, has 
engendered new – but not necessarily effective – ways of interfacing with the natural world and 
the crisis which threatens it. Relatedly, Lambert asserts that while “the internet has allowed 
155 
 
nonprofit groups to reach more volunteers, professionals, and donors” than ever before, it has also 
facilitated the rise of “slacktivism;” a term which refers to a generally technocentric form of 
“activism which requires the least possible effort” (2005: 138), and which, formally-speaking, is 
no different from other online consumer activities, insofar as it requires only a click of the mouse. 
Thus, in terms of environmental activism specifically, these approaches do little to facilitate 
engagement between activists and the environment, and hence do little to challenge the harmful 
ideologies and concepts of difference and separation which lie at the heart of the environmental 
crisis. It is for these reasons that the activist efficacy of a digital product such as The 11th Hour, 
which appears uncritical of the challenges that accompany its own medium, remains limited. 
Indeed, some “skeptical critics … question whether a cinema wedded to the technological world 
could ever be an adequate medium for healing humanity’s alienation from nature” (Duvall 2017: 
26). And such concerns are rendered all the more valid through the closing moments of the film 
which emphatically reaffirm support for a Socratically-withdrawn, digitally-mediated activism, 
and a correspondingly distant engagement with nature, both of which have become increasingly de 
rigeur in the contemporary era. This message is presented in a paradoxical pattern at this stage of 
the film, involving an idealistic message of the need for reconnection with nature communicated 
through the very means of contemporary digital Socratic withdrawal from nature. In this final 
sequence, Peter Warshall, an ecologist for the Whole Earth Catalogue, urges viewers to re-connect 
with the natural world, by “understanding [their] passion for place … and really loving the place 
you live in.” And this message of connectivity is re-affirmed by David Suzuki, who urges an 
understanding that “all life is related to us” (Conners & Conners Petersen 2007). Yet, after a series 
of shots of natural imagery, the message of the need for unity and connection with nature is once 
more decisively undercut as the screen goes dark, before the ultimate message of the film unfurls 
against the black backdrop, and is further impressed upon the viewer by a cool, robotic female 
voice, which urges audience members to “JOIN THE MOVEMENT [at] 
11THHOURACTION.COM” (Conners and Conners Petersen 2007).  
 
Aristotelian-inspired faith in Teleology in The 11th Hour  
Closely associated with the dynamics outlined above is the postmodern incarnation of Aristotelian-
inspired faith in teleology. As discussed in Chapter Three, in the contemporary era this approach – 
through a series of successive reinterpretations – has emerged as an evangelical belief in the ends 
of the free-market economy. And related rhetoric has since the end of the Second World War, 
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progressively intensified, to the point that in the contemporary era, neoliberal or radical free-market 
capitalism has emerged as “an unchallenged ideology; nothing short of an overwhelming, mind-
controlling ethic” (Conway & Heynen 2006: 17). But such ideation has also become increasingly 
enmeshed with both Promethean and Socratic approaches, as control society knits together 
elements of continuous social control and surveillance with a coercive economic system. In relation 
to this, the industrial and digital networks that dividuals retreat into both reproduce and are 
themselves reproduced by the economic forces associated with the contemporary faith in the telos 
of the global economy. The effects of such faith in an economy geared toward unceasing growth 
in the context of a finite biosphere – which is also rapidly reaching its carrying capacity – have 
been extensively documented, and are accordingly outlined in The 11th Hour. In particular, Herman 
Daly, the former senior economist of the World Bank, explains that “as the economy grows, it 
displaces, it encroaches upon the biosphere” (Conners and Conners Petersen 2007). But despite an 
apparent understanding of this most fundamental issue, many mainstream environmentalists 
featured in the film nevertheless continue to overlook the neoliberal economy as the key driving 
force behind the environmental crisis, and instead postulate solutions to the ecological crisis 
predicated on the free-market economy as a force for positive environmental change. Arguably, 
this approach, which remains compatible with “the dominant neoliberal framing … [that] 
commodifies the environment,” and which correlatively both “fails to challenge the rampant 
consumerism of the global North, and calls for the management of nature” instead, serves only to 
exacerbate the “asymmetric power relations” from which the environmental crisis stems (Higham 
& Hopkins 2015: 285). 
 Importantly, The 11th Hour exhibits such contradictory logic on several key occasions in its 
narrative. First, on the one hand, it strongly indicts the rampant self-interest of individuals and the 
unscrupulousness of corporations, which together underpin the consumer economy responsible for 
widespread ecological decline. These views are presented primarily in the third segment of the 
film, which is comprised mainly of the discussions of various pundits concerning solutions to the 
ecological harm perpetrated by – among other things – the vast network of subsidiaries of the 
neoliberal system. However, on the other hand, and remaining true to the bait-and-switch approach, 
as it were, established in earlier parts of the film, in the final section the statements of 
environmentalists urging a more moderate and balanced approach to nature are again interspersed 
with those of economists, entrepreneurs and scientists, all of whom contrarily advance technology- 
and market-based solutions. Even though such solutions unequivocally appeal to the very corporate 
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aspirations which have, in the first place, led to the uncontrolled exploitation of the environment, 
and which are presented in the form of penalties, tax breaks or incentives. This can be seen in the 
recommendations of Michael Gelobter, who argues that:  
 
It’s important, as we make progress in the world, to have an economy that’s flexible, 
and fluid, and ready to make changes. How do we protect the atmosphere that 
belongs to all of us? Well, one of the ways we do it, is we make people who are 
polluting it start paying for that pollution through a polluter pay system. (Gelobter in 
Conners & Conners Petersen 2007) 
 
Similarly, Lester Brown maintains the following:  
 
So, we lower income taxes and raise taxes on gasoline for example, taxes on burning 
coal… [W]e’re not reducing the level of taxes. We’re reducing income tax and 
offsetting it with an increase in energy taxes, in effect a tax on fossil fuels. (Brown 
in Conners & Conners Petersen 2007) 
 
Significantly, these suggestions do not extend beyond the ambit of economic incentive or sanctions, 
with the consequence that any meaningful or critical engagement with the prevailing capitalist 
outlook of our time is thoroughly eschewed. In fact, these solutions do not move beyond the 
established infrastructure of capitalist exploitation, which prioritizes the accumulation of wealth 
over the integrity of ecosystems, as evinced by James Woolsey, who even refers to the necessary 
scope of the environmental interventions as “minimal changes in infrastructure” (Conners & 
Conners Petersen 2007). This attitude to environmental reform, showcased in the statements of 
Gelobter and Brown, is telling in that it reveals a key motivation behind the proposed changes, 
namely the uninterrupted flourishing of the neoliberal economy. As Gelobter explains, “when we 
break our addiction to fossil fuels you see a lot of money flowing to industries that, in fact, represent 
the vitality of the American economy, media, high-tech, services. Taking action on climate change 
is good for jobs, and good for the economy” (Conners & Conners Petersen 2007). This statement 
is effectively articulated around two poles: firstly, the dirty, inefficient, and expensive fossil fuel-
dependent economy, and secondly, the vital, innovative, digitized and presumably clean domain of 
renewable energy, which is advanced as the goal of the new economic landscape. Indeed, the latter 
is presented as a final end to which the economy has been moving, through a series of evolutionary 
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modifications, such that it will eventually attain its ultimate form in a boundless capitalist economy, 
which will proliferate endlessly through human ingenuity in the digital sphere. Interestingly, 
however, the utopian vision of a sustainable world sketched by Gelobter in which audiences are 
asked to have faith – despite featuring in an environmental documentary – makes no mention of 
the environment.  
 
Hippocratic Balance in The 11th Hour  
It is arguably because of the proliferation of the above polarizing viewpoints that approaches to 
nature oriented more around Hippocratic balance – and to a lesser degree, Orphism – have garnered 
widespread support, particularly within the context of the various contemporary environmental 
movements. In Chapter One, the deep connections between man and nature espoused by 
Hippocrates – to the extent that he held the belief that an imbalance in these forces could lead to 
illness – were outlined (Wallace & Gagh 2010: 787). And, as discussed, this humoral view of 
human health remained largely intact in the corpus of medical knowledge until the age of 
Enlightenment when – as discussed in Chapter Two – through the convergence of several scientific 
innovations these views were gradually superseded by modern medical knowledge. Yet, 
understandings of humanity’s inherent connection to the natural world persisted, and were 
reconceived beyond the humoral view of health. Prevalent in this regard, as pointed out, was 
Freudian psychoanalysis, which sought to reconcile or balance the troubled internal psyche with 
the external world, as well as the emergence of early manifestations of the environmental 
movement in response to the ecological and ontological effects of the rampant urban and industrial 
expansion of the day. But such calls for balance between human activity and ecological integrity 
have not only endured, but have also intensified in the present day. An important factor which 
distinguishes such approaches – namely the deep ecology, ecofeminism and social ecology, 
discussed in the previous chapter – is that they seek not only to interrogate the material 
underpinnings of the environmental crisis, but also to challenge the ideological imbalances which 
have led to this point. Lawson explains that in such movements, there exists a “commitment to 
living in harmony in both the natural and the cultural world,” and thus such movements may be 
viewed as seeking “to treat not just the symptoms but [also] the essential causes” of ecological 
decline (2015: n.p). In balance-seeking approaches such as these, the primary problems are, 
correlatively, unbalanced or immoderate relations between humans and the environs in which they 
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are understood to be embedded. Relatedly, another key aspect of the Hippocratic approach to the 
environmental crisis is the negation of the notion of human centrality. 
 Within the film, there is an identifiable vein of Hippocratic thought, espoused by 
environmentalist David Suzuki, by faithkeeper Oren Lyons, by author Andy Revkin, and indeed, 
by Leonardo DiCaprio himself, among others. That is, the idea of balance – and the consequences 
of unbalance – are charted strikingly in the opening moments of the film by Revkin, who refers to 
our fragile position of balance in relation to the necessary conditions for life on earth, as “the Goldie 
Locks effect” (Revkin in Conners & Conners Petersen 2007). In this regard, he emphasizes that we 
exist on earth as a result of a set of several key factors, including our relative position to the sun, 
and that temperature, the existence of (liquid) water on the planet, and the concentration of various 
gases in the atmosphere, are accordingly all balanced in such a way as to sustain life. This idea is 
also reiterated in the framing of our position, in relation to the environmental crisis, as that of a 
“tipping point” (Conners & Conners Petersen 2007), which reinforces the desperate need to re-
establish equilibrium between human activity and ecological capacity, before the delicate balance 
which allows for the conditions that support life are lost forever. Suzuki further alludes to the 
culpability of humanity in the creation of the environmentally-harmful discursive frameworks 
which inform contemporary societies, when he states that it is “the human mind [which] threw us 
out of balance with the rest of nature” (Conners and Conners Petersen 2007). In so doing, the 
existence of an original balance among life systems before human – and in particular, industrial – 
interventions is alluded to, and those ideologies which grant ascendency to the human mind over 
the physical world are criticized for having played a key role in causing the current state of 
disequilibrium.  
 However, although such views are represented fairly consistently across all three segments 
of the film, the viewer still does not leave the film with the impression that greater balance in our 
interactions with nature, materially and/or ideologically, are the way to environmental reform. 
Instead, these exist at best as talking points or framing devices alongside the practical technology-
driven solutions that will allow human consumerism, and the techno-industrial economy which 
sustains it, to continue unabated.  Such presentations in the film may be read as a testament to the 
degree to which “the assumptions of our culture,” particularly “the assumption that we are the 
superior lifeform on earth,” have been inculcated among the global population (Hartmann in 
Conners & Conners Petersen 2007). But while these assumptions are occasionally interrogated and 
challenged by some of the film’s contributors, it is important to note that, in terms of the 
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Hippocratic approach to nature and the related recommendations of the environmental movements 
associated with it, much of what is suggested in The 11th Hour as a means of environmental reform, 
amounts to what Naess refers to as “shallow ecology” (Naess 2005:16). As discussed in Chapter 
Three, the shallow ecological approach is one “characterized [by] exclusive concern with human 
welfare and a lack of consideration for the intrinsic value of the environment” (Shoreman-Ouimet 
& Kopnina 2016: n.p), all underpinned by a failure to challenge the Cartesian assumptions which 
inform contemporary society, and marked by a proclivity to focus instead on maintaining – and in 
some cases even augmenting – the excessively high standards of living of the neoliberal ‘want-
driven’ consumer economy.  
 It is also arguably necessary to pay significant attention to this, with a view to rendering it 
conspicuous, because there is an established precedent – as outlined above – to preface thoroughly 
Promethean solutions, such as biomimicry for instance, with words of moderation, connectedness 
and balance that are more appropriate to a Hippocratic sensibility. And where this occurs it amounts 
to an extreme misrepresentation of the Hippocratic approach and similarly oriented environmental 
movements; one which may be read, at best, as a fundamental misunderstanding of the ecocentric 
principles of such movements, and at worst, as a deliberate attempt to imbue shallow ecological 
short-term solutions with a veneer of deeper ecological credibility. One of the most striking 
manifestations of the Hippocratic approach being progressively co-opted into the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus in this way occurs in The 11th Hour via the statements of 
Betsy Taylor, the founder of the Centre for the New American Dream. She unequivocally states – 
as though making a case for Hippocratic balance – that “it is not that consumption is bad, it’s that 
it’s gotten totally out of balance” (Conners and Conners Petersen 2007). Interestingly, the 
implication here is not that systems of excess should be interrogated and dismantled as a matter of 
urgency; a viewpoint advanced by many environmentalists of the Hippocratic tradition. Rather, it 
is advanced that they only need balancing, in a manner which leaves the materially- and 
ideologically-harmful aspects of consumerism largely intact, because of the quasi-fundamentalist 
Aristotelian-inspired faith in the economic telos of the free-market economy as the only viable 
option for the future.  
 
The Orphic Approach in The 11th Hour  
Similarly disconcerting is the film’s marginalization of Orphism as an approach to nature. As 
discussed in Chapter One, the Orphic approach, named after Orpheus, the custodian of the 
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theogonic poems, seeks to penetrate “the secrets of nature, not through violence but through 
melody” (Hadot 2006: 96). And accordingly, Orphism exists as a lyrical counterpoint to the 
brutality of Prometheanism which seeks, through mechanical trickery or violent means, to unmask 
nature, insofar as the Orphic approach employs artistry as a means to understand, and thereby draw 
close to, nature. As already mentioned, the Orphic lineage can be traced through the works of a 
variety of artists, poets and composers, who have over the ages sought not to forcefully wrest the 
secrets of nature, but rather to understand its secret workings by mimicking their generative 
processes in music and discourse. Yet precisely for this reason, Orphism, as an approach to nature, 
underwent a progressive sidelining since the age of Enlightenment which, as discussed in Chapter 
Two, gave rise to the unequivocal predominance of Prometheanism to which we have been 
habituated today. Despite this, though, as discussed in Chapter Three, Orphic resonances have 
persisted in certain critical quarters up until the present. And while the advent of digital technology 
– generally associated with the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus – and its inclusion into the 
array of contemporary mass media, may constitute a threat to the Orphic, certain artists and 
filmmakers, like Rivers, and Perrin and Cluzaud have respectively, in the contemporary era 
critically appropriated these technologies to further elaborate upon the Orphic tradition. In addition, 
these critical reimaginings of the Orphic perspective are frequently coupled with the established 
digital distribution networks of control society, and thus representations of an Orphic sensibility 
are today being made more easily accessible to larger audience groupings than at any other point 
in history.  
 Yet despite these new potentialities, in The 11th Hour the Orphic approach is by far the most 
under-represented of the five approaches of the extended Hadotian framework. Indeed, over the 
course of the film, the audience is exposed to only one clear representation of this perspective, 
which comes to the viewer through Nathan Gardels, editor of New Perspectives Quarterly, who 
advances a vision of the future that is radically at odds with the rational, scientific viewpoints 
otherwise advanced over the course of the film. This is articulated along the lines of theogonic 
myth, by Gardels, for whom humanity will be subject to “the revenge of the gods, or the revenge 
of nature” for their misdeeds (Conners & Conners Petersen 2007). While sentiments of this kind 
over time have been dissolved by reason, discarded as superstition, and correlatively pushed from 
the collective consciousness, with the apparent failure of scientific thought to provide solutions to 
the environmental problems facing the globe, Gardels’ poignant recourse to the cautionary imagery 
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of myths, such as Pandora’s Box, emerge as once more compelling. He warns that, at the outset of 
industrialization,  
 
we didn’t know what we were creating, we didn’t know the damage that was being 
created. … so as we go forward with technology that’s even more powerful than 
before, we have magnified the presence of the human race inside the ecology, 
therefore we can do vastly more damage with our technological prowess than we 
could before. We have to be even more cautious. (Gardels in Conners and Conners 
Petersen 2007).  
 
In many ways, this amounts to a direct critique of the acquisitive approach of Promethean scientific 
inquiry and its pursuit of progress in the interest of achieving god-like control over existence. 
Relatedly, in his critique of Promethean methodology, Gardels evokes Greek mythology “to tell 
the story of the genealogy of the gods, and thereby give a primitive explanation of the genesis of 
things (phusis), by personifying natural phenomena” (Hadot 2006: 40). This can clearly be seen in 
his insinuation that climate change constitutes a form of retribution for our reckless treatment of 
the environment. At a more oblique Orphic level, Promethean ideological assumptions of the 
primacy of humanity over nature, are also challenged in the film by Assubel and Lyons, both of 
whom interrogate the anthropocentric motivations of shallow environmental movements through 
statements which speak strongly to a sense of religious fatalism, and a recognition of the divinity 
of nature, respectively. That is, Assubel maintains that “when we all talk about saving the 
environment, in a way it’s misstated, because the environment is going to survive, we’re the ones 
who may not survive” (Conners & Conners Petersen 2007). This idea is also reiterated in the 
closing moments of the film through Lyons, who similarly emphasizes that whether we “eradicate 
ourselves from the earth,” is quite irrelevant, because “the earth goes nowhere, in time it will 
regenerate and all the lakes will be pristine, and the rivers, the waters, the mountains, everything 
will be green again … there may not be people, but the earth will regenerate” (Conners & Conners 
Petersen 2007). These somewhat Orphic-inspired statements accordingly undermine the widely-
held Cartesian notions of human centrality and control, or custodianship, of the environment, and 
instead subscribe to an alternative, more decentralized understanding that, like every other 
organism on the planet, humans too are subject to the power of nature which remains awesome.  
 But these critical Orphic reflections of humanity’s subordinate relation to nature – much 
like their Hippocratic counterparts – are undermined in The 11th Hour through problematic methods 
163 
 
of execution and framing. In the context of the Orphic approach, this is most clearly identifiable in 
the rendering of images and lyrical descriptions of nature, in order to allow the viewer to draw 
close to it. Of course, as discussed in Chapters One and Two, such rendering of a landscape, 
whether through imagery or discourse, would previously have been considered an art form open to 
an Orphic reading, but as thematized in Chapter Three, the progressive utilization of Promethean 
technology to create such images has in certain respects problematized the process. Nevertheless, 
as also discussed artists and filmmakers – such as Rivers, Cluzaud and Perrin – have developed 
critical approaches which allow them to use such Promethean technologies of surveillance for the 
purposes of drawing close to nature aesthetically. However, despite such potential reappropriation 
of these technologies, Conners and Conners Petersen may be seen to present a product which 
largely conforms to the accepted conventions and ideological assumptions of the Promethean status 
quo. That is, The 11th Hour utilizes this technology in a manner which allows for only limited 
critical engagement with nature, through what Ebert refers to as “just standard nature photography” 
(2007: n.p). In fact, just as such technology has been used not to challenge the ideological status-
quo, but instead to exert mastery over nature, through surveillance and the act of ‘capturing’ nature 
and observing it for anthropocentric ends, so too, in The 11th Hour, this approach informs the 
methods of framing. And beyond even this, there exists an identifiable attempt on the part of the 
filmmakers to impose human knowledge systems upon nature, through the insertion of graphs, 
maps and schematics in post-production, rather than seeking to draw close to nature and to 
understand it on its own terms.  
 To elaborate, in terms of visual content, within the film, two alternate aspects of nature are 
depicted: On the one hand, we see picturesque, untouched nature and pristine landscapes populated 
by majestic wildlife. On the other hand, we see nature in the grip of the environmental crisis, 
through apocalyptic imagery of forest fires and impenetrable smog, or vast landfills and endless 
urban sprawl. And while representations of the menacing aspects of nature speak to the deep-
seated, millennia-old human fear of nature – elaborated on in Chapter One – even the idyllic 
representations of nature are somewhat problematic, as they are framed through an idealized, 
tourist’s gaze. Carville explains that,  
 
Tourism’s representations of the natural world have predominantly been articulated 
through the gaze upon the landscape. From personal snapshots to consumerist picture 
postcards, tourist representations of nature have traditionally been associated with 
visual mastery of the natural world. Here nature is framed by the ocular metaphors 
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of representation. Each tourist may bring their individual stories to the photograph’s 
representation of the landscape but such stories are embedded with the distinctive 
tropes of ‘picturesque’ and ‘picture perfect’ that assist the tourist to make sense of 
the natural world. (Carville 2003: n.p) 
 
This is very much the case in the framing of The 11th Hour, which seeks to exercise a certain 
element of mastery over the environment, particularly when combined with Promethean 
technologies which make certain images possible; for example, underwater photography and 
sweeping, aerial drone footage – both indicative of the persistent urge for unceasing, ever-closer 
surveillance of natural phenomena, that is associated with the Promethean impulse. Moreover, 
these representations further mediate a viewer’s experience of nature, rather than affecting a critical 
interaction with it or fostering any sense of engagement with it; because this is evinced in how the 
vantage of the tourist informs the angles of, for example, sweeping shots of mist-shrouded 
mountains and idyllic, untouched beaches. 
 
Conclusion 
In many ways, The 11th Hour thus reflects on-screen an array of disconcerting ideological 
tendencies unfolding off-screen, which can be outlined in relation to the extended Hadotian 
framework; that is, the gradual encroachment of aspects of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian 
nexus upon Hippocratic and Orphic perspectives – perspectives that in the past constituted 
alternative voices against such hegemony. Moreover, the gradual appropriation of activism as a 
means of promoting and normatizing an environmentally-harmful economic and cultural ethos, as 
signaled by the progressive marginalization and manipulation of alternative voices within The 11th 
Hour, is worrying. As will be discussed, this is especially because mainstream audiences look 
increasingly to products of this sort as a basis for understanding the environment and their relation 
to it, and because the growing dominance of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus is 
intensified significantly in DiCaprio’s second film, Before the Flood (2016).  
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Chapter 5: DiCaprio’s Before the Flood (2016) through the Lens of the Extended Hadotian 
Framework  
 
Introduction 
The term Anthropocene, coined and popularized by Nobel laureate and scientist Paul Crutzen at 
the dawn of the twenty-first century, denotes “a new geological epoch characterized by the 
dominant impact of humans on the global environment,” and it is marked “by rapid population 
increase, urbanization, increasing consumption of fossil fuels, deforestation, pollution, habitat 
change and global warming” (Whyte 2013: 36). Such changes, as extensively explored over the 
course of the preceding four chapters, have been concomitant with environmental exploitation and 
eventual degradation arising from the predominance of a neoliberal ‘want economy,’ characterized 
by increasing cycles of hyper-production, hyper-consumption, and the engineered obsolescence of 
consumer products. These systems and practices, as well as the ideology of human exceptionalism 
which facilitates and entrenches them, have also to a large degree become normatized within 
popular consciousness. Indeed, there is now widespread consensus that “the autonomous, self-
sufficient, rational human subject … begins and ends with itself,” and that “nature has been 
domesticated, technologized and capitalized to the extent that it can no longer be considered 
‘natural’” (Küpers & Gunnlaugson 2017 n.p).  
 Arguably, DiCaprio’s environmental films – both The 11th Hour and Before the Flood – are 
not only reflections of this context, but also representative of the progressive escalation of the above 
tendencies. As discussed in the previous chapter, the reflection of this context in The 11th Hour 
becomes apparent when the film is viewed through the lens of the extended Hadotian framework, 
particularly in relation to the increasing predominance of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian 
nexus and its associated perspectives, and the correlative marginalization, and at times cooptation, 
of the less invasive alternative Hippocratic and Orphic approaches to nature. In this regard, and 
working with the understanding that the mass media is a complex tool that not only reflects the 
ideological landscape which we occupy, but also “structures reality for us” through how it “shapes 
and frames a world for us to inhabit and accept as real and legitimated” (Negrine 1994: 89), the 
enshrining of such imbalanced approaches to nature within popular consciousness via such mass 
media means is a matter of great concern. And this is all the more so because the progressive 
escalation of these tendencies can be identified in DiCaprio’s second environmental film Before 
the Flood (2016) – a development which also reflects the steady advancement of 
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Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian perspectives within society as a whole, in the intervening decade 
between the release of the two films.  
 With a view to exploring this issue, in what follows, after a brief synopsis of the film, its 
representation of the five approaches to nature of the extended Hadotian framework – namely 
Prometheanism, Socratic withdrawal, Aristotelian-inspired faith in teleology, Hippocratic balance 
and Orphism – will be considered. Such an analysis will be carried out to render conspicuous the 
continuation, and indeed the acceleration, of the dynamics explored in the previous chapter, namely 
the emphasis on the approaches of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus characterized by 
scientism, dualistic thinking and endeavors to master the natural world, along with the 
simultaneous marginalization and/ or excision of the Hippocratic and Orphic approaches to nature 
of balance and artistry, respectively. Moreover, beyond such treatment of the latter two ecocentric 
approaches, it will be advanced that Hippocratic balance and Orphism are also, at time, in the film 
infused with and thereby co-opted by the logic of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, to 
such an extent that their alternative critical voices in Before the Flood largely are silenced.  
 
DiCaprio’s Before the Flood (2016) through the Lens of the Extended Hadotian Framework 
Presented by National Geographic, and directed by Fisher Stevens, DiCaprio’s second 
environmental film, Before the Flood, is billed as a search “for hope in a rising tide of catastrophic 
news” (Beforetheflood.com 2018: n.p). The production of the film, which ultimately spanned two 
years, began in 2014 after DiCaprio’s nomination as a United Nations Messenger of Peace. 
Accordingly, the film follows him as he traverses a wide array of locations in a bid to showcase 
both environmentally-harmful practices and the locales where their effects are being sorely felt, 
while at the same time exploring an array of possible solutions to the problems of climate change. 
In so doing, the film tackles a similarly broad variety of environmental issues as The 11th Hour – 
such as deforestation, carbon-dioxide emissions, green energy, habitat depletion, commercial 
agriculture and resource extraction – in ways that are similarly oriented around the central 
lynchpins of fossil fuel dependency, climate change, and a lack of will to transform on the part of 
politicians, corporations, and the voting public.   
 However, Before the Flood also boasts a more solutions-oriented approach to these issues, 
espousing as it does both simple strategies which can be easily applied in viewers’ everyday lives 
– such as conscious consumerism and changes to one’s diet – along with the need for focused, 
over-arching political action. The film is thus decidedly more political in orientation than The 11th 
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Hour, not least because of how it identifies and interrogates malign political and corporate 
assemblages as stumbling blocks to environmental change, and correlatively urges viewers to use 
their vote to ensure the development of more sound environmental policies, to hold elected officials 
to account, and to spur on the development and adoption of green technology.  
 Structurally-speaking, the film also departs from the rigid talking head format utilized in 
The 11th Hour, insofar as it follows DiCaprio’s trek across the globe, as he consults with a number 
of scientists and politicians in order to uncover “the truth about the threat of climate change” 
(Beforetheflood.com 2018: n.p). In this regard, the format of Before the Flood varies considerably; 
it incorporates the traditional expository mode to disseminate facts and figures, as well as other 
scientific information, on the political and environmental topics outlined above, but it also 
supplements these explanations with both visual material and graphic representations. In particular, 
although the film incorporates elements which are reliant on dialogue and interviews – through 
which prominent figures espouse their views – notably, these deviate substantially from the static 
talking head shots used in The 11th Hour, in that they are more dynamic, often being filmed on 
location, and involving a degree of interaction between DiCaprio and the respective speakers, both 
with each other and with the subject matter at hand (Auld 2016: n.p). Moreover, unlike The 11th 
Hour, Before the Flood incorporates strong biographical elements, insofar as DiCaprio discusses 
his childhood, his own shifting attitudes toward the environmental crisis, and his growing activism. 
Interestingly, a significant part of this biographical element also focusses on DiCaprio’s concurrent 
involvement in the production of Alejandro González Iñárritu’s The Revenant (2015), which 
DiCaprio maintains thematizes “man’s struggle with the elements,” and which thus provides an 
intriguingly contradictory foil for an environmental documentary (DiCaprio in Stevens 2016).  
 The film opens with a contemplation by DiCaprio of Hieronymus Bosch’s painting The 
Garden of Earthly Delights, which he appropriates as a metaphor for the current self-destructive 
trajectory of human excess and environmental harm. In terms of this, he describes each panel as 
reflecting a distinct period in human relations with nature, ultimately concluding that if there is no 
immediate remedial action in this regard, the outcome will be a “twisted, burned, decayed 
landscape” in which incredible suffering is inevitable (DiCaprio in Stevens 2016). Indeed, as if by 
way of demonstration, the film itself at this point shifts away from the dreamlike quality of Bosch’s 
work toward a series of rapid cuts between various real-world scenes of environmental degradation 
and disasters, before returning to DiCaprio as he prepares to deliver his address on climate change 
to the United Nations assembly. In what follows, DiCaprio goes on to consult with a number of 
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figures from scientists and politicians to environmentalists across the globe, each of whom observe 
and remark upon the effects of climate change, and possible solutions thereto.   
 However, while Before the Flood differs considerably from its predecessor, The 11th Hour, 
both in form and content, as will be discussed, it also retains a similar ideological orientation, on 
account of its advancement of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian approaches to nature identified 
and discussed in the foregoing chapters, and its correlative marginalization of Hippocratic and 
Orphic voices.   
 
Promethean Sensibility in Before the Flood  
With regard to reflections of the Promethean sensibility within the film, as mentioned above, Before 
the Flood retains and advances many of the tropes identified in The 11th Hour. These are the 
marginalization of alternative ecocentric voices, the broad and reductive articulation and 
schematization of nature in terms of human techno-scientific rhetoric, a failure to interrogate the 
ontological dualism which has historically separated humanity from nature, the continued framing 
of nature as a threatening ‘other,’ and the proselytization of science-based ‘solutions’ to 
environmental issues – notwithstanding how these solutions serve to further cement the mastery of 
nature by logic. To be sure, the broader milieu of Promethean practices, particularly those 
associated with invasive resource extraction and the unbridled pursuit of profit, are superficially 
criticized in the film, but these criticisms accordingly sit uneasily alongside the deep and implicit 
ideological prejudice which has allowed for these developments in the first place, and which in 
nuanced ways the film perpetuates.  
 Admittedly, Before the Flood opens with what appears to be emphasis on an Orphic 
outlook, involving an analysis of humans’ relation to nature through the medium of Bosch’s The 
Garden of Earthly Delights. However, in a move which establishes a pattern that then carries 
through the rest of the film – and which, for that matter, can be viewed as a carry-over from The 
11th Hour – any insight derived from this appraisal is swiftly undermined as the film cuts to more 
Promethean orientations. In this way, the insights derived from Bosch’s painting are effectively 
invalidated by the litany of scientific facts and figures which follow, in a manner which implicitly 
categorizes the Orphic approach as useful or appropriate only insofar as its perspectives can be 
corroborated by scientific findings.56 Moreover, a similar strategy is applied to DiCaprio’s own 
                                                          
56 This technique and how it is allowed to take root and have profound effects on the Orphic approach as it is presented 
in Before the Flood, will also be discussed at length later in the chapter. 
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environmental credentials. Early in the film, a montage is presented of news excerpts and snippets 
of talk shows in which a range of critics remark disparagingly on DiCaprio’s environmental 
activism credentials. One such critic even refers to DiCaprio as “an actor from Hollywood with 
zero years of scientific training” (Stevens 2016), inferring both the primacy of the scientific voice 
within contemporary environmentalism, as well as a distrust, skepticism, and even open scorn for 
alternative voices, particularly those not endorsed by scientific credentials. Admittedly, within the 
context of the film, this montage is presented for the purpose of demonstrating the narrow-
mindedness of climate change deniers, but it remains telling of the manner in which it 
communicates that only a grounding in science functions as a stamp of approval within the popular 
consciousness, because of how science today is seen as the arbiter of truth, to the point where, 
ultimately, “it is science which … define[s] what is real and what is not” (Luntley 1995: 46).  
 This Promethean perspective is further underlined by the type of experts consulted. 
According to the film’s website, Before the Flood boasts interviews with “the world’s top climate 
scientists, energy experts, government leaders, and visionary entrepreneurs” (Beforetheflood.com 
2018: n.p). Thus, what is particularly noteworthy about this line-up, is the apparent dearth of 
environmentalists espousing alternative views which seek to relate to nature qua nature; that is, as 
an entity worthy of consideration and preservation in and of itself. Indeed, of the twenty key 
contributors listed on Beforetheflood.com, no less than fifteen have careers in science, politics, 
economics and business, while there are only five environmental activists listed. This composition 
is also reminiscent of the selection of sources for The 11th Hour. According to the film’s website, 
fifty-five contributors, spanning an impressive array of disciplines, were interviewed in the film 
(11thhourfilm.com 2018: n.p). But in this selection, there was a similar marked predilection for 
sources with backgrounds in science, technology, economics, politics and business, and a 
corresponding lack of recourse to environmentalists – with only around a quarter of the sources  
interviewed engaged in environmental activism as their primary occupation. Nevertheless, when 
these numbers are compared, what emerges is that in The 11th Hour’s line-up of contributors there 
is at least a greater diversity of voices, with the inclusion of environmentalists, authors, educators, 
journalists, religious leaders, and academics, alongside the range of scientists, engineers, 
economists, politicians and entrepreneurs. Conversely, in Before the Flood, there is an 
overwhelmingly unified thrust toward interviewing sources from fields associated with the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus. Such sources, Dearing and Rogers suggest, may be 
viewed as “issue proponents,” who are introduced “for the purpose of pushing a cause, [or] 
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promoting a vision or value system” (1996: 25). And the effect of such a prioritization of particular 
sources, is accordingly the inflection of any discussion pertaining to the environment around the 
tenets of the discourses of science and rationality, which implicitly reinforces the dualisms that the 
related Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian approach entails. This may be discerned within the film 
in the manner in which nature is framed primarily in terms of human utility, with the ecological 
crisis discussed as a threat to human survival and lifestyles, so that “programmatic proposals to 
master nature … are entertained as solutions to the ecological crisis” (Tostevin 2010: 1).  
 Indeed, representations of nature as existing for the sake of human utility are found 
throughout the film, much as they were in The 11th Hour. These mainly consist of references to 
nature as fulfilling a mechanical function of some kind, which constitutes a flagrant reduction of 
vast, varied and unfathomably complex lifesystems to that of a simplistic, one-dimensional process. 
An early example of this treatment of nature occurs through National Geographic explorer-in-
residence Dr Enric Sala’s reduction of the pivotal role of arctic sea ice in regulating temperatures 
and sea levels across the globe, to “the air conditioning for the Northern Hemisphere” (Stevens 
2016). Such references are also commonplace throughout the film, with the various processes of 
nature being described in similarly reductive ways, through being articulated in terms of nature’s 
utility for humans. For example, such as the ocean’s immense ability to regulate C02 levels in the 
atmosphere as merely “doing its job” (Jackson in Stevens 2016), and the rainforests’ capacity to 
fix carbon emissions are described in terms of it “keeping it safe for us” (Allen in Stevens 2016).  
 These discursive patterns are also graphically represented in a manner which recalls the 
schematic devices utilized in The 11th Hour, that were discussed in the previous chapter. Much like 
the rhetorical reductions above, these images reiterate a simplified image of nature and its 
processes; an image which can be readily observed and understood by humanity, but one which 
overlooks the complexity and interconnectedness of the various phenomena depicted. For example, 
complex climatic phenomena are depicted in the form of arrows and orbs, as can be seen in 
DiCaprio’s retelling of Al Gore’s explanation of global warming, which in Before the Flood is 
represented through a simple graphic rendering of the globe with a circle drawn around it to 
represent the atmosphere. Such representations serve not only to render these complex dynamics 
easily understandable to audiences, who of course cannot be presumed to have extensive scientific 
knowledge. But they also serve a deeper, ideological purpose, because these man-made, reductive 
renderings of nature effectively impose a degree of order – albeit illusory – upon massive and 
threatening natural events, which to this day remain unpredictable in their scope, intensity and 
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speed of onset, despite intensive scientific research. The parallels between this dynamic and the 
fear which gave birth to the Olympian deities discussed in Chapter One, can scarcely be missed. 
 Indeed, notwithstanding attempts, such as those discussed above, to schematize nature and 
render its processes open to human understanding and thus mastery, nature’s continued 
unintelligibility –  or propensity “to hide” as Heraclitus would have it (Hadot 2006: 1) – has led it 
to become increasingly represented as the threatening ‘other’ to human civilization. Such 
delineations may be seen to serve two purposes: firstly, to perpetuate longstanding myths of 
dualism which pits nature against humans; and secondly, to rationalize the ongoing quest for the 
domination of nature by humans. Such representations, thus entail a profound paradox. On the one 
hand, the environmental crisis is framed as the inevitable result of sweeping human interventions 
in intricately balanced lifesystems, whereby human activity constitutes the primary threat to the 
environment. But on the other hand, the fallout of the environmental crisis, such as floods, 
droughts, storms, wildfires and the like, are nevertheless framed as an unpredictable and capricious 
threat to human life, which requires further sweeping human interventions. Moreover, while both 
perspectives are represented, the latter receives significantly more attention, so that it is nature’s 
threat to humanity which is acted upon, rather than our threat to nature. This can be seen both in 
the film’s overt references to nature as posing a threat to human security, wellbeing and survival, 
as well as in the solutions that are put forward to ameliorate such threats, as these solutions are 
which are notably oriented around an intensification of human activities, rather than around any 
less invasive approach to the environment.  
 With regard to the former, and in a manner which recalls the statements in The 11th Hour 
of Peter Demenocal and James Woolsey outlined in Chapter Four, nature and the effects of climate 
change are referred to by then-president Barrack Obama as “a national security issue … not just an 
environmental issue,” because of how they are appraised through the lens of human migration and 
competition over scarce resources (Stevens 2016). This clearly suggests a prioritization of potential 
human suffering over the massive damage which is actually being inflicted by humans on the 
environment on an ongoing basis. Indeed, even Obama’s appeal to the majesty and beauty of nature 
is mediated through anthropocentric concerns, when he laments the possibility that his daughters 
may “never see a glacier” (Stevens 2016). Relatedly, the solutions proffered by Obama and many 
of the other experts consulted, not only place a similar emphasis on an escalation of human 
activities and interventions in nature, with the primary focus falling on scientific- or technology-
based solutions. In addition, they also evince a marked reluctance to engage with the ideological 
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edifice of human separatism or exceptionalism, which has allowed for the systematic plundering 
and destruction of ecosystems since the Industrial Revolution. In particular, Obama’s solutions 
remain confined to what can be achieved through the application of contemporary technological 
capabilities, when he suggests that we “apply existing technology to reduce carbon emissions, and 
then, start slowly turning up the dials as new technologies come online so that we have more and 
more ambitious targets each year” (Obama in Stevens 2016). Yet such approaches, which 
completely bypass the possibility of simply reducing consumption by living lives which are more 
balanced and attuned to nature, are not the exclusive preserve of Obama, but are rather put forward 
by numerous contributors. In this regard, they are perhaps best represented by the sentiments of 
Elon Musk, founder and CEO of both Space-X and Tesla Motors.57  Amid a futuristic scene of 
gleaming surfaces, banks of computers, and whirring robotic arms, Musk elaborates on his vision 
of a “sustainable energy future” that is reliant on what he calls “gigafactories,” which will produce 
the batteries that store power and drive high-tech green technologies, such as the Tesla electric 
cars, as well as ultimately accelerating “the world’s transition to sustainable energy through 
increasingly affordable electric vehicles and energy products” (Tesla.com 2018: n.p). A transition 
which, accordingly will render society’s current reliance on ‘dirty’ traditional fuel sources, such as 
coal and petroleum, redundant. For Musk, the development of these capacities will negate the need 
for the building of resource-intensive infrastructures, such as power stations and electricity grids, 
and see these replaced with solar arrays and battery packs. And he maintains that this will be 
instrumental not only in curbing harmful emissions and related environmental ills, but also in 
connecting the developing world to essential amenities and services, which have hitherto been ruled 
out due to the high cost and infrastructural requirements of traditional electricity systems. 
Moreover, Musk argues that the attainment of these ambitious goals is “manageable,” as they 
necessitate only the construction of 100 gigfafactories for a worldwide conversion from fossil fuels 
to renewables; an initiative which will effectively dissolve the current environmental crisis (Musk 
in Stevens 2016).  
                                                          
57 Such engagements on the part of Musk may be seen as largely representative of the salient tensions and 
contradictions which exist at the heart of many environmental pioneer projects today. On the one hand, SpaceX, 
“Musk’s private aeronautics company,” along with deep-space exploration, seeks to fulfil Musk’s “ultimate goal of 
colonizing Mars” (Yuhas 2018: n.p). But on the other hand, such Promethean ambition sits incongruously alongside 
Musk’s Tesla company, which engineers and manufactures “electric vehicles, battery products and solar roofs” in a 
bid to reduce, and ultimately end, the fossil fuel dependence responsible for the current sweeping destruction of 
ecosystems across the world (Tesla.com 2018: n.p). Musk’s viral launch into space of a Tesla Roadster aboard 
SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy rocket in February 2018 thus serves as a potent metaphor for the manner in which an impulse 
to stem environmental degradation has become wrapped up in Promethean discourses and practices.  
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 However, this kind of techno-cornucopianism and the related notions of ‘sustainability’ 
may be problematized for a number of reasons. To begin with, such notions of sustainability, as 
already discussed and problematized in the previous chapter, tend to view human activities, 
lifestyles, and economic development as worth sustaining, and thus result in few environmental 
changes that have substantive effects for the environment itself. In this regard, “the United Nations 
World Commission on Environment and Development offered the common definition of 
sustainable development in 1987: ‘Sustainable development is development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’” 
(Özdemirci 2016: 2). Accordingly, such definitions are telling on account of the deeply ingrained 
notions of anthropocentricism which underpin them, and which reveal the idea of sustainability 
and, even more so, sustainable development, as little more than “an oxymoron without substance” 
(Manahan 1997: 112); one which communicates no genuine concern for the environment, because 
of how it is seen as little more than a source of human utility (Luke 2015: 333; Sachs 2008:17). 
 But beyond this – as also discussed in the previous chapter – many of the components 
utilized in the fabrication of these so-called green technologies are in and of themselves very 
environmentally damaging, because they rely on toxic compounds and rare earth minerals 
(Shanthini 2016: 6). Moreover, while emissions released in the extraction and burning of fossil 
fuels in transport and other applications undeniably account for a large portion of humanity’s 
ecological footprint, Musk’s approach does not address the myriad of other environmentally-
harmful practices which have been normatized within society, such as rampant consumerism, 
large-scale commercial agriculture, and the irresponsible disposal of domestic and industrial waste 
products, to name just a few.  
 Yet it is possible that these adjacent abuses of the environment escape scrutiny because, in 
establishing as Musk does a simple point-by-point plan to eradicate fossil fuel use, in order to 
mitigate the future potential of human suffering entailed by the environmental crisis, he – along 
with many other pioneering techno-environmentalists – neglect to address the ideological root of 
these practices. For Schultz, this root involves a combination of notions of human superiority and 
exceptionalism, which underpin the widespread belief that “humans are in charge of what happens 
to the environment … [and] that our agency is the only agency humans need to consider,” not least 
because “humans are not a part of nature” (2014: 2-3); an assumption that has moreover legitimated 
the large-scale exploitation of nature. Correlatively, any supposed solutions to the environmental 
crisis which do not challenge these assumptions are bound to reproduce the same relations of 
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human dominance/environmental subservience that underpin the economic, political and socio-
cultural organizations of contemporary society. Furthermore, any such solutions stand to be bound 
by their reliance not only on human ingenuity, but also on the neoliberal industrial complex for 
both production and distribution. In turn, such a set of relations, it could be argued, is reliant on, 
and thus promotes, the most environmentally-damaging aspects of human-centered ideology and 
activity, namely human exceptionalism, fierce competition, invasive scientific inquiry, and 
escalated cycles of production, consumption and, ultimately, disposal. It may therefore be 
concluded that solutions which focalize the Promethean praxis of science and technology acted out 
upon nature – as opposed to being couched in viewpoints which seek to reconcile and balance with 
nature – remain inherently problematic, insofar as “modern technology dramatically accelerates 
our conflict with the ecosystem because of its nature” [emphasis added] (Schultz 2014: xiv).  
 
Socratic Withdrawal in Before the Flood  
In Before the Flood, contemporary manifestations of Socratic withdrawal can be identified in its 
representations of the tendencies to retreat from nature, and/or to address nature indirectly through 
various human endeavors from within the city walls. In this respect, such approaches to the 
environment emerge, firstly, through the film’s focus on the  humanist arena of politics; secondly, 
through the manner in which environmental concerns are articulated along the lines of human 
security and health, rather than in terms of any genuine concern for the environment itself; and 
thirdly, through how the continued retreat into the Anthropocene manifests via a series of mediated 
human interactions with the environment, from laboratories, offices, and amphitheaters, to digital 
media platforms, all of which result in a view of nature increasingly removed from nature itself.  
 In this regard, the very premise of the film is informed by the first of these, namely the 
humanist arena of politics, in that the key narrative driving force of Before the Flood is DiCaprio’s 
“journey as a United Nations Messenger of Peace” (Beforetheflood.com 2018: n.p). Thus, the film 
not only features influential politicians in its line-up of contributors, but also seeks to enlighten 
audience members about environmentally-damaging relationships between politicians, industry, 
and lobby groups, as well as emphasizing the audiences’ own political agency – which requires 
them to address environmental issues within the humanist arena of politics. Such an approach, as 
charted over the course of the preceding chapters, has its roots with Socrates, for whom the secrets 
of nature were “inaccessible to [human] investigative powers,” such that one would be better served 
to concern themselves instead with “the conduct of moral and political life” (Hadot 2006: 91). Over 
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time, though, this withdrawal became progressively more anthropocentric, involving as it did a 
forgetting of Socrates’ primary recognition of the transcendence of nature, particularly as people 
increasingly isolated themselves from nature within cities, and turned increasingly inward around 
human concerns: from the Christian religion discussed in Chapter One, through the disciplinary 
emphasis on efficiency, productivity and individualism discussed in Chapter Two, to the neoliberal 
digital dividualism of control society discussed in Chapter Three, in terms of which the present 
dividual is often no longer able to conceive of themselves as part of nature. In many respects, the 
material conditions of contemporary life have, of course, created a context which intensifies such 
tendencies to withdraw. Selhub and Logan explain that “in developed nations, the threat of wildlife 
in daily life has now been minimized, contact with animals used for nourishment is basically 
nonexistent, and with the advent of the produce section and bottled water aisle in the supermarket,” 
there is no longer a need to engage with nature in any meaningful manner, which amounts to what 
they refer to as a “broad withdrawal from nature” (2012: n.p).  
 The effects of such dynamics may be readily witnessed within Before the Flood, most 
notably through how the content of the film itself entails a withdrawal from nature. As mentioned 
above, there is a marked tendency, across both The 11th Hour and Before the Flood, to approach 
nature and the issues of climate change through human concerns, such as politics, health, and 
technology. Yet the influence of politics, both domestic and international, feature more heavily in 
Before the Flood than in its cinematic precursor. That is, while in The 11th Hour, a relatively small 
section of the narrative was dedicated to discussion of environmentally-damaging political 
alliances and the agency of voters, in Before the Flood, this theme is explored at far greater length. 
In the early moments of the film, after DiCaprio’s appraisal of Bosch’s The Garden of Earthly 
Delights, there occurs a dramatic sequence of images of buildings destroyed by natural disasters, 
smokestacks, gathering storm clouds, floods, and fires, while equally dramatic music crescendos 
over snippets of radio reports on these dire events. Then, suddenly, the music stops, and the 
audience is transported to the calm and order of the UN General Assembly. Arguably, such a 
juxtaposition serves to highlight the binary of natural irrationality and human rationality, implying 
that through political activities – such as assemblies, debates and addresses – the former can be 
overcome by the latter. Indeed, this idea is subsequently explored further when DiCaprio meets 
with Miami Beach mayor, Philip Levine, to discuss responses to climate change and its effect on 
cities. Of all the states in the US “that are susceptible to sea level rise, Florida is the key one” 
(DiCaprio in Stevens 2016), and Miami Beach has been particularly affected in this regard, through 
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a phenomenon known as “sunny day flooding,” which occurs as “the sea level rises, [and] the 
waters coming up, backflowing into [the] streets through [the] drains” (Levine in Stevens 2016), 
effectively flooding the city. Yet while Levine is considered particularly proactive and responsive 
to this phenomenon when compared with his colleagues,58 his solutions nevertheless remain largely 
informed by Socratic withdrawal from nature. That is, Levine’s solutions to rising sea levels and 
associated phenomena, such as sunny day flooding, entail a combination of economic and 
engineering interventions. By raising taxes, Levine was able to fund a $400 million infrastructure 
development in Miami Beach, which consisted mainly of the installation of electric seawater pumps 
and the raising of roads, to mitigate the worst effects of sea level rise in the city. The effect of this 
has been the creation of a window period during which life in Miami Beach can continue as before 
– as though no climate change exists. Yet, this initiative remains hamstrung not only by its 
transitory nature – with Levine optimistically estimating the efficacy of these measures to extend 
for only forty to fifty years (Stevens 2016) – but also by its notable lack of engagement with nature. 
That is, such solutions are oriented toward Socratic withdrawal from nature, insofar as they involve 
only the creation of a fragile and ultimately limited bubble within which human commercial life is 
granted a respite from nature’s encroachment.59 
 The above approach and policies of Philip Levine also serve as a blueprint for much of the 
proactive political response to the global environmental crisis featured in the film (as opposed to 
those politicians who remain intent on denying climate change). Accordingly, through the 
responses of Levine and the other politicians showcased in the film, there exists a marked 
propensity to act against the effects of global warming, and a correlative reluctance to interrogate 
its causes, both material and ideological. While suggestions concerning the reconfiguration of 
cities, the implementation of carbon taxes, and recourse to green technologies abound, silence 
hangs over topics like a reduction in consumption, and a respect for nature as an integral lifesystem 
                                                          
58 Levine makes mention here of Rick Scott and Marco Rubio, respectively, the Governor and the Senator of the state 
of Florida. Both are known climate change deniers, with Scott even going so far as banning the use of the term ‘climate 
change’ by officials in Florida (Stevens 2016). Moreover, this is not an attitude which is unique to Florida’s cabinet, 
but rather one which manifests to varying degrees in states across the US, to the level of then-presidential candidate, 
Donald Trump, who flippantly remarks: “Where is [global warming]? We need some global warming. It’s freezing!” 
A statement to which audiences responded with loud laughs and cheers as they effectively dismissed climate change 
as a serious concern (Stevens 2016).  
59 This moreover remains true into the present, with Levine currently running for the position of Governor of the state 
of Florida. His campaign webpage (Philiplevine2018.com) cites the environment as the first of his thirteen campaign 
priorities. However, similar to his approach during his tenure as Miami Beach mayor, the problems identified and the 
solutions offered are largely articulated through an anthropocentric perspective, which does little to challenge 
prevailing ideologies surrounding human relations to nature. Levine’s current campaign likewise focalizes issues 
which threaten human infrastructure or industries, such as tourism, and he in turn emphasizes solutions which 
ameliorate the effects of climate change, rather than seeking to address its causes (Philiplevine2018.com 2018: n.p). 
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rather than a mere resource. In this regard, a common thread can moreover be identified not only 
among the featured politicians’ ideas, but also on the part of the filmmakers too, namely a desire 
to safeguard human civilization as it currently exists, through insulating infrastructures and 
compensatory politico-economic initiatives, from the worst excesses of the environmental crisis. 
In short, these responses signify the fortification of city limits – both literal and figurative – against 
the incursions of nature, so that human activity can continue as before.  
 By way of corollary, the apparent key to an environmental event or concern being classified 
as an issue worthy of interest or consideration, is its propensity to threaten or disrupt human ways 
of life, as can be seen in DiCaprio’s trip to Beijing. Here, Ma Jun, the founding director of the 
Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, explains that the massive industrial boom 
experienced in China over recent decades, has led to it “[surpassing] the United States as the 
world’s number one polluter” (DiCaprio in Stevens 2016). However, residents of large cities, such 
as Beijing, have in recent years increasingly borne the brunt of such developments. Yet Jun goes 
on to explain that because of the direct effects on individual’s health in these urban locales, there 
has been a growing environmental consciousness, and he states that now “in China, people have 
concerns about climate change, but first and foremost because their everyday life is affected” (Jun 
in Stevens 2016). But in many ways this applies equally to many of the issues broached across the 
film, with environmental issues explored only if they pose a threat to national security, human 
habitats, food and water supply, or the capacity to accumulate profit. For this reason, we see 
concerns such as sea level rise, droughts, floods and C02 emissions covered in great length, depth 
and detail, while other environmental issues which do not directly threaten human health and ways 
of life – such as the mass extinction of species and the resultant loss of biodiversity and habitat, 
including forests and coral reefs – are mentioned only in passing, if at all.  
 Furthermore, in relation to Socratic withdrawal from nature, we see through the comments 
of Jun, a continuation of the dynamic of retreat, not only into human spaces and endeavors, but 
also into the digitality discussed at length in Chapter Three. That is, in relation to The 11th Hour, 
questions surrounding interactions with nature in an increasingly digitized world, along with the 
relatively new development of environmental engagement and activism through online platforms, 
were explored. And in Before the Flood we see a continuation of these themes, especially through 
Jun’s development of a digital map that details the nearly 9000 major factories in China and both 
their emissions and their compliance with environmental standards. According to Jun, this gives 
people the ability to “check this on their cellphones and push for polluting factories to address their 
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violations” (Stevens 2016). Furthermore, Jun asserts that these digital innovations, coupled with a 
thematization of environmental concerns in the mass media, has precipitated “popular support 
[which has] helped motivate China’s policy of green growth” (Stevens 2016). Interestingly, as Jun 
elaborates on this, the camera cuts from the interview to the Chinese People’s Congress, where 
applause and handshakes apparently greet the new environmental policy and its exponents. In this 
sequence though we see the emergence of a new form of environmentalism, one which operates 
online and within closed rooms, in a process where even the most progressive policies are written, 
signed, and enacted completely within the realm of human civilization, rather than in relation to 
engagement with the natural world beyond the confines of the city. 
 Moreover, such tendencies are also identifiable in the visual construction of Before the 
Flood. As an environmental film, particularly one which boasts a trans-continental journey to 
diverse environs, audience members could be forgiven for expecting to be presented with some 
form of engagement with – or at least visuals of – such environments. However, this is not the case 
in Before the Flood, because in contrast to its predecessor the film opens not with sweeping visuals 
of untouched rainforests, savannahs, and mist-shrouded mountains, but rather with an appraisal of 
an artwork, an account of DiCaprio’s early life, and proceedings at the UN assembly, all of which 
signify a further retreat from nature into the realm of human endeavor. Again, relatively early in 
the film, the audience is taken with DiCaprio to the arctic to consult with National Geographic 
explorer-in-residence, Enric Sala, on the worrying rate at which polar ice is melting. However, 
once more, in this exchange the impacts of this phenomenon on humans are emphasized, after 
which the film is largely constituted of interviews conducted in city streets, offices, factories, 
farmland, and neatly manicured gardens. In fact, even when DiCaprio finds himself beyond the 
limits of the urban world, these environs are explored largely in terms of their value to humans as 
living spaces or farmland, as seen on location in Kiribati and India, respectively. In contrast, the 
first example of a natural space explored as a lifesystem in its own right – and hence not merely in 
terms of its value to human utility – only occurs a staggering forty-three minutes into the film, in 
marine ecologist Jeremy Jackson’s exploration of dying coral reefs, and the corresponding decline 
of biodiversity in these areas.  
 It is important to note the above, because in many ways, such compositions set the tone for 
the future engagement between audience members and environmental concerns that is facilitated 
by Before the Flood. According to Meldrum and his colleagues, “visual presentations” that 
encourage “a sense of global responsibility” through depictions of “both natural and human impact 
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stories … associated with both individual and communal suffering,” nevertheless often fail to 
“generate momentum for public action” (2018: 300). In Before the Flood, visual presentations such 
as these are evident but are largely overshadowed by interviews, news clips, and images of political 
proceedings; while even when they are the main focus of the narrative they often emphasize human 
impact over environmental impact. Arguably, such omissions and/or weighting of visuals indicate 
a reluctance to address those criticisms of The 11th Hour outlined in the previous chapter, namely 
its failure to engage audiences partly because of its heavy reliance on talking head shots, and partly 
because of its lack of critical engagement with the shortcomings and potentials of the medium of 
documentary film. Moreover, such implicit negation of nature, in a film which is billed as an 
environmental documentary, is indicative of the extent to which the environment has been removed 
from environmentalism. And the result of this is a view of nature which is largely obscured by the 
lens of human experience, interest and utility; an approach which constitutes at a performative 
level, a partial repudiation of the environment in favour of Socratic withdrawal into the city and its 
habitual digital-capitalist way of life – notwithstanding how such a way of life is clearly 
unsustainable in the long term.  
 
Aristotelian-inspired Faith in Telos in Before the Flood 
In Chapter Three, Aristotelian-inspired faith in telos was discussed in relation to its contemporary 
incarnation as an evangelical belief in the ends of the free-market economy. And within the context 
of Before the Flood such a view is reflected in the attitudes of those who espouse an overarching 
belief that neoliberalism is commensurate with positive environmental change, because of how 
conditions of competition are perceived as fostering innovation that will stem the use of dirty, 
resource-intensive modes of production. Yet, as discussed in Chapter Three, these mechanisms are 
unlikely to yield any significant results, as within the neoliberal-digital context, the environment is 
still viewed as little more than a resource to be plundered in the unrelenting pursuit of profit.  
 That is, in Before the Flood –  as in The 11th Hour – we see experts like Gregory Mankiw, 
a professor of Economics at Harvard University, placing heavy emphasis on solutions such as 
economic sanctions in the form of carbon tax for the worst polluting offenders, which he refers to 
“a silver bullet for climate change” (DiCaprio in Stevens 2016). Mankiw explains that 
 
the basic idea is that we want to tax bad activities that have negative side effects on 
other people in society. So we’d raise the price of cigarettes by putting a tax on 
cigarettes, people are going to consume fewer cigarettes. Climate change involves a 
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variety of negative side effects and costs. A carbon tax forces people to take account 
of those costs. I think trying to appeal to people’s social responsibility is really very, 
very hard, because people have complicated lives and they have lots of things to 
worry about; they don't want to have to think about climate change every time they 
do every decision. They can't. And every time you turn on your car, are you supposed 
to think, ‘Uh oh, what am I doing to the climate?’ What the carbon tax does is it 
nudges them in the direction of doing the right thing … One of the important things 
to keep in mind is that if you have a carbon tax, you can turn around and cut other 
taxes in response. For example, payroll taxes. This is a tax shift rather than a tax 
increase. (Mankiw in Stevens 2016) 
 
Mankiw’s explanation is revelatory of two underlying dynamics which lead to the problematization 
of such policies, particularly when the measures involved are adopted as a key solution to the 
environmental crisis, rather than as a small, strategic component of much larger, and more holistic 
programmatic reform.   Firstly, such an approach may be problematized on the basis that it takes 
for granted a neoliberal framework, which has widely been acknowledged as the major source of 
environmentally harmful discourses and practices. In this regard, while a taxation structure which 
punishes polluters and incentivizes green policy may be viewed as broadly effective in a material 
sense, it fails to interrogate the ideological underpinnings of the neoliberal framework, leading Parr 
to label such measures as little more than “mere theatrics … [in] the Trojan horse of neoliberal 
restructuring” (2013: 3). Secondly, Mankiw’s assertions of the futility of trying to appeal to 
people’s responsibility is indicative of the coalescence of the Aristotelian faith in the free-market 
with elements of the Socratic withdrawal from nature discussed above, which collectively eschews 
the idea of people acknowledging their actions against, as well as their own connectedness to, the 
environment. Such a statement thus attests to the ascendency of capital accumulation over 
reverence for nature, and indeed life, as any imperative to act toward nature in a non-invasive (more 
Hippocratic or Orphic) manner is articulated as both disruptive, and ultimately superfluous, given 
the macro strategy of carbon tax. Proponents of such market-based solutions accordingly advance 
an approach of “enlightened self-interest” (Washington 2015: 127; Ayres & Simonis 1994: n.p), in 
terms of which any Hippocratic or Orphic gesture toward environmental sustainability is 
outweighed by the benefits of simply continuing with business as usual, under the auspices of an 
environmentally benign macro-economic strategy.  
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 Such discursive tendencies may account for the contemporary rise in movements centered 
within the neoliberal space, such as eco-modernization and corporate environmentalism. Such 
movements aim to effect change to industrial operations through a combination of “environmental 
regulations and market forces” that involve “incentives for ‘self-regulation’ in order to spur 
technological change, cleaner production and less environmental degradation” (Knutsen & Ou 
2015: 68). Similar suggestions are commonplace over the course of Before the Flood, not only 
from Mankiw, as mentioned above, but also from Elon Musk and DiCaprio, as well as a host of 
others. However, a key issue with such economic interventions is that they allow for the reduction 
of acts which profoundly compromise complex, life-giving ecosystems, to a mere financial trade-
off, which entails implicitly ascribing a monetary value to these natural systems and thereby 
reaffirming free-market views of the environment as a marketable resource. Relatedly, such 
approaches, unlike the approaches of environmental movements such as deep ecology, 
ecofeminism and social ecology, discussed in Chapter Three, do not necessitate an ideological 
overhaul of society, but instead simply allow for the continuation of ‘business as usual’. Indeed, 
Welford explains that corporate interests tend to push the “eco-modernist agenda” because “it is an 
agenda which is not inconsistent with … more traditional priorities [,] which means that radical 
change within the industrial organization or within society is not required” (1997: 17). Rather, 
through such means, businesses merely enact shallow ‘greening’ measures by simply, for example, 
installing solar panels or incrementally reducing emissions, as opposed to reviewing assumptions 
about the precedence of the want-economy and the needless but environmentally devastating 
consumption that it engenders – a review process which could have disastrous effects on their 
collective economic bottom line.  
 Yet it is not just corporate interests that resist such changes, it is also ordinary citizens who 
are reluctant to decrease their rate of consumption and adopt simpler, less resource-intensive ways 
of life; something which DiCaprio states in his interview with Sunita Narain of the Centre for 
Science and Environment in Delhi, when he advances that such exercise of personal restraint “is 
probably not going to happen” across the board (Stevens 2016). Here he asserts, completely 
bypassing any critical dialogue surrounding consumption and lifestyle choice, that “hopefully 
renewables like solar and wind will become cheaper and cheaper and cheaper the more money we 
funnel into them, the more we invest into them, and ultimately it will solve that problem” (DiCaprio 
in Stevens 2016). In short, he reflects the view that any environmental issues arising from sustained 
economic development and neoliberal expansion can be overcome with the simple application of 
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capital. Articulations of this sort, of course, overlap with promethean and Socratic perspectives, 
insofar as they are underpinned by notions of human supremacy and exceptionalism, as well as 
oriented around the ability of technological innovation – undertaken within the context of free-
market capitalist competition – to ameliorate the effects of climate change. In short, they express 
the belief that given the appropriate political and technological interventions, any environmental 
problem can be overcome through insightful capitalist investment. This attitude, involving as it 
does the coalescence of the promethean and Socratic approaches with Aristotelian-inspired faith in 
the free-market is drawn into greater conspicuity as the film closes with the following message:  
 
 This film’s carbon footprint was offset by paying a voluntary carbon tax. The funds 
will support efforts to protect critical rainforests. Discover your climate impact and 
how you can offset it by visiting carbotax.org. Learn more and take action at 
Beforetheflood.com. (Stevens 2016). 
 
In this, one easily discerns an attempt to reconcile the obvious contradictions between “the 
importance of communication tools,” such as environmental film, “for the ecological movement,”60 
and “the environmental impact of these tools even when they are operating as a facilitator for 
promoting ecological consciousness” (Özdemirci 2016: 1). Importantly, though, the above attempt 
at reconciliation is not an isolated gesture, but rather an idea which prevails throughout both Before 
the Flood and The 11th Hour, as it does throughout much of corporate environmentalist discourses. 
Moreover, in the abovementioned afterword to Before the Flood, the intertwining of Promethean 
and Socratic approaches with Aristotelian-inspired faith in neoliberal capitalism can also be 
identified, through the appeals to both the economic and technological/digital approaches featured 
and the need for related political action. Such an inclusion in the last instance of the film is 
significant, as it speaks to the level of importance with which such approaches are endowed in 
Before the Flood. Indeed, serving as the final sentiment, the above afterword may be seen as a 
decisive iteration of DiCaprio’s outlook, the conclusion to which his journey has ultimately led 
him, and to which there can be no retort from otherwise adversarial voices urging a more balanced, 
                                                          
60 Admittedly, the film industry is not as environmentally harmful as notorious offenders like the fossil fuel and mining 
industries, chemical manufacturing and commercial agriculture. However, Castley asserts that, nevertheless, “globally, 
the motion picture industry contributes directly to greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) through travel and other fuel 
consumption associated with productions;” in addition to this, there are also related local direct environmental impacts 
during filming, which can often “disturb wildlife and habitats, through sound and light pollution, trampling vegetation, 
constructing sets and increasing waste generation” (Castley 2015: n.p).  
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less invasive approach. Also of interest here, is the deepening engagement with the discourses of 
the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, which can be charted from The 11th Hour to Before 
the Flood. That is, where The 11th Hour alluded only to digital engagement and online activism in 
its final words, urging viewers to “JOIN THE MOVEMENT [at] 11THHOURACTION.COM” 
(Conners and Conners Petersen 2007), a decade later in Before the Flood we see a much more 
concerted push, not only toward digitized forms of activism, but also toward solutions rooted in 
the neoliberal framework – unequivocal faith in which emerges as having concretized into dogma. 
 
Hippocratic Balance in Before the Flood  
As discussed, alternative, non-invasive, balance-seeking approaches to the environment, entailing 
ideas that fall beyond the scope of the scientific, digitized, urbanized, neoliberal want-economy, 
have been largely marginalized both within society and within the mass media products addressed 
to it. In Before the Flood, the most obvious sign of such marginalization occurs through the 
prioritization of interviewees who have backgrounds in science, politics, and economics, over other 
sources, like environmental activists, which effectively allows the agenda to be set firmly within 
the parameters of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus. And this effective exclusion of 
environmental activists and other alternative voices serves to reinforce messages that advocate 
solutions which focalize shallow approaches to the environmental crisis, based around 
technological innovation, punitive taxation, and/or digital slacktivism. These solutions, while also 
advanced within The 11th Hour, were at least interspersed in that film among some alternative 
Hippocratic perspectives that looked to a deeper engagement with nature, and which reiterated our 
embeddedness within natural lifesystems with which we need to strike a balance. In contrast, such 
messages of unity and balance are all but absent from Before the Flood, with environmental 
messages oriented mostly around ideas of custodianship and escalating human intervention in 
nature, in order to stem environmental degradation by means of science, technology and politico-
economic measures. Measures that, accordingly, underscore narratives of the supremacy of 
rationality, and thereby both legitimize regimes of human dominance over nature, and negate the 
ideological interrogation necessary for substantive changes in behavior toward the environment.  
 Indeed, early in the film, DiCaprio even seems to criticize such a personal view of 
environmental activism, here he remarks that while before “everyone was focused on small, 
individual actions,” today “[w]e all have to … bring environmentalism to the American 
consciousness;” but in this regard, he argues that where before “it boiled down to simple solutions 
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like changing your light bulb ... it’s pretty clear that we’re way beyond that point now” (Stevens 
2016). In this, he effectively disparages as hollow, fatuous, and anachronistic, individual gestures 
toward environmental action that challenge the established ways of consumer life. Yet, his ensuing 
suggestions regarding economic sanctions and the development of green technology, which are 
also called for by others in this film, although collective rather than individual, remain similarly 
complicit in the maintenance of consumer lifestyles. In fact, a critique against this capitalist 
approach to climate change is levelled only once within the entire film, by Sunita Narain of the 
Centre for Science and Environment in Delhi, who presents DiCaprio with alarming statistics on 
American consumerism and resources usage, which amounts to 1.5 times more than the average 
French household, and a staggering 61 times more than the household average in Nigeria (Narain 
in Stevens 2016). Narain also questions the culture of consumerism worldwide, but particularly in 
the US, asserting that because American “consumption is going to really put a hole in the planet 
… we need to put the question of lifestyle and consumption at the center of climate negotiations” 
(Stevens 2016). In many respects, her statements echo Hippocratic sentiments which reiterate both 
the deep connections between humanity and nature, and the understanding that an imbalance in 
this relationship could lead to suffering (Wallace & Gagh 2010: 787). That is, here the Hippocratic 
call for balance is articulated as a need to balance our actions with the external realties of climate 
change. Such a call also resonates the orientation of with influential environmental movements, 
such as deep ecology, social ecology and ecofeminism, which all seek to strike a balance between 
human activity and nature to ensure mutual flourishing, rather than unsustainable relations of 
human dominance and environmental subordination and exploitation. However, while initially 
DiCaprio seems to agree with the statements of Narain, he subsequently posits the possibility that 
technological innovations – such as utilizing solar and wind power – will allow for the 
uninterrupted continuation of current patterns of consumption.  
 Beyond this, and as seen in The 11th Hour, the notion of balance is co-opted in Before the 
Flood through assertions concerning the value of conscious consumerism that leads to ‘balanced’ 
consumerism. As discussed, the most striking manifestation of this in The 11th Hour occurs through 
the statements of Betsy Taylor, the founder of the Centre for the New American Dream, who 
unequivocally states – as though making a case for Hippocratic balance – that “it is not that 
consumption is bad, it’s that it’s gotten totally out of balance” (Conners and Conners Petersen 
2007). Yet such sentiments are also reflected by DiCaprio in Before the Flood, as he urges viewers 
to become more aware of the products they purchase and consume, and suggests that they avoid 
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beef products and those products containing palm oil, as these are among the most environmentally 
harmful to produce. While such measures would indisputably aid in a holistic programme of 
reforms, ironically, they still remain bound up within the realm of the small, individual actions – 
such as eating chicken rather than beef, or changing a lightbulb – which were initially disparaged 
by DiCaprio himself. Thus, such assertions by DiCaprio also evince the co-optation of the 
Hippocratic approach into the Aristotelian-inspired faith in the free-market economy. In terms of 
this, in consuming consciously, the consumer “takes into account the public consequences of his 
private consumption or attempts … to use his purchasing power to bring about social change … 
[T]he environmentally conscious consumer is [thus] convinced that he/she can actually change the 
status quo of continued environmental deterioration” through their purchasing choices (Kautish 
2019: n.p). Yet DiCaprio’s and others’ recourse to tropes of balance notwithstanding, these 
recommended actions will arguably fall short of materializing any real change in relation to 
environmental degradation, because much like the solutions of those advocating carbon tax, the 
response of balanced consumerism remains uncritically grounded in the neoliberal marketplace. 
Accordingly, it fails to address the problematic ideological underpinnings of this context, in 
particular the belief in the right of humans to plunder the environment for consumer gratification, 
expediency or profit. In contrast, previous critical voices in the landscape of environmental 
activism, like the balance-seeking approaches of deep ecology, advanced an ecosophy which 
combined a philosophical grounding in substance monism,61 with practices which accordingly 
entailed respect for nature as something of equal importance to human life. Yet the consumer 
balance showcased within this film and its predecessor, does little to either thematize such 
ecosophical balance or challenge existing notions of, and relations between, humanity and the 
environment, because it instead promotes incremental environmental changes by urging viewers to 
pay attention to what they consume, rather than critically evaluating the necessity of consumer 
practices as a whole. In this way, and as seen in consumer patterns established in relation to Socratic 
withdrawal and digital activism in particular, such an interpretation of balance effectively excises 
the environment from environmentalism. This is because, in the act of ‘balancing consumerism,’ 
                                                          
61 Spinoza’s substance monism, in contrast to the dualistic worldviews of thinkers such as Descartes, entails the idea 
that all matter – humans, animals and nature – are varying “modes of a single substance;” in other words, they “arise 
out of and so are, united with the whole of nature, the single substance … that constitutes all modes of existence” (Fox 
1995: 146-147). Such an outlook holds great critical value for environmentalists, particularly those who seek to 
problematize the manner in which human exceptionalism has allowed for the wanton exploitation and abuse of nature. 
Arne Naess, in his formulation of deep ecology “draws explicitly on Spinoza’s” conception of substance monism, 
arguing that such understandings have the potential “to alter our understanding of desire and our construction of a 
sense of responsibility with respect to nature” (Dahlbeck 2018: n.p).  
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environmentalism becomes constituted as a series of small, individual battles waged in the aisles 
of supermarkets, which correlatively negate any meaningful engagement with nature, or the 
prevailing ideologies which have dictated our interactions with it, thus tipping the balance in the 
direction of global ecological catastrophe.   
 
Orphism in Before the Flood 
In much the same way as there is a demonstrable annexing of the alternative Hippocratic 
perspective concerning the need for balance by the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus in 
Before the Flood, so too, Orphism undergoes considerable co-optation in its articulation from The 
11th Hour to Before the Flood. As discussed in the previous chapter, of the five approaches 
identified in The 11th Hour, Orphism is the least represented, due in large part to its irreconcilability 
with the prevailing Promethean status quo. Brief glimpses of Orphism can, of course, be identified 
in the film through, for example, Gardels’ invocation of myth and the quasi-religious fatalism of 
Assubel and Lyons. However, such marginalization and co-optation of Orphism by the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus within The 11th Hour, does not simply continue, but also 
intensifies in Before the Flood, where there are only two references to artistic readings of nature, 
both of which are deeply problematic reflections of Orphism.  
 On the one hand, the opening scenes of the film, where Bosch’s The Garden of Earthly 
Delights is discussed leads viewers to anticipate that given the prominent position granted to this 
artwork, the Orphic approach to nature will be explored through the film as an alternative to the 
pervasive influence of Promethean scientism in the contemporary era. However, this is not the 
case, because the Orphic approach within Before the Flood is advanced as an alternative only 
insofar as it can be corroborated by scientific findings. Here, Bosch’s triptych is read as a linear 
progression from a utopian state of human harmony with nature, through a period of 
“overpopulation, debauchery and excess,” into the final panel, involving a nightmarish rendering 
of “a paradise that has been degraded and destroyed” (DiCaprio in Stevens 2016).  In this reading 
of the painting as an oversimplified metaphor for humanity’s destruction of the environment – a 
concept which for Bosch, painting in the 16th century, would have been unimaginable – DiCaprio 
silences the complexity and polyvocality of the work by imposing a univocal account of its 
contents; an account which in this context is lent a degree of legitimacy by scientific findings.  
 On the other hand, this dynamic intensifies toward the end of the film, in DiCaprio’s 
interview with Peter Sellers of NASA. Here Sellers’ compilation of data sourced from numerous 
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satellite observatories, into a tool for climate simulation is thematized, along with how it is 
effectively a technicolor map of the earth, comprising representations of cloud formations, sea 
surface temperature, and carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, among other things (Sellers in Stevens 
2016). Shot dramatically, with DiCaprio and Sellers silhouetted against the vivid rolling waves of 
various climate phenomena as they unfurl across the earth’s surface in blue, red, green and yellow, 
DiCaprio declares “it’s like a great piece of art” (Stevens 2016). And while the visual 
representations of the ebb and flow of temperatures, gulf streams, and precipitation are indeed 
mesmeric, the classification of such a tool as art in an Orphic sense, is deeply problematic. In the 
case of traditional Orphic techniques – which predate the modern scientific method by centuries – 
attempts were made to fathom nature in a manner which is contingent upon the nuances of song, 
myth, and art; methods which do not attempt to forcefully unveil nature or try to bend it to the will 
of humanity, but rather seek to draw close to nature by mimicking its generative processes. It 
should, of course be acknowledged that in the digitized contemporary era, certain artists have 
drawn on the potentialities of new audiovisual technologies – such as film and audio recordings, 
as discussed in Chapter Three – as novel means of drawing close to nature in an Orphic sense. 
However, that is not a generalized phenomenon because the incorporation of mediums so strongly 
associated with the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus necessitates close critical 
consideration, before they can be advanced as Orphic. In the case of Sellers’ rendering of the earth, 
while he – like Rivers and Messiaen, discussed in Chapter Three – makes use of modern 
technological devices and capabilities, a key distinction must be made between his work and theirs. 
This is because, unlike Rivers and Messiaen, Sellers does not critically appropriate the technologies 
of Prometheanism in order to draw close to nature, but rather adopts these methods as a means of 
enacting a regime of intensive observation of nature, in order to render nature ever more open to 
human surveillance, in what amounts to a forcible unveiling of nature’s secrets. His work thus 
entails Promethean technology, science and ideology eclipsing any recourse to a non-invasive 
understanding of nature compatible with the Orphic perspective.  
 In The 11th Hour, representations of this kind occurred fairly frequently, and were 
accordingly problematized, particularly in relation to their post-production treatment which – 
beyond the initial act of surveillance – constituted a series of further attempts to impose a system 
of human order upon natural landscapes. But in Before the Flood, representations of this sort are 
even fewer and more far between, while still being problematic for similar reasons. And while it 
may be argued that the mechanisms of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, such as digital 
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technology and neoliberal distribution networks, have made the production and global 
dissemination of such environmentally-oriented products possible, they also constitute part of the 
wider co-optation of alternative Orphic voices by the hegemony of the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, which accordingly informs contemporary popular 
perceptions of nature.  
 
Conclusion 
While marginalized in comparison to the other approaches of the extended Hadotian framework in 
The 11th Hour, at least manifestations of Orphism were featured in the film, albeit in the form of 
efforts to understand climate change phenomena through recourse to myth. However, in Before the 
Flood, this marginalization intensifies to such an extent that Orphism no longer exists 
independently, but rather only as a functionary of Prometheanism, which is used moreover as an 
innovative visual aid to introduce scientific findings, and to shock and awe audiences where graphs 
fall short. And as in the case of DiCaprio’s proclamations regarding Sellers’ map, as a form of art, 
the degree to which the Orphic approach in Before the Flood has been co-opted by the Promethean 
technologies of control society, namely surveillance, digital technology and science, can scarcely 
be missed. Such limited contemporary representations of Orphism may, however, be seen as 
representative of a general trend involving the increasing assault of the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus and its associated approaches, upon the alternative 
approaches to nature of both Orphism and, as discussed earlier, the Hippocratic pursuit of balance.  
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Conclusion  
Adamson, in her article “What Winning Looks Like: Critical Environmental Justice Studies and 
the Future of a Movement,” maintains that The 11th Hour is beneficial for how it indicates the 
scale of the environmental crisis, and that we are responding very late to its manifestation. Fildes, 
in his turn, in “Disaster of Titanic Proportions: The 11th Hour,” on the one hand concurs with 
Adamson by suggesting that The 11th Hour is valuable for how it allows environmental experts to 
take center stage in a world otherwise dominated by corporate voices. But on the other hand, he 
also criticizes the film for how it nevertheless focusses on DiCaprio as a celebrity. Similarly, 
Boykoff and Goodman in their “Conspicuous Redemption? Reflections on the Promises and Perils 
of the ‘Celebritization’ of Climate Change,” place great emphasis on how The 11th Hour as an 
environmental film is problematic precisely because of DiCaprio’s celebrity presence, which 
renders the film less about the environment and more about marketing the product that is DiCaprio. 
This issue is also underscored by Weik von Mossner in her “The Human Face of Global Warming: 
Varieties of Eco-Cosmopolitanism in Climate Change Documentaries,” where she expresses 
concern over how The 11th Hour rides on DiCaprio’s celebrity appeal, such that it comprises just 
another part of mainstream commodity culture, its environmental aspects notwithstanding. And 
while Shanthini, as already discussed, points to the even deeper problem of how The 11th Hour 
does not thematize the environmentally-polluting aspects of renewable energy development and 
production, which it hails uncritically as the panacea for all environmental ills, Doyle, Farrell and 
Goodman in their “Celebrities and Climate Change” thematize on how Before the Flood entails 
significant recourse to emotional manipulation of audiences on the part of DiCapri – to the point 
where insights, such as those of Shanthini do not emerge. From the above it is clear that both The 
11th Hour and Before the Flood have catalyzed much critical debate over what environmental 
documentaries need in order to remain environmentally-focussed, what they need to avoid in order 
to guard against accusations of naivety, and in what ways they can end up being more manipulative 
of audiences rather than remedial. In contrast to the above, this dissertation asks not so much 
whether DiCaprio manipulates audiences, but rather what discourses are speaking through 
DiCaprio, on account of the historico-discursive dynamics which both preceded the film and gave 
rise to the current context of the environmental crisis. From this dissertation, what emerges is that 
throughout history, humanity’s relations with nature have been characterized by ambivalence, and 
marked by a trend of intensifying dominance over nature, leading us to the current precipice of 
ecological collapse. In this regard, when considered through the lens of the extended Hadotian 
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framework, such a trend can be accounted for in terms of the telescoping of the dominating 
Promethean impulse with Socratic withdrawal and Aristotelian-inspired faith in teleology. As 
discussed, what this has entailed over time is the progressive imbrication of the approaches of 
Socratic withdrawal and Aristotelian-inspired faith in teleology, with the Promethean endeavor to 
wrest the secrets of nature through violence, to constitute what is now called the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus. This union, it was argued, has served to consolidate 
discourses of human dominance over nature, human exceptionalism and their corresponding 
isolation from nature, and the reification of human economics over natural ecosystems. Moreover, 
it was advanced that the discursive juggernaut comprising of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian 
nexus, has also come to exert increasing influence over – when it has not marginalized or eclipsed 
– the non-invasive Hippocratic balance-seeking, and aesthetically-oriented Orphic, approaches to 
nature.  
 Such discursive patterns, particularly when they arise in relation to environmental concerns, 
tend to precipitate worrying new tendencies, such as techno-cornucopianism and the widespread 
denial of the environmental crisis. Beyond this, as discussed in relation to DiCaprio’s 
environmental films – The 11th Hour and Before the Flood – the escalation of these tendencies in 
broader society has carried over into such mainstream cinematic environmental narratives to such 
an extent, that the messages of such films are now beset by unbalanced representations of the 
environment, and untenable recourse to technology and ‘sustainable development’ as the only 
viable means to facilitate ecological restoration. Cinematic representations of this sort are also not 
only deeply problematic in an ideological sense, but also highlight the material contradictions of 
the related film genre as a whole. In particular, for ecocritic Simon Estok, such contradictions raise 
questions about the suitability of these popular environmental narrative forms in generating new 
and sustainable attitudes toward nature. This is because, such in-built imbalances and thematic and 
formal paradoxes tend to engender what Estok refers to as a culture of “specatorial complicity,” in 
which contemporary audiences are regularly bombarded with mass media messages concerning the 
environmental crisis and related issues, but take no corresponding action, despite incontrovertible 
evidence that their contemporary lifestyles and consumer practices are extensively and irrevocably 
damaging the environment (2014: 49-50). 
 Yet it would be unfair to advance such contradictions and imbalances as the exclusive 
preserve of the popular environmental documentaries discussed in Chapter Four and Chapter Five. 
Rather, such cinematic products should be understood as the consequence of a centuries-old 
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discursive lineage, which has both informed and been informed by changing scientific, socio-
political, and economic milieus. With a view to exploring this issue, such developments were 
engaged with over the preceding chapters through the framework of the extended Hadotian 
framework, in order to identify how its five different approaches to nature have interacted within 
certain changing historical contexts, in ways that have informed human relationships with nature.  
 In Chapter One, approaches to nature from Archaic Greece, through Classical Greece and 
Ancient Rome, to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, were explored. Beginning with early 
propitiations of the gods by the Greeks of the Archaic era, which they undertook to render less 
threatening the unpredictability of nature, such attempts to domesticate nature were traced in 
relation to their recharacterization of deities – from the primordial and elemental forces of the 
Titans, to the more genteel anthropomorphic Olympians, with whom devotees could engage in a 
degree of bargaining. Thereafter, and continuing into Classical Greece, the ongoing perception of 
nature as a threatening and mad force beyond the limits of the polis was explored by drawing on 
literary sources such as Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex. Yet also discussed was the emergent fields of 
mathematics and science, which signified a shift “out of the era of traditional belief into the era of 
reason” (Tarnas 2010: 23-24), after which the burgeoning of Promethean scientific sensibility in 
opposition to the erstwhile ontological security offered by the myths of Orphism, was considered. 
In turn, it was observed that many elements of Hellenistic culture carried over into Ancient Rome. 
That is, how the Ancient Romans sustained an interest in Promethean scientific enquiry, embraced 
the revival of Socratic withdrawal through the Stoics, continued the search for Hippocratic balance 
through the physician Galen, as well as maintained elements of Aristotelian-inspired faith in the 
ends of nature, were all elaborated upon. Conversely, how “the patronage of Orpheus or other 
Orphic elements” was not commonly practiced in Ancient Rome, on account of being perceived as 
“alien to Romanness” (de Jáuregui 2010: 68) and, in some cases, Roman mythology, and how 
Orphism in this context was brutally repressed – as in the case of Bacchus worship – was also 
thematized. Next, focus fell on how in the closing decades of the ancient world, new explanatory 
models were once again ushered in. That is, as discussed, where Greco-Roman traditions faltered, 
Christianity surged forth introducing new ways of perceiving nature, which also involved 
eschewing Hellenistic/Roman medico-scientific discourses, in favor of Christian mythico-religious 
models, that, in many respects, reverted to pejorative tropes of nature found in earlier epics and 
tragedies, such as The Odyssey and Oedipus Rex. Such discursive tendencies, evident in biblical 
texts, along with philosophical contributions by Christian scholars such as Augustine and Aquinas, 
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it was argued, all contributed to the solidification of spiritual/physical or soul/body dualisms, which 
were elaborated on later by Descartes. Accordingly, against this backdrop, how the five approaches 
to nature of the extended Hadotian framework were all subject to inflection, with some rising to 
dominance and others being impugned, was considered. Then, it was advanced that just as the 
scientific discovery of nature in Classical Greece was responded to by further Socratic withdrawal 
from nature, so too, in the Renaissance, the progressive erosion of Aristotelian-inspired faith in 
divine Christian teleology saw the increasing tendency to withdraw into the city, and around the 
burgeoning humanist impulse reflected in the idea of “man as the measure of all things” (Copson 
2015: 6). Moreover, how the waning of Christian dogmatism which had characterized the Middle 
Ages, also gave rise in the Renaissance to new modes of aesthetic expression that allowed for a 
resurgence of Orphism, and with this intriguing explorations of nature, madness, and human nature, 
was considered. This was undertaken with particular reference to Leonardo da Vinci as a figure in 
whose work there occurred an interesting coalescence of the various approaches of the extended 
Hadotian framework.  
 In Chapter Two, the birth of disciplinary society after the Enlightenment, as identified by 
Foucault, was considered in terms of its features of growing secularism, urbanization and 
industrialism, and how these entailed a reconfiguration of the five approaches to nature of the 
extended Hadotian framework. In this regard, it was advanced that the approach of Prometheanism 
steadily gained ground through the climate of scientific fervor which characterized the 
Enlightenment. And such dominance, it was suggested, manifested through the massive leaps in 
science and technology in the disciplinary era, particularly through the advent of the steam engine 
as a means of harnessing nature’s power to the ends of human convenience and acquisition. In turn, 
how methods of widespread disciplinary regimentation of space and time, along with panoptical 
surveillance, were for the first time rolled out to ensure the maximization of social control, resource 
extraction and productivity in the context of capitalist industrialism, was elaborated on. In addition, 
how this entailed a variant of Socratic withdrawal around the concept of the disciplinary individual, 
whose ethical orientation – measured against normative benchmarks – became the subject of much 
examination and documentation, was discussed. Thereafter, how within this context Aristotelian-
inspired faith in teleology was similarly imbued with the logic of discipline through being 
reinterpreted under the auspices of evolutive historicity, as the pursuit of ever greater societal 
efficiency – as though the salvation of society hung in the balance – was thematized. In this regard, 
it was argued that such banding together of the Promethean, Socratic and Aristotelian approaches 
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to nature, under the banners of progress, individualism, and efficiency, constituted for the first time 
in history a discursive nexus with the power to marginalize alternative, non-invasive approaches 
to nature. Focus then shifted to the margins of this nexus, and it was advanced that Hippocratic 
approaches to nature arose in the form of Freudian balance-seeking psychoanalytic models, which 
deviated in their gentility from invasive scientific enquiry, and in the form of early environmental 
consciousness, such as that espoused by scholars like Robert Smith. Thereafter in relation to 
Orphism, artistic and spiritual movements involving ideas of the world soul and the challenging of 
binary conceptions of humanity/nature, were identified in the respective works of Goethe and 
Schelling. Importantly, though, despite their relative marginalization, this persistence of 
Hippocratic balance and Orphic aesthetic endeavors as challenges to the increasingly concretized 
dominance of the Promethean, Socratic and Aristotelian-inspired approaches to nature, were 
construed as key voices of resistance in the context of increasing disciplinary societal control, and 
the environmental exploitation that was concomitant with it.  
 In Chapter Three, the waning of disciplinary society and the gradual instantiation of control 
society, was explored. As discussed, after the mid-twentieth century, Deleuze – and indeed 
Foucault – remarked upon the widespread social shifts which heralded a new epoch, namely that 
of societies of control. As advanced, these reconfigurations of the social order generally entail a 
concomitant shift in human relations to nature, which may be understood through the lens of the 
extended Hadotian framework in relation to the increasing power of the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus. In this regard, it was argued that this historical period, 
characterized by new digital technological capabilities, digitized (in)dividuals, and the dominance 
of global, free-market capitalism, entails an intensification of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian 
nexus established under the auspices of discipline. Moreover, it was advanced that in this context 
humanity has become progressively more detached and alienated from nature, through becoming 
increasingly enmeshed in digitized networks and consumer economies. Indeed, it was even 
advanced that the dividuals of control society are for the most part no longer able to imagine 
themselves as embedded in nature, with the consequence that nature tends to be viewed today as 
little more than a resource to be plundered, or a threat to be mastered. However, such practices and 
the attitudes which legitimate them, have directly caused and indirectly contributed, to massive 
environmental damage, to the point of precipitating the contemporary environmental crisis, and 
details and statistics in this regard were considered at this juncture. Yet, what was also discussed, 
was how this context has given rise to a widespread ecological consciousness, which was first 
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articulated through the environmental activism that emerged around the 1960s. Such activism, it 
was suggested, resonated with Hippocratic attempts to strike a healthy balance with nature, through 
seeking not dominance over the environment, but rather equilibrium between humans’ and nature’s 
needs. And these perspectives were explored in relation to the environmental movements of deep 
ecology, ecofeminism and social ecology. Orphism, too, in the wake of the appropriation of 
digitization and globalized neoliberal distribution networks by certain artists, was considered in 
terms of its potentialities for the expression and dissemination of alternative perspectives on the 
link between humans and nature; perspectives which are arguably valuably catalytic of difference 
in the era of societies of control.  
 In Chapter Four, the reflection – and at times, the intensification – of such dynamics was 
explored in relation to DiCaprio’s environmental film The 11th Hour (2007). Here, representations 
in The 11th Hour of the five approaches to nature encompassed within the extended Hadotian 
framework, as established in the preceding three chapters, were analyzed. This was done in order 
to gauge whether or not the film presents an ideologically coherent message that advances a holistic 
approach to ameliorating the worst excesses of the environmental crisis. Accordingly, through an 
exploration of the frequency, framing, and pacing of representations of the respective approaches 
in the film, it was concluded that The 11th Hour did not effectively challenge the dominance of the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, but rather in many ways perpetuated ideas of human 
exceptionalism. This occurs, in particular, through its advancement of an “unqualified vision of 
limitless material progress, [and] an infinitely munificent, cornucopian technology” (Martins 1998: 
157). That is, as discussed, its solutions to climate change – involving emphasis on solar and wind 
energy – and its endorsement of the application of biomimicry in architecture, industry and design, 
all serve to further co-opt nature for the utility of humanity, and to obtain from nature – in violent 
Baconian fashion – its secrets for the purposes of human flourishing, all under the banner of 
‘sustainable development.’ In short, while the film featured many prominent environmentalists, 
who along with DiCaprio espoused an ostensibly balance-seeking perspective, through the framing 
of such segments their collective orientation nevertheless remained consistently Promethean. Thus, 
while appeals to Hippocratic balance did seem to occur throughout the film, they comprised only 
a veneer of environmental credibility, beneath which the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus 
reigned supreme; particularly in its articulation of a balanced approach to consumerism, as 
something Hippocratic in orientation, despite how this stands at odds with any meaningful 
environmental reform. Moreover, it was noted that Orphism was all but completely marginalized 
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in The 11th Hour, with only one reference to such an alternative view of nature, considered briefly 
from the perspective of myth. Such predilection for approaches associated with the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, it was argued, are indicative of an approach to the 
environment which is extremely anthropocentric in orientation. And it was advanced that this 
approach seeks not to protect the environment for its own inherent value, but rather to safeguard 
human security, comfort, and profit, through shallow, ameliorative measures that do not holistically 
address the environmental crisis, but that seek instead to stem its consequences for humanity, by 
mastering them through scientific and technological means.  
 In Chapter Five, Before the Flood was similarly analyzed in terms of its weighting of 
representations of the five approaches of the extended Hadotian framework. And in this regard, a 
parity was identified between this film and The 11th Hour in terms of the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, as well as a worrying amplification of its influence 
resulting in further marginalization or co-optation of the alternative voices of Hippocratic balance 
and Orphism. That is, Before the Flood similarly emphasizes technological solutions, political 
action, and economic sanctions as answers to the environmental crisis, indicating a sustained 
articulation of environmentalism through the paradigm of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian 
nexus. But in addition, a shift away from interactions – both discursive and physical – with nature 
was also identified, signifying an intensification of anthropocentric tendencies. This development, 
it was argued, is particularly alarming in that it signifies an articulation of environmentalism that 
is increasingly devoid of concern for, or involvement with, the environment, contrary to the 
Hippocratic and Orphic approaches outlined in Chapter Three. This is because, in Before the Flood, 
there is a heightened negation of Hippocratic voices, which occurs primarily through the selection 
of sources, as well as through how the film maintains the narrative of ‘balanced consumption’ 
espoused earlier in The 11th Hour. Similarly, in Before the Flood, the Orphic approach – far from 
being subject to the same degree of marginalization evident in 11th Hour – became imbued with 
Promethean logic, to the extent that its transgressive potential was all but completely undermined. 
Firstly, this was observed in relation to DiCaprio’s appraisal of Bosch’s The Garden of Earthly 
Delights, when the insights derived therefrom were deemed only worthy of consideration insofar 
as they could be corroborated by scientific findings. Secondly, this was seen in DiCaprio’s 
categorization of Peter Sellers’ weather map as “a great piece of art” (Stevens 2016), which was 
deemed to be extremely problematic because of how the Promethean technologies of surveillance 
involved in its creation remain irreconcilable with an Orphic approach to nature. Accordingly, it 
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was argued that the consequence of such representation in the film is that alternatives to the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus are systematically marginalized, and thereby stripped of 
their legitimacy as viable alternatives to the dominating and aggressive practices which 
characterize contemporary relations with the environment.  
 However, as also discussed, this is indissociable from several weighty contradictions which 
lie at the heart of cinematic productions like DiCaprio’s The 11th Hour and Before the Flood. 
Firstly, concerns have been raised over the mass media’s well-established capacity to set agendas, 
along with its embeddedness in the digitized, neoliberal landscape, both of which need to be 
critically considered in relation to their impact on the production and dissemination of 
environmental messages for popular consumption. This is because, while the films superficially 
communicate notions of treating nature with respect by diminishing our impact upon it, they 
simultaneously appropriate mechanisms which are responsible for much of contemporary 
environmental damage. In short, far from critically utilizing digital technologies and neoliberal 
distribution networks to spread messages that challenge audiences to think differently about the 
environment – in a manner akin to filmmakers such as Perrin and Cluzaud – DiCaprio and his 
fellow producers utilize these technologies and networks to reaffirm messages of human 
exceptionalism and our right to consume. 
 Secondly, and in relation to the prejudices outlined above, the solutions advanced by 
DiCaprio – despite his statements to the contrary in Before the Flood – remain generally isolated, 
small, and thus easily-achievable individual actions, such as voting for a different supposedly pro-
environmental political candidate, exchanging beef for chicken in one’s diet, and/or refraining from 
purchasing products that use palm oil, along with part-time recourse to renewable energy and 
outfitting one’s home with sustainable low-energy gadgetry. In this, it is evident that DiCaprio 
urges changes that are oriented around consumer choices in a taken-for-granted capitalist 
environment, rather than urging a critical appraisal of the impact – and indeed necessity – of 
consumerism, and humanity’s skewed relations to the environment that have arisen from it. And 
because of this, DiCaprio’s message amounts to an attempt at “remedying the dislocatory effects 
of climate change for hegemonic structures without changing them” (Hammond 2018: n.p). Of 
course, such approaches do tend to be heavily favored in such films, on account of how they 
intimate that contemporary lifestyles can be sustained; something which renders their narratives 
palatable to audiences for whom discourses of consumerism and human exceptionalism have been 
normatized. However, such intimations remain questionable because of how they promote a 
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techno-cornucopian view of the environmental crisis, and thereby correlatively relay an unrealistic 
image of the type of collective action needed to bring about the requisite change to effect a 
downturn in climate change and its associated phenomena.  
 Finally, in both films, DiCaprio’s predilection for perspectives aligned with the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, and his eschewal at the same time of Hippocratic and 
Orphic voices – which have not been co-opted into this nexus – is palpable. Accordingly, through 
the lens of the extended Hadotian framework, both films read as extremely thematically 
unbalanced, tipped in favour as they are of the prevailing techno-scientific and digitally-withdrawn 
neoliberal status quo. And because of this, the discussions reflected therein relating to the 
environment are largely framed in terms of human concerns, whereby the key objective is not 
maintaining environmental stability for its own sake, but rather for its ability to sustain human 
needs and consumer desires. Such an approach speaks strongly to the anthropocentric principles of 
the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus, which the film effectively enshrines through its 
advancement of solutions that are technologically-, politically-, or economically-driven. Rooted as 
they are in the neoliberal marketplace, these outlooks remain fundamentally anchored to the 
ideologies which lie at the heart of the current environmental crisis, insofar as they reiterate 
dualistic and techno-optimistic ideas, that serve to concretize patterns of human domination of 
nature, predicated on the perceived legitimacy of environmental subordination. As Hammond 
poignantly conjectures, such approaches do not constitute viable attempts to “address and resolve 
the problems of unsustainability, but should rather be seen as a societal strategy to sustain the 
unsustainable” (2018: n.p).  
 To be sure, while a shift to sustainable energy and food sources, environmentally-conscious 
political action, and progressive taxation strategies – as suggested by DiCaprio and others – are 
constituents of possible environmental activism, they are by no means the silver bullet for climate 
change, which in the films they are suggested to be. Indeed, Thiele dismisses solutions like those 
advanced by DiCaprio as ephemeral “technological quick fixes,” which amount to the equivalent 
of “fighting obesity with corsets and a diet of doughnuts,” because through such solutions we only 
“gain the illusion of control temporarily, but the long-term prognosis is grim” (2016: 424). Instead, 
measures such as those advanced by DiCaprio and the various contributors in The 11th Hour and 
Before the Flood should be critically engaged with as a means of supplementing broader watershed 
ideological change. That is because the environmental crisis necessitates a systemic overhaul 
through which existing ontological conditions that determine relations between humanity and 
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nature are interrogated, and notions of human exceptionalism and our recourse to the wanton 
destruction of the environment for related ends, challenged. In this regard, it is helpful to look to 
Arne Naess’ “distinction between shallow and deep approaches to ecological ethics.” In terms of 
this distinction, those approaches “motivated by ‘shallow’ ecological concerns” and operative 
“within the traditional anthropocentric framework whereby the environment [has] value because 
of its contribution to human wellbeing,” were always bound to be inadequate (Oakley 2004: 379). 
Thus, environmental action should be carried out on the basis of philosophical contemplation that 
recognizes the inherent and inestimable value of nature qua nature, as well as human embeddedness 
in such a system. This is because, only from such acknowledgements can respect for the 
environment naturally flow.  
 Yet, it is precisely this degree of philosophical reflection that The 11th Hour, and to a larger 
extent Before the Flood, lack. Indeed, Mangun and Henning contend that “without a broader 
general ideological base,” the adoption of superficial remedial policies, such as those advanced in 
both films, will only result in “a collection of fragmented, short-term, and often conflicting 
policies,” which cannot possibly meet the enormous scope of the environmental reform required 
to stem the current degree of ecological decline (1999: 20). What is needed, then, is a holistic 
approach, one which combines ideological reform and remedial measures, to encompass and 
formulate new ways of relating to nature as a result of new ways of conceiving of nature. 
Admittedly, the scope of Hadot’s analysis does not extend beyond Britain and continental Europe. 
But such research nevertheless provides a very useful framework for engaging critically with both 
historical and contemporary human attitudes towards nature, in a process which moreover remains 
open to alternative attitudes – resonant with Orphism – from beyond the ambit of the West. In this 
regard, Hadot’s model, on account of its advocacy of the value of Orphic attitudes to nature, finds 
parity in an array of diverse practices and approaches to nature, stemming from Eastern and African 
cultural groupings. In terms of this, Taoism, alongside the notions of ‘interbeing’ associated with 
Buddhism, as well as those trance rituals and aesthetic traditions of the Khoisan that express a 
profound sense of “environmental connectedness” (Funke et al 2008: 325), are all cases in point.  
 Furthermore, the legitimacy of reading the philosophy of Hadot in such a manner is 
supported by a number of his other works, Philosophy as a Way of Life (1995) and The Inner 
Citadel (1998) being chief among them. This is because, in these works, Hadot emphasizes the 
need, on the part of the philosopher, to go “beyond discourse in order to take upon himself the risk 
of the radical transformation of himself,” through the adoption of practices of philosophy that 
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render it a way of life, and which are opposed to the notion of philosophy as the mere production 
of discourse within the ivory tower of academia (Hadot 1995: 31-32). Arguably, this understanding 
of philosophy is vital today, where people need both to formulate new and less exploitative 
frameworks for understanding nature – in which ecologically-damaging dualistic tendencies of 
thought are problematized – and to adopt corresponding behaviors and practices that counter the 
Cartesian splitting of humanity from nature. The extent of the damage wrought by such dualistic 
thinking, which in many ways continues to legitimate the unsustainable plundering of the earth’s 
resources under the auspices of neoliberalism, has been brought to the fore by, among other 
scholars, Naomi Klein. In This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs The Climate (2014) she paints 
a poignant picture of the dire need for widespread environmental action. Indeed she argues for 
mobilization against the menacing bulwark of global capitalist structures and discourses, with 
which the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus neatly corresponds. Accordingly, the insights 
derived from the non-invasive, ecocentric worldviews and practices of Orphism – and the 
Hippocratic pursuit of balance with nature – may well prove valuable in this important struggle. 
 In this regard, a dismantling of the ideologies associated with the 
Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus should be construed as a crucial step to counter the 
invasive and exploitative practices which have, for centuries, characterized human relations with 
nature. Correlatively, the (re-)integration of Hippocratic and Orphic approaches to nature may well 
provide a more useful framework through which to negotiate more equitable and non-invasive 
means of understanding, and thus relating to, the environment. In relation to the Hippocratic 
approach, resonances in contemporary balance-seeking environmental movements can be 
identified, and through these we may find new modes of relating to nature – modes which strive to 
quell exploitation and, in its place, to establish greater equilibrium between earth’s lifesystems and 
human behavior. Conceivably, what this will involve, in particular, is the breaking of cycles of 
hyper-consumption, and the engendering in their place of lifestyles which are materially simple, 
and which reflect respect for, and an understanding of our embeddedness within nature. 
Additionally, philosophically-speaking, embracing the related elements of Spinoza’s substance 
monism – which is reflected in several of the abovementioned environmental movements – may 
function strategically to destabilize the hegemony of Cartesian dualism, which has hitherto justified 
a plurality of abuses of nature, both physically and discursively. Similarly, the Orphic sensibility – 
Hadot’s initial counterpoint to Prometheanism – may likewise lend corrective insight through its 
aesthetic practices, which stand to foster creative new responses to environmental concerns. In 
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particular, such responses, which seek to understand nature through mimicking its generative 
processes in art, music and verse, may hold the key to the formulation of a framework for relating 
to nature in a non-invasive manner, and in a way that moreover breaks with the erstwhile patterns 
of mastery and ruthless conquest, which have served only to entrench patterns of human dominance 
and exploitation of the environment. Ultimately, it is hoped that, through recognizing and 
representing the catalytic and transformative potential of these marginalized, alternative 
approaches to nature, new forms of resistance may be engendered to contest the discursive edifice 
of the Promethean/Socratic/Aristotelian nexus. Through this, a way forward hopefully can be 
negotiated; one predicated neither upon the domination of nature, nor upon the withdrawal from 
nature, nor upon the subordination of nature to economic interests, but instead upon a deep and 
abiding respect for the inherent value of nature, as our only home within a vast cosmos.  
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